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|FOREWORD
The papers presented in this volume are the outgrowth of the first national
conference on the subject of nuclear propulsion for rockets, ramjets, and space
vehicles. The Nuclear Propulsion Conference itself was held at Monterey,
California, at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, and was jointly sponsored by
the American Rocket Society, the Institute of Aerospace Sciences, and the
American Nuclear Society; the three largest and most vigorous technical societies
concerned with nuclear propulsion.
D
This volume follows the typical organization of the Conference, though the
order of subjects is different here than at Monterey. Included here are many of
the good papers submitted, but which were not presented at the Conference because
of time limitations. Those presented are grouped first in each section. There
is no Index to the volume.
At the beginning of planning, late in 1960, the organizing committee felt
that a serious lack of exchange of information was already confusing work in
nuclear propulsion and would soon significantly hamper such work. Yet, because
of%he nature of the work itself, it was obvious that any technical forum supplied
by the societies would fall in its goal of exchange of useful information unless
the meeting aimed for discussion of work in classified areas. Thus, of necessity
and by design, the meeting was organized on an entirely classified basis. It
could not have been held at all without the support of the Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office of the USAEC/NASA, headed by Mr. Harry B. Finger. His office undertook
iv
Qthe security clearance responsibility for the meeting, and enthusiastically
supported the meeting in every other way possible. This Proceedings has been
published under the auspices of the _j and was compiled by Mr. William Hanna
of that office.
We hope that the Conference served its major purpose; to acquaint the
legitimately interested technical community with the real state-of-the-art in
existing nuclear propulsion programs. It was noted that most of the papers came
from the USAEC National Laboratories, while most of the attendees came from the
nuclear and aerospace industries of the country. This is rightly so and emphasizes
the premise which initially suggested the meeting: That nuclear propulsion is
passing through a vigorous transition state from National Laboratory scale to
industrial sized development. Surely, unless such a transition continues, and it
is well along in the NERVA and RI_T programs, nuclear propulsion will not be able
to fill its proper role in the era of space flight before us.
Altogether, about 215 papers were submitted. The majority of these were
classified and required security documentation as well as the careful record-keeping
employed to keep track of all papers. Pertinent papers were sent to each Session
Chairman, who alone had the responsibility for assembling his session. We owe a
debt of gratitude to these gentlemen. The major accounting and distribution Job
of paper handling was done by Mildred Foglesong of the Los Alamos Scientific
V
Laboratory. Without her constant attention, careful work, and accurate records .
the Conference organization could not have functioned. Millie, we thank you.
And last, but of utmost importance were the pre-Conference activities of
Prof. Frank E. Faulkner of the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, and the continual
efforts of the ARS Meetings Management Staff, particularly Mr. Rod Hohl, in setting
up housing, registration, and other necessary arrangements.
tO,
Robert W. Bussard
Program Chairman
Nuclear Propulsion Conference
For the Organizing Committee:
Robert F. Trapp (ANS)
Douglas Aircraft Company
Clare Stanford (IAS)
Nuclear Division, Martin-Marietta Co.
Frank E. Rom (ARS)
Lewis Research Center, NASA o
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• [o]Harold B, Finger*
This country has committed itself to the most difficult and dramatic
technological undertaking ever attempted by man. I refer to the commitment
that has been made by the President, by the Congress in supporting the
President's recommendations, and by the people of the United States that we
intend to explore space and apply our scientific findings and the technologi-
cal developments for the benefit of all mankind. There is no question that
the benefits that will result from this program will make all of mankind the
winner.
As a result of the commitments made, scientific information, techno-
logical developments, and consumer application of certain space systems have
been proceeding at an amazingly fast pace. Launch sites, Government labora-
tories, fabrication/assembly plants and tracking stations are being built;
large launch vehicles are under development; manned spacecraft with all of
the essential life support and guidance equipment are being developed, tens
of thousands of people and thousands of industrial, Governmental, university,
and non-profit institutions are involved in the over-all program. The program
to land men on the moon will cost in the neighborhood of 20 billion dollars
with another 15 billion over the next several years.
Obviously, such a major national co_nitment will go into a continuing
program beyond the presently committed effort aimed at early space objectives.
The achievement of even those early objectives is paced by the need to develop
new system hardware which in mar_ areas goes beyond available technology. In
looking ahead at the missions and objectives we see beyond our early objectives,
we are determined that we -.,st be prepared with the technology needed to per-
form any desired mission in space. We never again intend to be caught in the
position where there are missions we want to do, but for which the technology is
unavailable. It is our anticipation of even more difficult space missions than
those that have already been defined and programmed that makes the nuclear pro-
pulsion part of our program an essential portion of our over-all space effort.
This importance was confirmed by the President over a year ago when he included
the Rover Program as one of four areas requiring increased emphasis in our
space effort. I am personally convinced that the major national effort now
being devoted to space achievements will go on to the establishment of manned
space laboratories, exploration bases on the moon and manned missions to the
near planets. The use of nuclear energy will be required in the vehicles
designed for accomplishment of these advanced missions. Our program antici-
pates such use, but it also recognizes that nuclear rocket systems developed
for advanced missions could be used with the large chemical rockets now being
developed to substantially improve the payload and energy increment capabilities
of these rockets.
This discussion is limited to the nuclear rocket program; however, it is
important to recognize that other nuclear systems required for advanced space
missions must be pursued actively to establish the technology in these other
areas, to evaluate the feasibility of these other systems, and to objectively
assess them on a technical basis in comparison with the nuclear rocket system.
k
*Director, Nuclear Systems, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion Office
(AEC-NASA), U. S. Atomic Energy Commission (Washington, D. C.)
There is no need for saleama_ship in system selection for particular missions.
Rather, there is a need for objective evaluation of technology and mission
requirements to select systems which can perform, with greatest assurance,
particular missions in a given time.
Nuclear Rocket Characteristics and Performance Potential
In the nuclear rocket system, liquid hydrogen is heated to high tempera-
ture in a nuclear reactor after having been pumped into the reactor from a
large liquid hydrogen propellant tank. The specific impulses these systems can
achieve, using solid core reactors, are in the range of 800 to lO00 seconds, two
to three times the specific impulses of chemical combustion rocket systems. The
development of the nuclear rocket involves major problems in reactor core
development. These will be discussed below. In addition, other significant
problems are development of liquid hydrogen cooled nuclear rocket nozzles and
control system analysis and development. Hydrogen turbopump systems of large
capacity will eventually be required for the nuclear rocket and, while not con-
trolled by feasibility or lack of basic data, are a major development area.
The nuclear rocket system performance potential is indicated in the next
two figures. Figure l, familiar to many, indicates the vehicle requirements to
perform a manned, Mars landing mission. Calculations indicate a nuclear rocket
propelled spacecraft, weighing approximately a million pounds, assembled in an
earth orbit, can accomplish this mission with a 400-day total trip time. The
nuclear spacecraft would remain in _4_rs orbit until needed for return to earth
orbit while manned landing on Mars and return to the orbiting spacecraft would
use chemically propelled systems. A spacecraft weighing lO million pounds
would be required to accomplish this mission using chemically propelled systems.
The performance advantages for such missions, we feel, Justify our major effort
in the nuclear rocket program. Accomplishment of the first such mission using
nuclear rockets would pay for the development effort and the vehicle costs re-
quired to perform the mission. However, nuclear rockets developed for such
advanced missions could be used with large chemical rockets, now being developed,
to substantially improve the payload capability in near earth missions. This is
indicated in Figure 2 which shows performance of a nuclear propelled third stage
on the advanced Saturn C-5 vehicle. The Saturn C-5 vehicle, 33 feet in diameter,
uses five F-1 kerosene-oxygen engines to produce a 7,500,000 lb. total first
stage thrust. The hydrogen-oxygen second stage uses five J-2 200,000 lb. thrust
engines. The payload presented can be placed into a lunar orbit, using these
first two advanced Saturn stages and the nuclear third stage. The payload
plotted as a function of the nuclear stage thrust ranges from something over
100,O00 lb. to 130,000 lb. established in a lunar orbit. An all-chemical
advanced Saturn, using four stages, could deliver approximately 55,000 lb. to
65,000 lb. into this same lunar orbit. Incorporation of the nuclear third
stage substantially increases the payload capability of the advanced Saturn
vehicle.
The lunar orbit payload is shown because lunar orbit rendezvous has been
selected as the technique to accomplish the manned, lunar landing. A single
advanced Saturn would be used during the initial landing mission to place the
Earth return vehicle and lunar landing bug in an orbit around the Moon. The
bug would land on the Moon and the men would then return to the orbiting return
vehicle, rendezvous with that vehicle, and return to Earth. Approximately
doubling the lunar orbit payload through the use of nuclear systems indicates
the potential of a direct flight mission using a vehicle such as the one shown
here. We anticipate that after the initial Moon landings, nuclear stages will
be used to perform lunar operation missions. The lunar orbit payload is also
of interest because of the potential advantages of a nuclear system as a
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reusable ferry betweenearth andlunar orbit. Thenuclear vehicle, initially
established in an earth orbit wouldtransport passengers,equipmentand supplies
to a lunar orbit. Transfer from lunar orbit to Moon's surface would be accom-
plished by another vehicle. Return payloads would be taken back to earth orbit
by the nuclear vehicle. The system would then be refueled in the earth orbit
and reused.
This is obviously an advanced mission in that frequent nuclear stage reuse
and restart are required. Even the first lunar orbit mission indicated requires
nuclear stage reuse. At least two re-firlngs are required in the postulated
mission trajectory. The system is first restarted in the earth parking orbit
to _chieve the lunar intercept trajectory and the second re-firing is needed to
establish the system in a lunar orbit. Almost every mission we postulate re-
quires restart of the nuclear stage. Restart is, therefore, an important reactor
development program requirement.
The first nuclear engine, NERVA, will operate at a thrust at the low end
of the curve of Figure 2 corresponding to about lO0,OO0 lb. lunar orbit payload.
It is conceivable that we will go to somewhat higher powers, as development pro-
ceeds, if the increased payload Justifies such power increases. We anticipate
that there will be major useful NERVA engine applications in missions related to
lunar operations.
These two figures have indicated performance potential we foresee in nuclear
systems. I have not indicated a need for extremely high power stages, although
such a need, we are convinced, does exist. High power lO,O00 to 20,000 megawatt
stages producing 500,000 lb. to 1,000,000 lb. thrust would be required for second
stage applications with the NOVA type large chemical booster vehicles.
AEC - NASA Nuclear Rocket Pro6ram
As you know, the development of nuclear rocket propulsion is being con-
ducted Jointly by NASA and AEC through the Space Nuclear Propulsion Office (SNPO).
The SNPO, organized in August, 1960, is responsible form anaging all aspects of
the propulsion effort. This effort constitutes a large program, larger than ar_y-
one would have hoped for, or expected only two years ago. But this is a logical
program with restrictions to assure satisfactory components before proceeding
with complicated systems. In addition, this is not a program to develop a single
article, but rather to develop a whole technology that will permit real explo-
ration and exploitation of space.
The major elements of the AEC-NASA nuclear rocket program are as follows.
The KIWI reactor testing will define a basic reactor configuration which will be
applied in the NERVA engine and engineered for flight applications in the NERVA
engine development. The NERVA engine, in turn, will be flight tested in the
RIFT stage which is intended to evaluate the flight operating problems of nuclear
rockets. The RIFT stage will be designed to consider eventual application in
useful space missions. In additlon, we have ouradvanced technology programand
the major facilities required to perform all aspects of this effort. These are
the essential ingredients of the joint nuclear rocket program.
I would like to review each of these major areas to show how the program
fits together, the status of each major program element and our plans for over-
all system and technology development.
3
Reactor Development
There is no question that the major problem area is in the reactor. The
KIWI reactor project, conducted by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, includes
design, fabrication, and test of reactors to define a basic rocket reactor core
configuration. The major reactor development problems, we anticipate, are high
temperature fuel element materials, uniform radial core temperature, core structure
support, fast startup with combined power and flow control, and last but not
least, restart capability with the companion problem of controlled shutdown to
maintain core integrity. Since these items are self explanatory, I will proceed
to describe the reactor program being conducted to solve these problems.
The KIWI project began in 1955. The first three reactors tested in this
program were the _-A reactors in Figure 3. The tests, started in 1959, were
conducted after extensive laboratory design analysis, materials investigations,
neutronic investigations, as well as fabrication development work. The three
K1-WI-A reactor tests confirmed the design of these reactors, provided materials
information and some controls information. These were strictly research devices
not applicable to a flight system and for this reason the active core volume was
minimized. A central heavy-water island was incorporated in the system, and
water was used to cool critical non-nuclear components of the system, such as
the converging nozzle.
The KIWI-A reactor characteristics are compared in the table below with
the KIWI-B reactor characteristics.
KIWI REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS
KIWI - A KIWI - B
Power i00 _ I,000 MW
Pressure Vessel O.D. 73 IN. B 51 IN.
Power Density 4.25 _/FT 34-_ _b'ill_3
Reflector Graphite Beryllium
Coolant-Propellant H Gas H2Li_uid
Hydrogen Flow Rate 7 L._/_SEC. 70 LB/SEC.
Exit Gas Temperature 3460_F 3600UF
Control System Center-Island Rotating
Axial Rod Reflector
Segment
The KIWI-B design is intended to evolve into the flight type system
required for the _S_RVA engine. The KEWI-B will have a tenfold increase in
power level over the KIWI-A, while reducing the outer core diameter. The core
power density is increased approximately eight fold and the pressure vessel O.D.
is reduced to 51 inches. Much of this size reduction results from replacing the
thick graphite reflector with beryllium. F_ydrogen flow is increased and hope-
fully core exit temperature as well. In addition, the central-island axial-rod
control system was changed to the reflector control.
The EIWI-BIA, first of the KIWI-B series, was tested in December 1961 and
a photograph is shown in Figure 4. The reactor has a cleaner configuration than
the KINI-A. Since liquid hydrogen _s not yet available in the test cell, the
reactor power level was limited to approximately 300 megawatts due to the lower
heat removal capability of the gaseous hydrogen cooled nozzle. The December
test was terminated after 30 seconds of the planned five minutes run because of
a hydrogen leak in the pressure vessel-nozzle flange seal. The data obtained
were encouraging, having indicated satisfactory fuel element operation and
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suitability of the reflector control system. Thefirst liquid hydrogentests
with the _-B reactor werecompletedin July with a uranium-238loaded reactor,
referred to as the cold flow reactor. In these devices, the systemstartup
relies uponthe nozzle-reflector-core heat capacity to vaporize the liquid
hydrogenpropellant prior to entering the core. Therefore the first ten seconds
of reactor startup canbe investigated using a non-critical reactor system. The
purposeof the July tests were therefore to evaluate this initial startup period,
to determine the control systemrequiring hot operation startup and to checkout
the facility. Both test operations provided the _ata required for the first hot
reactor operation with liquid hydrogen.
TheKIWI-BIBwasusedfor the first hot reactor run with liquid hydrogen.
During the Septemberl, 1962, test, reactor powerexceeded900megawattsand exit
gas temperaturewasincreased at a rate of 70°R/sec. At approximately700 mega-
watts, the core suffered damageand fuel elementmoduleswereejected from the
nozzle at intervals. The reactor powercontinued to increase until fuel loss
forced the level downas the control drumlimits hadbeen reached.
Early in the start cycle, hydrogenpressure fluctuations were observedat
the pump outlet, however these fluctuations had ceased about ten seconds before
damage was noted. We believe these pressure variations resulted from an unchilled
bypass line at the pump outlet; however, pressure data indicated that the fluc-
tuations were well attenuated at the core inlet.
The results of the test indicate reactor startup with liquid hydrogen is
feasible and reactor power is stabilized by core hydrogen flow. The core dam-
age in the test confirmed our prior judgment not to select the KIWI-B1 design
as a candidate for NERVA application.
As indicated above, one of the major reactor problems is development of a
suitable core structural support. The fuel element work has been most promising,
but the method of retaining these elements within the core has not been selected
or proven by test. Several different reactor designs have therefore been de-
fined, aimed primarily at determining a satisfactory core support for the
reactor and one which may then be developed for core support in the NERVA flight
system.
Graphite is an extremely good high temperature material. It is not as
strong at low temperature as at high temperature and, in addition, it is stronger
in compression than in tension. The basic difference among our varying designs,
therefore, results from the fact that although the first design has the fuel
modules and structure intension, it is our intent in later designs to put the
structure, as _ch as possible, under compressive load.
The KIWI-B reactors that have been run to date utilized the KIWI-B1 core
design shown in Figure 5. This figure shows the reflector section with rotating
control drums, the outer pressure shell, the core, and the core support plate.
Core configuration detail is shown in the lower right sketch. It is an unfueled
graphite module containing fueled cylindrical fuel elements_ each of which has
seven holes. A similar fuel module configuration was used in two of the KIWI-A
tests; however, the fuel elements in those tests were four hole fuel elements.
The modules are nested to form the reactor core and each is supported from the
top support plate by a hollow threaded bolt through which hydrogen may pass into
the central fuel element. The pressure drop resulting from the flow of hydrogen
through the fuel elements imposes a tensile stress in the module and in the
KIWI-A tests. Certain of these modules cracked and in one test three were dis-
charged through the nozzle. Although we have attempted to alleviate the problem
by keying the modules together at the core discharge end, the basic reason for
module failure has not been uncovered in laboratory tests. Primarily for this
reason, weare not dependingon the KINI-BI design. HoweVer,retest of the
KIWI-B1wasplannedbecausethe hardwarewasavailable andwebelieve that liquid
hydrogenstartup information obtained from this design is applicable to startup
of the other designs.
Thenext three reactors to be discussed, EIWI-B2,KIWI-B4and KIWI-B6,are
designedto place mostof the core graphite componentsunder compressiveload.
TheEIWI-B2reactor shownin Figure 6 uses a modular core structure similar to
the KIWI-B1. However, rather than depending upon the cold end support shown for
the KIWI-B1, a solid graphite block is used at the discharge of the reactor to
support the _eled modules. The fUel elements themselves pass through holes
bored in the graphite support block. Design problems include maintaining the
geometric stability of the graphite block and limiting thermal stresses at the
block edges to acceptable values. This is, however, one of the designs that we
plan to test early next year.
At the present time, the KIWI-B_ design, shown in Figure 7, is the prime
candidate for adaptation to N_qVA requirements. It involves a compressive graphite
system and a different fUel element configuration. The KIWI-B_ has a homogeneous,
fully loaded core rather than the heterogeneous system of the B1 and the B2. Six
hexagonal fuel elements are clustered about an unloaded graphite rod as shown at
the top right of the figure. These are held together by a cluster retaining
plate and suspended from the top support plate of the reactor by a bolt which
passes through the fuel element cluster to graphite support blocks at the bottom
of the core. The pressure load from the flow through the reactor puts a tensile
load on this steel support rod, but the fuel element cluster is in compression,
bearing against bottom support blocks. Hydrogen cools the central support rod
and a pyrolytic graphite tube, surrounding the rod, insulates it from the fuel
elements. The greater fueled graphite volume in this core design gives us, we
believe, higher power potential than that required for NERVA. Part of this po-
tential may be used to attain higher NERVA system temperatures than indicated
earlier, since i_zpulse has a greater effect than power level on performance in
most of our missions. The final reactor design, now being prepared, is the
EIWgI-B6 reactor and is shown in Figure 8. Comparatively new to the program, the
design is made feasible by the development of pyrolytic graphite components which
provide good insulating properties. A hydrogen cooled fabricated support plate
will be used in this design to support the reactor core. Hydrogen from the nozzle
coolant tubes will cool the plate and will then flow to reflector inlet channels.
One KINI-B6 design problem is the transition of core flow passages into the
limited number of pass-throughs in the hydrogen cooled bottom support plate.
For this reason, 19 fuel elements are included in the fuel cluster. This design
has not progressed much further than the conceptual design phase and is the
responsibility of Los Alamos. However, it will be worked on Jointly by Los
Alamos, AeroJet and Westinghouse.
project accomplishments include:
a. satisfactory fuel element developed,
b. uniform reactor core radial tem_perature demonstrated,
c. combined power and flow control using gaseous hydrogen
demonstrated,
d. startup data obtained with liquid h_irogen in hot reactor test,
e. high heat flux nozzle proof tested,
f. hydrogen turbopump for Test Cell A acceptance tested and
operated on cold flow reactor test, and
g. three KIWI-B core structural support designs completed and
reactors fabricated.
Webelieve that wehavegonea long waytoward developing a satisfactory fuel
element. Wehave not yet operatedat the powersor the durations that we intend,
nor havewe restarted the systemat desired power and temperature. However_ all
laboratory tests indicate the fuel element should operate satisfactorily for a
limited number of restarts at KIWI and NERVA design temperature and power density.
Core temperature distribution has proven to be remarkably uniform_ an important
requirement for these high temperature systems. We have obtained, as I indicated,
startup data with liquid hydrogen during both cold flow and hot reactor opera-
tions. The KIWX-B nozzle has been proof tested with a hydrogen-oxygen combustion
chamber and has operated satisfactorily during the KIWI-BIB test. It is extremely
important to recognize that much has been accomplished in the KIWI project. Many
problems _ere encountered; many have been solved_ others still exist to be solved,
but we are confident that these too will be solved. Several designs are being
worked on and out of these at least one will have sufficient design margin to
provide a satisfactory reactor for the KIWI - NERVA system.
NERVA Project
Even after accomplishing the objectives of the KIWI program to define a
basic reactor core configuration to be used in the NERVA engine, considerable
engineering work will be required to provide a reactor suitable for the flight
loads that will be experienced during flight operation of the NERVA engine.
Although it had been our intent to demonstrate the suitability of a reactor de-
sign_ delays that have been encountered in obtaining necessary reactor data have
led to a different approach. We have tentatively selected KIWI-B4 as the most
promising reactor for application in NERVA. We have instructed our contractors,
Aerojet and Westinghouse, to proceed with design and fabrication of NERVA re-
actors_ based on this B4 design, suitable for meeting the flight loads to be
experienced in NERVA. In addition, our contractors are proceeding with design
evaluation of KIWI-B6 for possible application in NERVA. We have greater over-
lapping and anticipation of results than we had planned in order to keep the pro-
gram moving on as rapid a pace as is practicable. This does involve greater risk
of funding and manpower use and from that point of view involves a greater gamble
than we had originally proposed. The engineering development will have to be
conducted by Westinghouse as the principal Aerojet subaontractor. This engineer-
ing development is due to the higher loads to be experienced by the NERVA engine
reactor as compared to KIWI reactors design loads.
Some of the modifications required to meet these load specifications are
shown in Figure 9 which is a drawing of the NRX-A, the designation for the NERVA
version of the KIWI-B4 reactor. Lateral support _ust be provided to the reactor
because side loads will be imposed during the handling and launch phase of the
flight operation prior to reactor startup. The lateral support system is shown
as a series of 3x3 pyrolytic graphite blocks which are spring loaded against the
core to retain it as a fairly rigid package. Lateral support design is compli-
cated by deflections on the fuel element clusters due to the side loads. These
deflections cause shifting of one fuel element cluster against the next and ex-
cessive friction between these clusters would cause binding and prevent freedom
of expansion, leading to possible fracture.
A shield contained within the pressure shell will be required in the flight
system to attenuate radiation energy leak-'.ngfrom the core by an order of magni-
tude to reduce propellant heating in the tank. This shield will be evaluated
first during the KIWI-B5 reactor tests. KIWI-B5 is a KIW -B_ reactor with a
shield.
Extensive system design and analysis and component research and development
for the NERVA engine system will be in process during the KIWI-B and NRX reactor
testing. Basedon workdoneto date, estimated performancecharacteristics of
this engine are presentedbelow.
Estimated Nuclear En6ine Performance Characteristics
(Hot Bleed Cycle)
Thrust LBS
Pressure, Chamber PSIA
(Nozzle Inlet)
Nozzle Expansion Ratio
Specific Impulse, Stea_y State SEC
Flow Rate, Propellant LB/SEC
Temperature, Core Exit Gas OF
Weight, Engine Dry LBS
40:1
78O
7O
3,630
13,750
You will note that the engine weight is high, but the high specific impulse com-
pared to chemical combustion systems more than compensates for the comparatively
high engine weight in the lunar and planetary missions which we intend for the
nuclear rocket.
A full scele mockup of the NERVA engine is shown in Figure i0. Here you
see the reactor, reactor control drums actuators, liquid hydrogen cooled nozzle,
the thrust structure, and the large spheres which accumnlate high pressure gas
during operating cycles to provide pneumatic gas for actuator power during engine
restart operations. The over-all engine stands approximately 25 to 28 feet tall.
The tank shutoff valve and the gimbal bearing are located in the inlet duct with-
in the upper thrust structure. The turbopump system is located in the duct region
downstream from the glmbal. The gas used to drive the turbine is exhausted
through the roll control nozzles.
Although we have authorized our industrial contractors to proceed with
NRX-A reactor fabrication, a basic guide llne in the program still requires that
successful reactor operation with liquid hydrogen be achieved prior to the
initiation of the major non-nuclear hardware procurement and development on both
the engine and the RIFT vehicle. Nevertheless, through analysis and tests, very
important fabrication and operating data have been obtained on the NERVA nozzle,
methods for bleeding gas for turbine drive fluid, engine control, turbopump
operation, and development of temperature, pressure and flow sensors for the
control system. Work will be continued on non-nuclear component areas con-
sidered to be major problems in the nuclear rocket system. It is intended that
sufficient component and radiation effects information be available before assem-
bly of the first engine to give the greatest possible assurance that the first
engine will operate satisfactorily and that the difficulties encountered will
result from those component matching and integration problems which cannot be
satisfactorily evaluated with prior tests and analyses. The difficulties of con-
ducting nuclear rocket engine system tests require that careful experiments amg
analyses be conducted prior to such tests to insure the greatest probability of
success. A trial and error process in this area will not provide a developed
engine in the time that we have allocated for the program.
RIFT Project
We have already initiated efforts required to develop the RIH stage
which will be used to flight test the NERVA engine. Lockheed has been selected
for that contract work. The principal objective of the RI_ Project is to flight
test the NERVA engine and obtain information on the operation of a nuclear rocket
system in the space flight environment. In addition, it is intended that these
RIFT tests provide data necessary for the development of an operational stage.
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They, therefore, constitute the first flights in the development of an opera-
tional vehicle. For that reason, the RI_ stage has been designed, primarily,
for the flight test objective in mind, but it is geometrically configured with
consideration of optimum escape payload when used as a third stage on the
advanced Saturn vehicle. The RYI_ project does involve certain unique problems
in cryogenic systems, radiation effects, nuclear hazards, weight distribution
and start, restart and cool down operations.
Although chemical combustion systems also use cryogenic fluids, the nuclear
rocket does involve new cryogenic problems. For example, the RI_ stage will
involve the design, fabrication and operation of the largest liquid hydrogen
propellant tank planned on a_y of our vehicles. Nuclear rocket operation is
complicated by the radiation effects imposed on the components of this system.
i_he_e hy_ic actuators have worked effectively in all other chemical systems,
electropneumatic systems will be required in the nuclear rocket, and most of the
electronic gear, cable, and other components for the system will have to be
evaluated under radiation environment conditions. In addition, the nuclear hazards
of operating the _ project and the effect of follow-on operational use on the
RII_ program safety design will be considered. The weight distribution is differ-
ent, largely because of the massive weight of the nuclear engine. The startup,
restart, shutdown and cool down of this system provides unique control require-
ments on the vehicle and also unique trajectory and guidance requirements.
A drawing of the RI_T stage is shown in Figure ii. The stage will stand
approximately 86 feet tall. The nose cone that will be included in the flight
test system will add an additional 5_ feet to this height. The diameter of the
stage is 33 feet, which is the same as the diameter of the first two stages of
the advanced Saturn. The total stage weight is 200,000 pounds, with a hydrogen
p_pellant capacity of 156,000 pounds. The configuration of the entire RIFT
vehicle is shown in Figure 12. The total height of the vehicle will be 364 feet.
The first stage will be the S-1C stage, which I discussed above, and which has
a take-off thrust of 7-1/2 million pounds. A water filled du_m_ stage will be
used in place of the S-2 stage in order to provide reasonable acceleration to
the RIl_ stage.
It is now planned that four flights will be conducted with the RIFT stage.
The first flight will be a cold flow test and will involve operation of the engine
in the manner similar to that conducted for the KIWI test this past July. The
first flight will, therefore, evaluate the initial startup of the nuclear system,
but it will be conducted with the reactor fueled with uranium 238 so that there
are no criticality or safety operating problems associated with that first flight.
Such a flight is also required in order to checkout the dynamics of the entire
booster vehicle system and the telemetry system.
The second flight trajectory, with one nuclear thrust period, is depicted
in the next two figures. Figure 13 shows the trajectory plot in relation to
surrounding laud masses. The take off will, of course, be in Canaveral. The
first stage after cutoff will impact in the ocean approximately 450 nautical
miles from Canaveral sad impact of the RIFT stage will occur approximately 2,400
nautical miles downstream in the Atlantic Ocean. The altitude and range co-
ordinates of the second flight trajectory are shown in Figure l_. The first
stage, S-1C booster, will cutoff at approximately 60 nautical miles and will
impact, as I indicated above, shout 450nautical miles from the launch point.
The second, or nuclear stage, will be brought up to full power after this cutoff
and will operate for approximately 12 to 1300 seconds, cutting off at 1500 miles
range with impact at the 2400 miles range. The total flight time will be 2000
seconds.
I have indicated here our plans for the second flight involving a single
operating period. Consideration is now being given to multiple operating periods
for the third and fourth flight. I should point out that these multiple
operating period flights havenot yet beendefinitely established_ especially
in view of the fact that the reactor operation with restart has not yet been
evaluated. Thedata obtained during the reactor operation will significantly
affect the kind of flight modeweestablish for this system.
It is important to recognize that wehavelimited the RIFTproject to
these first four flights and fully expect that beyondthis time wewill con-
tinue with the flight testing of the vehicle. At that time, however_weexpect
that the programwill no longer be the Reactor-In-Flight-Test program_but will
becomethe programaimedat the developmentof an operational vehicle.
I haveJust described the AEC-NASANuclearRocketProgramandwhereweare
in 1962. Theprogrambeganin a Laboratory sevenyears ago. Now_with our major
contractors selected, wehavelarge scale industrial participation. Wehave a
total programconsisting of reactor, engine#and stage developmentefforts to
demonstratethe practicability of nuclear flight. Wealso have advancedresearch
andtechnology efforts to provide techniquesneededto perform useful missions
with nuclear rockets. Wehaveprogressedto full scale reactor testing at approxi-
mately designpowerlevel. Thetesting pacewill increase since our secondtest
cell is almost available, the KIWIreactor pipeline has reactors available for
testing and NERVAreactor tests are scheduledto begin within a year. Wehave
achieved several important technological milestones. Wefeel that wehave the
fuel elementrequired for the first engineprogramandwehave shownthat rocket
reactors canbe started andoperatedusing liquid hydrogencoolant without signi-
ficant control problems. Mar_ydifficult problemsremainbefore a nuclear rocket
engine is developed_but wewill be ready whenthe needarises for nuclear rockets
to propel sustained lunar exploration missions andmannedflights to the near
planets.
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CRITICALITY AND NUCLEAR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
KIWI-A SERIES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION TEST REACTORS
J. C. Hoogterp
J. D. Orndoff
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
I. Kiwi-A Reactor Objectives.
The "A" series of three Kiwi nuclear propulsion test reac-
tors for_@_periments at the Nevada Test Site contained a uranium
(93.2% U_° ) loaded graphite core, a graphite reflector and a
D20 island. Boral rods in the D20 served as control. The core
heat exchange medium was gaseous hydrogen.
The aim of the test reactor was to provide as inexpensively
as possible, a temperature and environment suitable for core
material testing, (instead of simulating a flyable reactor).
Secondary goals were to check oomputed temperature effects on
neutronics and to gain experience in reactor testing. The pur-
pose of the D20 island within the core was to reduce fuel volume
and simplify control.
In the interest of early results, _ompromise test conditions
were set at a power density of 12 Mw/ft , with maximum power at
lOOMw, and exit gas temperatures in the neighborhood of 2000°C.
II. Mockup Studies.
At the beginning of the Rover Program, in 1954, basic criti-
cal information was needed for dimensioning preliminary reactor
designs. So the earliest critical assemblies at the LASL Pajar-
ito Site constituted a survey of the dependence of critical size
on parameters such as fuel loading, core density, island size
and reflector. When approximate design conditions were esta-
blished, there followed crude simulations of vessel walls, insul-
ating layers and controls. These assemblies were set up in the
"Honeycomb" machine (Figure 1), which sacrificed geometric per-
fection for flexibility and had fuel regions made up of long
sandwiches of graphite plates and enriched-uranium foils.
As design progressed to the point that more detailed neu-
tronic information was required, measurements shifted to a "ZEPO"
mockup (Figure 2) with a precise but inflexible geometry. Here
the emphasis was on detailed fuel loading for favorable power
distribution (allowing for computed differences at operating
temperatures), and establishing a control and safety system with
suitable characteristics.
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In Zepo-A, the mockup of Kiwi-A, structures were realistic,
except that uranium foil and graphite plates first simulated all
the loaded graphite fuel (Figure 3). Later, reactor fuel plates
were substituted in portions of the assembly. Zepo-A' mocked up
the Kiwi-A',-A3 modular core design with fuel-rods appropriately
distributed in a graphite matrix (Figure 4).
The 18 different critical configurations assembled on
Honeycomb are described in Table I. The first seven o_3_hese
assemblies were slanted toward variation in carbon: U_ ratios.
The next three rather clean systems were designed as checks for
computations. Assemblies Ii, 12 and 13 gave critical data on
cores of near minimum volume. The balance of the Honeycomb assem-
blies approached the realistic reactor design.
Kiwi-A design was based on Honeycomb Assembly A-18, with
Zepo-A establishing the final fuel loadings and control proper-
ties.
In Kiwi-A, fuel loadings were adjusted radially to compen-
sate for most of the flux peaking nea_he D20 island and gra-
phite reflector. As established by U _ activation measurements
in Zepo-A and computed effects of temperature chang_35fue_-plate
loadings in this reactor ranged from 60 to 300 mg U /cm .
For Kiwi-A' and-A3, flow-channel sizes were varied radially
so that only 3 loading gradations were required for a nearly
flat radial temperature profile under operating conditions.
Table III gives fuel loadings for these reactors, and
Figure 5 shows typical application of corrections to convert a
Zepo power distribution to that expected for the hot reactor.
III. Features of The Test Reactors.
General design features of the three reactors is typified
by the schematic of Kiwi-A in Figure 6. Identical pressure
shells were water cooled. Reflectors were 14" thick graphite
annuli with ~ 5% of the volume occupied by coolant channels for
a bypass stream of hydrogen. Graphite wool served as thermal
insulation between the core and island and core and reflector.
The double-walled island container was cooled by rapidly circul-
ating D20.
The boral control and safety rods moved lengthwise within
the D_0 island. The controls consisted of six ganged rods
(shimS) and a vernier rod. Four additional safety rods were
adequate to maintain the reactor subcritical for any positioning
of the control rods. Figure 7 summarizes integral control rod
calibrations for the three reactors.
The core of the Kiwi-A', -A3 reactors (Figure 8) consisted
of 126 modules which were 45" long and supported at the cold end
of the reactor by tie rods. Each module contained 7 stacks of
fuel elements. For these reactors, the island, core and reflec-
tor liners were coated with a thermal insulating paint.
IV. Reactor Test Results.
Each test reactor was assembled at Los Alamos and operated
21
Figure 3. Zepo mockup of Kiwi-A "Whim".
/
Figure 4. Zepo donut mock-up of Kiwi-A'-A3 Module geometry.
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Figure 7. Integrated Values of Kiwi Control.
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Figure 8 Kiwi-A' -A3 Fuel and Module Design
• J •
27
28
!
8
!
0
io
ol
I-4
o
r...l
r-I
I
°H
._I
.i-I
r_
s'%
_O
I
r4.1 .r-I
v_
.I-4
4.a
•e.i 4.a
;>O
uG)
ed,_
.,4
I U
"130
r.4
O_
_O
Oe6
U-,-_
I:_ ..I
X_
"O
I-4
I--I
e_
-el
_.H
{d
®
L'_I
"_4-_
_O
_J
Oo
e_ U_ e_
_JO
"4'--1OOO O
I I
'O
eJ
i-4
U_
-_:_
O
_O
O
O
e_
O
U
_-H O'_
_O,_
0 _) _,'-_ _ _
•,._ _ bO_._ _
0.,_ r..) 0 oJ'O
.r-I
"0
0
i-I
I O
Iii
oo
I,,,,4
29
4o
O
•,'_ _ ®1
"0_ _1
•_ • O_l
O
I_r._ oooooo
IIIIII
o
_P
'O
"O
_J
O
r-4
_>
O
e_
e.-I
e_
..I
P4
at low power to confirm proper control characteristics and the
desired power distribution.
The reactor power was calibrated as follows. Just before
disassembly of the reactor, the fuel was activated by low-level
operation. Afterward, V-counts of fuel elements established the
relative fissions distribution throughout the core. Radiochem-
ical analysis of several elements placed this distribution on an
absolute scale, so that the total number of fissions in the core
was obtained and related to the response of auxiliary radiochem-
ical samples. Similar samples then could carry this power cali-
bration over to NTS instrumentation.
At NTS three sets of counters with overlapping ranges
carried the low-level power calibration to the required 100Mw
operating range. Enriched uranium fission chambers were used
from zero to about 10 watts of reactor power, compensated ion
chambers covered the intermediate range, and uncompensated io
chambers about 400 feet from the reactor registered from - 10-
watts to full power.
As an illustration, Figure 9 combines records of control rod
position, reactivity (reconstructed), and power for the Kiwi-A'
high-temperature run. Conditions at full power, i.e. power
values, hydrogen flow rate, and exit gas temperature, are sum-
marized in Table IV for the three A-type reactors.
In Table V are values of available and utilized excess re-
activities, plus a breakdown of the latter for the three power
runs.
Kiwi-A had the mishap of losfng the island closure plate
and the graphite wool around the island during the high power
run. Kiwi-A' lost segments of three modules and all the fuel
elements in these modules. Modules in Kiwi-A3 were cracked but
the reactor held together for the duration of its test.
Erosion in fuel plates of Kiwi-A was severe in the hottest
section of the reactor. This plate erosion cost ~ 4.005 in
reactivity. Niobium coating of the flow channels in the Kiwi-
A'-A3 reactors reduced fuel erosion to a negligible amount.
3O
4,
Table IV
Results of the "A" Series Tests
Kiwi-A Kiwi-A' Kiwi-A-3
Date 7/16/59 7/8/60
Duration at full power, seconds 301 346
Thermal power, average Mw 74 90.3
Thermal power_ peak Mw 77 105.
Exit gas temperature, Av °C 1543 1960
Gas flow rate, pounds/second 7.1 6.7
10119/60
259
I14
ll8
1949
8.5
Table V
Available and Utilized Reactivity for
"A" Series Test Reactors ($)
Available Control Excess Reactivity
from cold critical (Estimated)
Reactivity contributed by
Hydrogen Propellant
Total Utilized Reactivity as indi-
cated by Control withdrawal
Reactivity utilized by Reactor
Temperature Coefficient
Reactivity Utilized by Reactor
parts losses
Reactivity Utilized by Reactor
Core Corrosion
Residual Reactivity Difference
Post run cold minus Pre Run Cold
Kiwi-A Kiwi-A ' Kiwi-A3
I0.6 i0.2 8.85
0 .i 0.2 0.2
7.2 7.5 7.7
1.4 6.2 6.2
1.2 0.6
4.0 Negligible
5.7 1.00 1.3
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NEUTRONICS OF KIWI-B NUCLEAR PROPULSION REACTORS _i
H. H. Helmick and J. D. Orndoff
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
The Kiwi-B series of Rover reactors, the second phase of the
Kiwi program, is aimed at developing a reactor design suitable for
flight application. The initial design of the Kiwi-B series called
for a beryllium-reflected graphite-moderated core, rather than the
graphite reflected graphite-moderated core containing a D20 island,
as in the Kiwi-A reactors. Stages in the neutronic studies for
the design of Kiwi-B type propulsion reactors consist of: (a) pre-
liminary critical mockups in the Honeycomb assembly machine to
establish gross features; (b) refined mockup studies with Zepo
(zero power) assemblies to determine control characteristics and
suitable U loading distributions; and (c) cold critical measure-
ments on the reactor itself to confirm its characteristics,
particularly to provide improved power distribution estimates for
specification of flow-passage orifices.
The Honeycomb assembly machine, in which critical surveys
were conducted consists of a matrix of 3" square aluminum tubes
which assemble into a 6' cube. The fuel region of the mockups
was made up of .002" and .005" enriched uranium (oralloy) foils
placed between 0.28" thick graphite plates and inserted in the
3" x 3" aluminum Honeycomb tubes. Two of the fuel tubes were
movable and served as vernier control rods while safetys were
provided by four more retractible fuel tubes. Poison materials
located at the graphite-beryllium interface in the assemblies
mocked up control vanes in the proposed reactors. Figure i is a
summary of the effectiveness of various control materials in a
typical Kiwi mockup assembly. Figure 2 shows the reactivity
contribution of hydrogen distributed uniformly over the cross
section of the core as a function of distance from the unreflected
end.
Based on the data obtained from Honeycomb measurements, a
uranium-loaded graphite core 35" in diameter and 52" long was
established for the Kiwi-B series of reactors, with void fraction
and uranium loading as variables. The universal reflector system
to be used with a variety of core designs was a beryllium cylinder
of annular thickness 4-1/2" containing 12 rotatable control drums
with boral inserts. The initial design (Kiwi-B-1A) had cylindri-
cal fuel elements within unloaded graphite "modules" which fitted
together in a hexagonal-based matrix. Later designs aimed at
eliminating the support modules to give a core made up completely
of hexagonal fuel elements. Maximum uranium loadings of 0.4 gm/cc
result in non-thermal reactors with consequent low neutronic
32
temperature coefficients of reactivity.
In the second reactor mockup series, Zepo assemblies provide
close neutronic simulation of the eventual reactor. The Zepo
core, raised by a hydraulic lift into a beryllium mockup reflector
assembly (Figure 3), consisted of a graphite cylinder which con-
tained 1159 three-quarter inch diameter holes arranged in a hex
pattern identical to the Kiwi-B-1A design. Fuel was in the form
of .003" uranium-foil hole liners, and graphite rods were inserted
in the holes to provide the desired average density. The 12
rotatable Kiwi-B control rods were mocked up by boral strips (53"
long x 3.3" wide) installed in the Be reflector. An actual
reactor reflector with control cylinders was installed later
(Figure 4).
Table I gives the characteristics common to the first ten
mockups, and Table II is a summary of critical data for these
variations. Each of the mockups from ZB-6 through ZB-10 has two
values for uranium density and C to U ratio. The first value
listed applies to the 204 outermost fuel rod holes, and the second
value is for the remainder of the core. The percent "Effective
Kiwi-B void," is corrected for minor geometric differences between
Zepo and Kiwi cores. Reactivity contributions of uranium and
graphite as functions of radius are shown in Figure 5.
Fission distributions along radii directed either toward or
between control rods shown in Figure 6 indicate the effect of
controls on the local fission power. Data have been converted to
hot reactor conditions, and the value listed for a control rod,
is the amount of poison that the rod contributes to the system.
The photograph, Figure 7, shows equipment for measuring
radial fission distributions. An array of ten fission counters
is installed on the core and is remotely positioned axially so
that a complete core flux map can be made in a relatively short
time.
The effectiveness of several materials installed on the
rotatable Be control drums is shown in Table III. "Reactivity
contribution" refers to the effect of rotating a control drum
from full "out" to full "in" when 120 ° of its surface is covered
with the material specified.
Table III
Control Rod Material Effectiveness
Material
Surface
Density Thickness
(gm/cm2) (in.)
Reactivity
Contribution
(dollars)
Gd .102 .005 -0.43
Gd .204 .010 -0.47
Cd .322 .015 -0.45
Cd .665 .031 -0.46
Boral .063 (B 10) .047 -0.72
The final stage in the checkout of the Kiwi-B design was a
cold critical check of the actual B-IA reactor. The primary
33
purpose was to provide a checkout of the system prior to shipment
to the Nevada Test Site; however, a number of additional measure-
ments were made because of the high desirability of obtaining such
information at this time.
Multiplication measurements throughout the various stages of
assembling the reactor provided a safety guide for the succeeding
Nevada assembly. The first stages were building up the core
(Figure 8) and surrounding it by the graphite reflector cylinder.
Then Cd "safing" strips were attached to the exterior of the
reflector cylinder, after which the pressure shell with Be re-
flector and control rods was installed around the Cd clad core.
The completed reactor assembly is shown in Figure 9.
A delayed critical configuration for the cold, dry reactor
was obtained wfth the twelve control rods 123 ° from their full
"in" position. The differential and integral control rod worth
of a typical rod is shown in Figure 10.
Values of Rossi-a, the neutron chain decay constant, with
the reactor near critical gave a prompt neutron mean lifetime of
43 _sec.
The radial fission distribution was obtained by gamma count-
ing .006" diameter uranium wires which were distributed through
the core resulting in the normalized radial fissioning flux
distribution shown in Figure ii. Upon applying cold/hot cor-
rection factors and multiplying by the fuel element loadings, the
predicted "hot" fission density curve of Figure 12 was produced.
Power was calibrated by numerically integrating the product
of uranium weight and cold radial flux distribution over the
entire core, and normalizing to results of radiochemical analyses
of the center fuel element and several neighboring uranium
monitor wires. With the above information, radiochemical analyses
of similar wires in the reactor during a low power run in Nevada,
provided the basis for calibration of the neutronic instrumen-
tation at the test site.
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Reactivity contribution of hydrogen distributed uni-
formly over the cross section of the core.
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Figure 3. Zepo critical assembly machine
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Table I. Common characteristics of the first ten Zepo mockups
GROSS FEATURES OF ZEPO MOCKUPS OF KIWI-B-1A
Region Radii (in) Material
0
Fuel
17.5
Oy
C
Nb
Gap Void
18.0
Density(g_/cc)
0.074. 0.113
Reflector C 1.84
19 875
Reflector
24.6
Be & Gaps
52.75 in
52.0 in
Core Length
Peripheral Reflector Length
End Reflector 4-1/2" thick A1 plate 70% void
placed 1/2" away from core inlet.
Control Rod Mockup 3.3" x 53" x .100" boral, surface
density .126 gm/cm 2 normal boron.
1.62
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Figure 8. The nearly completed Kiwi-B-IA core
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IFigure 9. The complete Kiwi-B-iA reactor assembly
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NEUTRONIC CALCULATIONS OF TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS ON KIWI REACTORS
Eugene A. Plassmann
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
ABSTRACT
The one-dimensional DSN neutronic code has been successfully
used to reproduce the radial fission distribution measured in
zero power critical mockup experiments of Kiwi reactors. The
calculations were than extended to predict the change in fission-
ing rate produced at Kiwi operating conditions. The neutronic
temperature coefficient for these reactors is also predicted. _
Machine calculations on the neutronic behavior of Kiwi
reactors have, in general, been done in close cooperation with
the experimental program. That is, experimental measurements,
obtained with critical assembly mockups of Kiwi configurations,
were used as the starting point for the calculational series, and
these in turn, could be used to predict and perhaps even guide
future experiments.
One of the basic requirements in the design of a Kiwl
reactor is a fairly uniform radial power distribution, so that
the core structure will not be subjected to undue thermal
stresses. Thus one must be able to predict the distribution of
fission density within the core of the reactor at its operating
temperature. Since critical assembly experiments are generally
limited to room temperature operation, one must resort to cal-
culational procedures in the prediction of these high t_mperature
effects. Such temperature dependent neutron_c calculations have
been done using the one-dimensional DSN code" developed at Los
Alamos. This code is capable of solving a variety of neutron
transport problems using the IBM types 704 and 7090 computers.
In general, the calculation will compute the neutron and fission
distributions in the reactor and can be used to predict the
neutronic temperature coefficient of reactivity.
In all the temperature_related calculations, twenty-four
energy group crossosections 2'3 for all the reactor materials were
used. These are especially suitable for this type of calcul-
ation since the energy region below 1.125 electron volts is sub-
divided into eleven of the groups. It is in this energy range
where most of the change associated with the expected reactor
temperatures would take place. Up-scattering cross sections
were included in the uranium, carbon, and beryllium sets. Only
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radial calculations were made, and axial leakage, suitable for a
reactor length of 132 cm (plus extrapolation lengths), was repre-
sented by a buckling approximation.
Kiwi-B-IA
At the time that this series of calculations was started,
experimentation had reached the stage of a _airly detailed zero-
power critical mockup, which is called ZEPO , of the Kiwi-B-1A
reactor. Thus, experimentally measured radial fission traverses
were available, and the first problem was to reproduce these on
the computer. The core, reflector cylinder, reflector, and
pressure shell were divided into radial zones in the usual manner
so that the reactor materials at their proper densities could be
represented in the code.
Radial dimensions and material densities associated with the
ZEPO mockup of Kiwi-B-1A are listed in Table I. The first ZEPO
assembly was quite rough. It had a uniformly loaded core with
19.6% void, and the reflector was made up of slabs and blocks of
beryllium with an overall void of about 10%. In this ZEPO, the
twelve rotating control rods were mocked up as strips of boral
inserted between the beryllium slabs. In the calculation, the
control rods were represented by a 0.1 cm thick sheath of boron
imbedded in the middle of the beryllium reflector. Using the
density of boron in this sheath as the variable parameter, a set
of calculations was performed to match the experimentally measure-
ed fission distribution.
As is indicated in Table I, the calculations followed
several stages in the experimental development of the ZEPO
machine. Entries in the table show only the changes which were
made from the preceding set-up. In the second column, the
oralloy density was decreased at the outside of the core. This
was done because there is a sharp increase in fission rate at the
outer boundary of the core caused by the return of thermal neu-
trons from the beryllium reflector. A reduction of the oralloy
density in this region, coupled with changes in the proposed
hydrogen propellant flow rate would produce a sufficiently uni-
form radial core temperature.
The next column in the table, represents the ZEPO after the
real reflector with its twelve rotating control rods was received
and the pressure shell was mocked up. The variable void in the
reflector was set at 7%.
As previously discussed, the calculations reproduced the
experimentally measured fission traverses by varying the boron
density in the 0.1 cm sheath in the reflector. It was found that
3 x 10 20 atoms/cm 3 was needed for a good m_ch when l_oking at a
traverse between control rods, and 10 x 10 _v atoms/cm when
looking toward a control rod. The reproduction numbers calcul-
ated for these various cases are given at the bottom of the
table. Since the purpose of the calculation is primarily to
obtain a correct fission distribution, a computed kef f differing
from unity by several percent is quite satisfactory. Of signi-
ficance, however, is the change in kef f in going from one calcul-
ation to the next.
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An example of the success achieved in matching the exper-
imental fission distribution is shown in Figure 1. This repre-
sents the final ZEPO case in Table I, where the proper reflector
and pressure shell were installed. The dashed curve is the
experimental traverse shown as an average of two critical confi-
gurations. In the final reactor, the control rods should be
about halfway out, so this curve is a good representation of the
desired conditions. The solid line histogram then shows the DSN
computed fissions per gram of oralloy averaged in each of the
core intervals. The results are normalized to unity at the center
of the reactor.
Having thus gained confidence that reliable fission distri-
butions could be calculated, the dimensions and material densi-
ties of the actual Kiwi-B-1A test reactor were substituted into
the calculation. These are listed in Table II, and show small
changes from the final ZEPO set-up. In this way, a predicted
cold fission distribution was obtained. The cross sections were
then nodified to the temperatures indicated in the table, first
to a preliminary guess, and then to a more refined prediction, to
compute the expected hot fission distributions. The results are
plotted in Figure 2. The fission rate decreases at the core
boundary as the temperature is increased.
Also plotted is the cold to hot fission ratio which in-
creases at the edge of the loaded core to about 30% more than its
value at the center of the core.
After the Kiwi-B-IA reactor had been assembled at Los Alamos,
and the actual fission distribution measured at delayed critical,
this fission ratio was used to help decide the dimensions of
orificing plugs needed to produce a flat radial temperature pro-
file for the test at Nevada.
The calculated k__f values show a change of -0.00028 indi-
cating a decrease of about 35 cents in reactivity in going to the
operating temperature. This, of course, does not include the
effect of core expansion which would contribute an additional
loss in reactivity.
Kiwi-B-4A
For calculational purposes, Kiwi-B-4A is essentially the
same as the B-1A reactor except in core composition. This new
reactor has about 12% less graphite and twice as much oralloy.
Stainless steel which is present in the core, although included
in the calculations, does not contribute markedly to either
reactivity or fission distribution.
ZEPO type experiments were performed to determine an oralloy
loading scheme to eliminate the fission spike in the peripheral
elements. DSN calculations again closely followed the exper-
imental development. As before, the experimental fission distri-
butions were matched in the calculations by adjusting the boron
density in the 0.1 cm sheath representing the c_ntrol rods. For
this case, it was found that 20 x 10 _v atoms/cm produced the
best fit.
Figure 3 gives an example of the match obtained for one of
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s
the early loading schemes. Here the fuel elewent oralloy loading
was varie_ in ten radial zones from 390 gm/cm ° at the center to
125 gm/cm at the periphery of the core. The solid curve shows
the experimental traverse as an average of measurements toward
and between control _ods. The histogram is the calculated dis-
tribution normalize6 to one at the center of the core.
Having thus found the proper boron sheath density, the Kiwi-
B-4A design dimen_ions and material densities were substituted
into the calculation to obtain cold and hot fission distributions.
These are shown in Figure 4 for a later version of the oralloy
loading scheme. In going to operating temperature, the fission
density again decreases at the core periphery, however not as
much as in Kiwi-B-1A, because the average neutron energy is now
higher into the epithermal region. The cold to hot fission ratio
at the outside (f the core is now about 18% higher than the center
value.
The reprod,_ction numbers produced by these calculations show
that the neutro_ic temperature coefficient of reactivity for
Kiwi-B-4A is very small and probably positive.
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k OWR ACTORCO RO' WORTh
Albert W. Charmatz
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Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Los Alamos, New Mexico
Calculations were performed to determine reactivity worth of control
elements in reactors suitable for rocket propulsion. The renlt_ approxl-
mate values were used to evaluate the feasiblity of alternate contr01 methods,
for an estimate of actuator requirements, and for analyses of control system
behavior resulting from individual rod motion.
Configurations considered included reactors with absorbing rods located
within the reactor core, as well as those using rotating control vanes located
within an external reflector, and rotating vanes in both the reflector and a
central moderating island. Calculations were performed to determine means of
reducing power peaking at the core - reflector interface. A brief survey was
lSO performed to determine an approximate upper limit on reactor power level
eyond which control by neutron absorption in the reflector alone is no longer
dep
o_e and Cross sections
Use was made of the discrete S approach to the numerical solution to
the neutron transport equation (DSN) _n one dimensional form, for solution on
IBM 704 and 7090 computers. Cross sections used included 13, 16, 18, and 24
neutron energy groups.
Reacto r Type I - DUMBO
The Dumbo system was a heterogeneous, thermal reactor consisting of
separate fuel-moderator modules on a 12 cm triangular spacing (Fig. IA). Each
module consisted of a central void into which hydrogen flowed after passing
radially first through a zirconium hydride moderator annulus and then through
a fuel-loaded molybdenum annulus. Control rods were placed in the interstice
formed by three nearly-touchlng modules. This geometry was converted to a
form suitable for the one dimensional transport code, as shown in Fig. lB.
The separation of the control rod from the first neutron-emittlng (ZrH) sur-
face was made on the assumption that, given isotopic neutron emission _rom the
* Work performed under AEC Contract W-7405-ENG. 36.
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surface, the probability of neutrons seelngthe absorbing rod wasidentical
for both the actual reactor and the one dimensional model. Cell calculations
were performed to obtain appropriate cross sections for the homogeneous core.
Table I lists poison rod configurations and calculated central control
rod worth, as well as experimental worth measured on the DUMBO ZEPO, where
available. In this and following tables, calculated control element worth is
given to _ significant figures for comparison purposes within a set of cal-
culations, and not with an expectation of absolute two place accuracy.
Reactor Typ_ll - KIwI-B
A. Centra _ Rod Worth
Calculations of reactivity worth of centrally located cylindrical rods
were performed on various reactor models. An early reactor type which was
converted to DSN calculatlonal form for rod worth, and later, for reflector
neutron-absorbing curtain calculations, is shown in Fig. 2 Figure 2A shows a
typical module, while Fig. 2B shows a loaded section in greater detail with its
share of the surrounding unloaded region. Fig. 2C indicates a typical model
used in cell calculations to determine flux depressions within the loaded por-
tion and flux-averaged modified cross sections to be used in the homogeneous
core part of the overall reactor model. Table II lists the results of central
rod worth calculations.
B. Re_lector CgBtrol Van_s
Relative worth of rotating control drums within the reflector was deter-
mined by solving for system reactivity with neutron absorbing curtains repre-
senting a "poison in" or a "poison out" position, placed in either of two posi-
tions with the reflector, the former 0.5" from the inner reflector surface and
the latter 0.5" from the outer reflector. Using the one dimensional code a
change in reactivity worth of the entire poison curtain was obtained for the
two extreme positions, yielding a reactivity worth per unit surface area of
absorbing curtain. Considering the curved geometry of individual poison seg-
ments and examining flux shapes in the reflector regions, the integrated worth
of a given vane (full out to full in motion) could be simulated with sufficient
accuracy for the required purposes by representing the true vane surface area
by that of a larger vane. The control vane arc length (one-third of the
periphery associated with a given control vane) was considered to be one-thlrd
of 2_ times (the true vane radius plus about 1 1/2 cm), where the added con-
stant is in the order of a thermal neutron mean free path in the beryllium of
interest. The ratio of this fictitious area to that of the calculational
model's curtain area, times the total curtain worth, was then called the worth
of an individual control vane. Table III indicates some calculated values for
typical curtains and vanes, as well as clean reactor reactivity vs. reflector
thickness.
C. Pgwer Peakin= at Core Edge
For a uniformly loaded core, fission density is found to increase quite
rapidly near the core edge because of a return of low energy neutrons from
the reflector. One method of reducing the magnitude of this peaking is to
place a selective neutron absorber (e.g., a cadmium sheath) between the core
and the reflector to absorb low energy neutrons returning toward the core while
permitting high energy neutrons to pass from the core to the reflector. A
disadvantage is the reduction in control vane worth, since the control vane is
operating partly on low energy neutrons. Table IV summarizes results of calcu-
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lations. Measurementsof the effect of adding a four mil Cdscreenat the
inner edgeof the Be reflector of a faster spectrumreactor, whichweremade
on the Honeycombcritical assemblymachine, resulted in a_._6 reactivity de-
crease, and a decreasein peaking from about 1.6 times core averageto 1.0
times average,analagousto the changeslisted in Table IV.
Kiwi-B-4
Table V describes a Kiwi-B-4 model, used for rod worth and reflector
control vane studies, and a comparison of calculated and measured results.
8000 and _0,000 MW Reactgrs
Calculations were performed to determine approximate reactivity worth
of rotating control vanes located in the reflectors of reactors resulting
from conceptual design studies. Tables VI and VII list results and reactor
descriptions.
Vane WQrth vs, Power Lev_l
Vane worth, observed as a function of reactor power level for certain
detailed reactor designs (Table VIII), shows no significant change over_the
power range considered, as well as an approximately constant Eu203 to B IO
relative worth.
40,000 MW Reactors
Simplified models of 40,000 MW reactors were examined in order to obtain
a measure of the feasibility of reflector control of large reactors. Instead
of 150 MW/cubic foot of active core as in the 20,000 MW design, 175 was used,
yielding a 228 f_core volume requirement. The effects of changing reactor
length (5, 6, and 7 ft), core void fraction (30 and 40%), and reflector thick-
ness (6 and 8") were studied (Table IX). The lack of power peaking at the
core edge indicated thicker reflectors could be considered; this led to higher
vane worths (_i$ for 12" reflectors on some models).
Because of decreasing reflector control worth for thin reflector models,
a reactor model was investigated in which a central Be island was emplaced.
Table X indicates a significant increase in total curtain worth, but also
reveals a large interdependence of the two control regions.
Full power hydrogen reactivity worth may be estimated as being in the
order of + 205, subject to many initial assumptions. Temperature reactivity
effect (room temperature to 3000 R average core temperature) has been calcu-
lated at _ -205. The uniform addition to the core of Gd (_I to 3 x 101Sa/cc)
results in a decrease to _ -5 to i05, for the 40 KMW 30% void 8" reflector, and
the 40 KMW island models, although fuel loading must be increased (Table XI).
Beyond this, the complex interrelation of reactor type (core void, length,
reflector thickness and operating (_) conditions) with temperature and hydro-
gen reactivities, has not been investigated.
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Table I - Dumbo Central Control Rod Worth
Rod Worth
Absorber
Absorber Rod O.D. Thickness Calculated Measured (ZEP0)
Cd 0.5 inch 17 mils $0.35 $0.37
Gd 0.5 3 .39 ---
BI° 0.595 2 .57 .67
Table II - Kiwi-B Central Control Rod Worth
Absorber
Absorber Rod O.D. Thickness
BI° 0.5 inch 2 mils
" 2.36 2
Eu20 a - Gd_O 3 0.5 9 + I
" 2.36 4 + i
" 2.36 9 + i
Hf 0.5 solid
Reactor Description:
Core - 36 inch O.D., 15% void, 400 mgU/ccC
Gap - 0.3 inch C wool
Reflector cylinder - 2.0 inch C
Reflector - 5.0 inch Be, 10% void
Rod Worth,
Calculated
$0.38
1.2
0.41
0.87
1.6
0.52
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Table III
Kiwi-B BI° Curtain Worth
Worth Worth
Absorber Reflector Relative to Relative to
Thickness Thickness Clean Reactor "Curtain Out"
6 mils 4.0 inch $15.2 ---
0.4 4.5 10.8 ---
4 4.5 16.6 ---
6 4.5 17.5 $16.2
6 5.0 19.8 18.5
Vane Worth
<$0.54
< 0.44
< 0.67
< 0.71 (0.66)
< 0.86 (0.81)
Kiwi-B Reactivity vs, Reflector Thickn_s_
Reflector Reflector Beryllium
Thickness Void FractiQB D_nsit¥ Reactivity
4.5 inch 0.I0 1.234 a/cm _ $1.9
4.5 0.175 1.138 0 (Reference)
4.5 0.25 1.031 -2.6
5.0 0.175 1.265 2.3
4.5 0.175 1.138 0 (Reference)
4.0 0.175 1.012 -2.5
Reactor Description:
Core - 52 inch L x 35.5 inch 0.D., 20_ void, 41% loaded at 250 mgU/ccC
Gap - 0.25 inch C wool
Reflector cylinder - 2 inch C
Gap - 0.25 inch
Reflector - 4, 4_, or 5 inches Be
Kiwi-B-iB Vane Worth
Calculated Worth Measured WQr_h
Absorber Reflector C_rtain Vane _Reac=gr at Kiva)
I0 mils Bl° 4.5 in. Be $18.2 $0.77 $0.78
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Table IV - Poisoned Reflec_Qr in Kiwi-B
Centerline F o _ _P
AbsQ_b_r _ Average F o_ Average F o _Cle___
None 1.13 1.91 ---
i mil Cd 1.28 1.17 $ 8.2
2 mils Cd 1.30 1.04 9.7
I mil Cd 1.47 0.71 17.6
(+ 6 mils Bl°
vane curtain)
2 mils Cd 1.48 0.69 17.8
(+ 6 mils BI°
vane curtain)
Reactor Description:
Boral
Vane Curtain
L_0 from Cd
8.1
Core - 52 inch L x 35 inch O.D., 20% void, 36% loaded to 250 mgU/ccC
Gap - 0.5 inch C wool
Reflector cylinder - 2 inch C
Gap - 0.125 inch
Reflector - 4.5 inch Be, 17.5% void
Table V - Kiwi-B-4 - Central Rod and Reflector Vane Worth
I. c_
Rod Worth
Absorber Rod O.D. C__ Measured (gEPO)
Bn4c 0.125 inch 6.1¢ 4¢ (Average of 28
close rods)
II. Reflector
Absorber Vane Worth
Absorber Thickness _ Measured (EEPO)
BI° i0 mils $0.55 $0.67
Eu 20 s 5 --- .41
" i0 .... 50
" 12.5 .42 ---
" 15 .... 53
" 20 .47 ---
Reactor Description:
Core - 52 inch L x 35.1 inch O.D., 28% void
Reflector cylinder - 1.8 inch C, 10% void
Reflector - 4.5 inch Be, 12% void
Core loading: 400 mgU/ccC to r = 15 inches, then 348 to r = 15.75,
304 to r = 16.5, 264 to r = 17, and 220 to r = 17.25.
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Table VI - 8.000 MW Reactor CQDtrol Vane Worth
4.1 inch
6.0
6.0
6.0
7.5
Total
Absorber Curtain Vane
Reflector Thickness Absorber Thickness Worth Worth
1.03 x i0 e4 a Be/cm 2 EueO s 30 mils $ 6.24 $0.17
1.51 EueO s I0 12.2 .45
1.51 EueO s 30 14.1 .52
1.51 BIo i0 15.9 .59
1.89 EueO s 30 23.9 i. I
Reactor Description:
Core - 52 inches L x 55 inch O.D., _ 35% void
Reflector cylinder - 1.9 inch C plus AI
Reflector - Be, 20_ void
The only variation among reflector thickness models is number density of
25 and 28 in the core.
Table VII - 20.000 MW Reactor Control Vane Worth
Total
Absorber Curtain Vane
Absorber _ Worth Worth
Bz° 6 mils $14.7 $0.43
Eu_ Os i0 12.0 .35
" 30 14.6 .42
EumO s + Gd20 s 9 + i 12.0 .35
" 27 + 3 15.8 .46
Reactor Description:
Core - 60 inches L x 69.5 inch O.D., 347. void, four radial
loading variations _60 mgU/ccC)
Reflector cylinder - I inch C, 107. void
Reflector - 6 inches Be, 20% void
PR
4,000 MW
8,000
20,000
Table VIII - V_ne Worth as a Function of Reactor Power Level
Boron-ten E_ropium Oxide Relative
_icknes_ Worth _ Worth
5 mils $0.41 ---
lO mils $0.67 lO .50 0.75
15 .53 ---
I0 .55 12.5 .42 _ .76
20 .47 ---
I0 .59 i0 .45 .76
30 .52 ---
i0 .49 i0 .35 .71
30 .42 ---
Measured or
Zepo
Zepo
Zepo
DSN
DSN
DSN
DSN
DSN
DSN
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Table IX - _Q.00Q MW Reactor Control Vane Worth
Core Core Thickness Curtain Vane
L X D _in.) Void _ _3 Worth
60 x 91 30% 6 inch 20 mils $ 4.4 $0.i0
30 8 20 7.4 .22
30 8 50 8.1 .24
40 6 20 8.0 .18
40 8 20 11.6 .35
72 x 83.5 30 8 20 10.6 .35
84 x 77.5 30 8 20 16.2 .56
Table X - 40.000 MW Reactor With Central Island
Reflector
Out (Min. Poison)
In (Max. Poison)
In-->Out
In-->Out
Reactor Description:
Island
Poison
Out- ->In
Out- ->In
In (Min. Poison)
Out (Max. Poison)
Island - 8 inch radius, 20% void Be
Core - 46.5 inch outside radius, 35% void
Reflector cylinder - i inch C
Reflector - 6 inches Be, 20% void
Absorber - 20 mils Eu_O 3
Reactivity
$9.5
17
ii
18
84
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LEAKAGE RADIATION FIELDS FROM THE KIWI-B-1A
D. M. Peterson
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
The leakage radiation fields from a simple model of the
Kiwi-B-IA reactor system have been computed using the QAD program
originally developed by R. E. Malenfant of LASL. Some predicted
shapes for these radiation patterns are given here, and one
particular calculation is compared to experiment to permit some
discussion of the agreement attained.
The QAD program utilizes a distributed point source, line-of-
]_ght calculation. That is, this program considers the source
egion as a set of small volumes, with a point source in each
: olume and calculates the contribution of each of these sources
t a particular detector considering only the effects of those
aterials on a line-of-sight between the point source and the
detector. Gamma source spectra, material attenuation factors,
and buildup coefficients may be arbitrary. Neutron sources
presently must be given the Watt fission spectrum and the neutron
attenuation factors employed are based upon moments method data.
At each detector point, the QAD program will provide an arrival
/ number spectrum or energy spectrum as well as dose and heat
generation rates from both gamma radiation and fast neutrons.
The geometry used in these calculations (which is shown in
Figure l) was assumed to be in free space, that is no air
scattering or other external scattering was considered. The
system consisted of a central cylindric core, a graphite liner,
a beryllium reflector, an aluminum core support plate, an alumi-
num pressure vessel, and a nickle nozzle.
The reactor source was simulated by 750 source points, the
source intensities being chosen to correspond to a flat radial
power distribution, and a cosine longitudinal power distribution.
A nineteen line source spectrum was used for the gammas; a fission
spectrum source was used for the neutrons. The calculation re-
quired 6-10 seconds per detector point.
Some gamma isodose patterns are shown in Figure 2. These
were computed for a reactor power of i000 MW. The high dose rate
regions exhibit irregularities which may be roughly correlated
with the effective penetration lengths for radiation emanating
from the central portion of the reactor. As the distance from
the reactor center increases, these irregularities become less
pronounced, and the radiation patterns tend toward isotropicity;
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this is nearly achieved at 4 meters.
In order to provide a better comparison between the analytic
method and experiment, the total gamma ray dose and the activation
to be expected in sulfur (from fast neutron flux above 2.2 mev)
were also computed for various points along a meridian ring
geometry located 127 cm from the center of the reactor core.
There were some fourteen experimental setups, stationed ten degrees
apart, on this ring. The calculated data were normalized to
correspond to 2.95 x 1018 fissions, which is believed to be the
correct source strength for the particular run to which comparison
was made.
The calculated and experimentally determined gamma ray doses
for this case are shown in Figure 3, on which there is also a
phantom view of the reactor and meridian ring geometry super-
imposed for purposes of orientation.
Since the analytic dose predictions did not take into account
radiation which was scattered from the massive test stand shield -
the 19" thick object which is outlined below the reactor - it is
not surprising that the analytic results are lower than the
measured doses at the bottom or inlet end of the system. Other-
wise the agreement between the two sets of results is very good,
both in shape and magnitude.
Except for those effects near the inlet end previously
attributed to external scattering, the largest percentage devi-
ations between the experimental and analytic results occur in
that portion of the figure above 120 ° . In this region, the
geometry used for the calculated models was oversimplified in
comparison to the rather irregular and complex arrangement of the
actual system. Better agreement might have been obtained if the
calculational geometry had been a more precise representation of
the system, but it is felt that an adequate representation was
obtained with the simple model chosen.
For the remainder of the system, the analytic and experi-
mental results appear to agree to within five percent. However,
the experimental results were probably enhanced a few percent by
radiation delivered after shutdown, but prior to the recovery of
the dosimeters. Thus, it is probable that the calculations are
over-predicting the doses by approximately 10% in the area of
best agreement - i.e., that part of the calculational geometry
which best approximates the actual system. Small as this
difference is, the agreement in the shape of the data is probably
better - i.e., if the calculated curve had been renormalized for
a best fit to the data in the upper two-thirds of the figure, few
deviations would be greater than five percent.
A comparison of some tentative neutron flux calculations and
experimentally determined neutron fluxes are shown in Figure 4.
The analytic data have been normalized to the experiment at the
92 ° position in order to compare the shapes of the two sets of
data.
This figure shows that the fast neutron experimental and
normalized analytic data are in reasonable agreement. The absolute
agreement is not as good as for the gamma ray data; the unscaled
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analytic data are about a factor-of-two higher than experiment.
It may ultimately be possible to obtain better absolute agreement
between such calculations and experiment, but it is too early to
tell, since there are fundamental differences between these
geometries and the situations for which the moments method data
were developed.
These attempts to calculate neutron fluxes by the moments
method have just recently been undertaken in the hope of gener-
ating a neutron program which can perform calculations with the
same ease, speed and reliability now inherent in the QAD gamma
program. With growing experimental and theoretical experience
available as a normalizing guide, via measured doses and Monte
Carlo calculations, it should be possible to realize these aims
regardless of the absolute accuracy ultimately obtainable.
This program can be used to compute radiation fields for
systems with more complex physical configurations than can be
readily handled by Monte Carlo and S n type programs, though the
QAD results are not as detailed as those of Monte Carlo or Sn.
Thus, QAD is not considered as a replacement for these other
approaches, rather it is a supplement which is used both to
perform initial survey type calculations for new systems and to
apply Monte Carlo and S n results to the complex portions of more
thoroughly studied systems by normalizing to such results at
suitably chosen points.
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DESIGN COMPUTATIONS FOR A NUCLEAR ROCKET SHADOW SHIELD
BY
Mary Ann Capo
Westi nghouse Electri c Corporation
Astronuc lear Laboratory
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
5O283
The objective of this study was to design a shield for use in the NERVA nuclear
rocket engine system. The primary purpose of the shield is to reduce the radiation heating
of the liquid hydrogen in the propellant tank to a tolerable level in order to minimize the
vehicle system weight. Experimental data are not yet available that define the propellant
flow in the tank so as to correlate propellant temperature rise with tank heat input. There-
fore, it was assumed that a shield would be required which reduces the total tank heat input
by 90%.
Before designing the shield, it was necessary to define the magnitude and distribu-
tion of heat deposited in an unshlelded tank. Three processes of heat deposition in liquid
hydrogen were considered: core gamma ray interactions, fast neutron elastic scattering,
and the capture gamma reaction with the emission of a 2.23 Mev gamma ray.
Illustrated in Figure 1 is a scaled drawing of the unshlelded propellant tank with
the reactor core, reflector and core top supportplate in position. This configuration illus-
trates a 37.5 ° angle tank. If one visualizes the lower section of the tank as the frustrum of
a cone, the apex of which is located at the center of the reactor, the major base of thecon_
is equal to the tank diameter (30 feet); and the minor base is located 8.5 feet above the core
center. The tank angle, g, is then half the angle of the cone.
Throughout this study it was assumed that a KIWI B-1 type core would be used for
the NERVA mission generating 1120 MW of thermal power and operating for 20 minutes.
The radial power distribution within the reactor was considered flat, while the axial power
distribution was assumed to be a skewed cosine distribution.
Tank heat input data were calculated for three different tank angles of 25° , 30° and
37.5 ° . Gamma energy fluxes were obtained along the plane area subtending the tank from
the center of the core using Program 14-0. This program evaluates polnt-to-polnt attenua-
tion kernels and integrates over the cylindrical source volume in performing reactor-shleld
penetration calculations. Neutron energy fluxes were obtained by normalizing multlgroup
one dimensional diffusion data to the fast neutron data computed by Program 14-0. The
total heat input to each tank was obtained by integrating the normal component of the total
energy flux over the plane area. The normal component was obtained by multiplying the
flux by the cos a determined by the R, Z location of each detector.
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Resultsareshownin,Table1for threetankangles.
TABLEI
HEATINPLITDATAFORTHREETANKANGLES
TankAngle
HeatInput,MW 25° 30° 37.5o
CoreGamma 0.33 0.46 0.66
Neutton 0.07" 0.095 0.13
CaptureGamma 0.24 0.33 0.45
TOTAL 0.64 0.885 1.24
Thisanalysisassumesthat all of the incidentenergyflux isabsorbedin thetank,
that all theneutronsthat reachthetankwill bethermallzedandproducea 2.23Mev
gammaray,andthat all thesecondarygammaraysaresubsequentlyabsorbed.Studiesare
nowin progressto determinethepercentof gammaraysthat mightescapethe tank,and
to determlneabetterdistributionandeffectof the capturegammarays.
Theabovedataindicatethat 52°/_of thetotal heatis dueto coregammas,11%to
neutronklnetlcheatingand37%is dueto capturegammas.
Sincetheshieldspecificationis a 90%reductionin total tankheating,thefollow-
ing equationcanbeestablished:
where
P = 0.52 FI,
P = fraction
Fy = ratio of
rays
Fn = ratio of
If the fraction 0.52 and 0.48
+ 0.48 Fn
of unshlelded propellant heatlng
shielded to unshlelded heating due to core gamma
shielded to unshielded heating due to neutrons
should change drastically due to a more refined
analysis of the tank heating problem, then the shield, of course, would also change. How-
ever, there was an immediate need for determining a basic criteria for the shield design.
I'he above equation was therefore selected as a basis for the shield design.
With various thicknesses of shield materials positioned above the core top support
plate, Program 14-0 was used to calculate gamma ray and neutron dose rates at a detector
point located on the core mldplane at the bottom of the tank. The shield extended radially
to the outer edge of the core.
The parametric data thus generated consist of the attenuation factor for each shield
material for neutrons and gamma rays as a function of shield material thickness.
Several values of the fraction P, defined above, were selected for the parametric
study; namely, 0.2, 0.1, 0.07 and 0.04 which correspond to 80, 90, 93 and 96% center llne
attenuation. From the parametric attenuation data, values of the unshlelded to shielded
ratios for neutrons and gammas were determined for each material and were combined to
obtain the values F1, and Fn also defined above. Since, for configurations consisting of two
materials, several shields could be selected that would result in a specific cente.r line atten-
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uation, the problem remained to determine the minimum weight shield for a given attenua-
tion factor.
Presented in Table II are the weight calculations for a 96°,_ center line attenuation
shield consistlng of Li H and steel.
TABLE II
WEIGHT CALCULATIONS FOR A 96% CENTER LINE ATTENUATION SHIELD
Shield No. 1 Shield No. 2 Shield No. 3 Shield No. 4
Steel, cm 9 8.6 8 7.2
Li H, cm 15 17 20 25
Total, cm 26.7 28.4 31.1 35.8
% Steel 33.7 30.2 25.7 20.1
AL 14 15.7 18.4 23.1
Shield Weight (gm/cm2) 82.4 80.7 78.1 75.4
Engine Weight (gm/cm z) 9.1 10.3 12.0 15.1
Tota I Weight (gm/cm 2) 91.5 91.0 90.1 90.5
The four cases represent four different shield configurations consisting of Li H and
steel. Notice that the total thickness does not equal the steel plus lithium hydride thick-
ness. This is due to a 10°,_ void fraction included to account for necessary coolant channels.
The per cent of steel in the shield mixture is tabulated. The AL represents the increased
pressure vessel and interstage vehicle length required for each particular shield. It was
assumed that a 5-1nch (12.7 cm) plenum above the reactor would be needed regardless of
whether or not a shield was present.. Thus, AL = the shield length minus 12.7 cm. The
shield weight for _ach case is given. The engine weight = AL times the engine density
of 0.653 gram/cm . This density was derived from an aluminum pressure vessel weight of
17.4 Ib/in, and an interstage sleeve weight and engine connection weight of 16 Ib/in based
on previous RIFT studies. An effective interstage weight factor for the nuclear stage of
1/2.7 was assumed. This weight trade-off factor is necessary since the interstage sleeve
would not be carried for a full mission as would the shield. The total weight shown here
is then equal to the shield weight plus the engine weight.
The total weight can then be plotted as a function of the per cent of steel in the
shield material mixture to determine where the minimum shield weight occurs. The per cent
steel at which the minimum weight occurs varies depending upon the desired attenuation
factor. The minimum weight for a 96% center line attenuation shield occurs at about 27%
steel, and for a 90% center line attenuation shield at about 17.5°/_ steel. Given the total
weight and per cent steel at which the minimum shield weight occurs, the shield weight and
subsequently the shield thickness can easily be determined.
This same type of analysis was carried out for several material configurations.
Results are shown below in Table III.
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TABLEIII
VARIOUSMINIMUMWEIGHTSHIELDS- 90%CENTERLINEATTENUATION
Shleld Total Shleld Weight Total Weight
Material Thickness, cm (G ram/cm 2) (Gram/cm 2)
Li H - U 23.9 43.6 50.9
Li H - Steel 26.0 50.8 59.5
Be - Steel 26.0 51.2 59.9
L H.o - U 42.1 41.5 60.7
Bed- 25.0 63.0 71.1
L H 2 - Steel 37.4 56.7 72.8
Graphite - Boron 40.0 61.2 78.9
Be - Boron 38.1 63.4 79.9
The total shield thickness is given, as well as the shield weight and corresponding
total weight which includes the engine weight. The Li H - Uranium shield appeared inter-
esting from a weight viewpoint. However, uranium is toxic and required special handling
facilities. In addition, both the lithium hydride and uranium would have to be placed with-
in a containing material which would increase the weight. The container material itself
should be included as a gamma shielding. Thus, the shield design would require an iteratlve
design process where the mechanical designers would include canning and structure material,
and the configuration reanalyzed to determine how much the shielding could be reduced.
This appeared prohibitive from a time standpoint. The configuration of Li H - Steel was
selected for the first NERVA shield design since it appeared more practical because of
manufacturing technology and adaptability to the heated bleed engine cycle. In the heated
bleed cycle it is advantageous to extract heat from the shield. The Li is an excellent heat
source due to the n, a reaction. The steel container for the Li H was included as a gamma
shield. The next configuration worthy of investigation appears to be a berylllum-steel
shield. It shows evidence of promise but more extensive calculations will be required to
determine its value. The other configurations were either incompatible with the heated
bleed cycle or resulted in heavier weights.
With the selection of the lithium hydrlde-steel shield, the problem remained to
determine the thickness of shielding and the radius of the shield required to reduce the
total tank heating by 90°/_. Two different shield radii were invest igated; these two radii
correspond to the outer radius of the core and the outer radius of the reflector.
A parametric family of curves was generated, shown in Figure 2, illustrating shield
weight as a function of prol0ellant heating. These data were obtained by calculating the
total heating in the tank with shield thicknesses corresponding to 80, 90, 93 and 96°/c center
line attenuation for the two different shield radii. Only two tank angles are shown here for
simplicity. The zero weight corresponds to the unshlelded condition. For a 25° angle tank
it can be seen that either shield effects a 90°/_ reduction in total tank heating. The weights
of these two shields are approximately 1400 and 1800 pounds. The lighter of the two shields
is that which extends to the reflector outer radius. For the 37.5 ° angle, where the shield
radius equals the core radius, no amount of shielding effects a 90% reduction. With the
shield extended to the outer radius of the reflector, a 2100 pound shield is applicable. This
shield represents approximately a 96°/_ center llne reduction.
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It then seemed expeditious to shape the shield to effect a weight savings. An itera-
tlve process was followed in shaping the shield for each tank angle persued in this analysis.
The final shaped shield weighed 1660 pounds for a 37.5 ° tank angle compared to about 2100
pounds for the unshaped case. This shield consists of the original cylinder covering the entl re
reflector diameter but with a diagonal slice removed at the corners. This diagonal slice be-
gins at the core outer radius and projects to zero thickness of the reflector outer radius.
The Li H - Steel shield is now be|ng built by Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory
for delivery to Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for a series of tests with the KIWI B-4
reactor core as the source.
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LCALCULATIONS OF NEUTRON
66 50284
ACTIVATION DOSE RATES
IN NUCLEAR ROCKET VEHICLES AND TEST FACILITIES
Robert M. Thornton and C. K. Butterworth
Lockheed-Georgia Company
INTRODUCTION
Static testing of nuclear rockets will result in neutron activation of the engine, the stage
and any other materials and structures thatare exposed to the neutron leakage during a
test. The magnitude of the gamma dose rates from activation must be considered in
planning the test program, designing the testfacilitiesand determining the feasibilityof
re-use of components in the test program.
We have performed calculations of the activation characteristics of alloys for RIFT
applications, dose rates from the RIFT stage, the NERVA enginejand several versions of
a static test stand. The current Lockheed RIFT stage design has been used and the
structural design of the NERVA engine has been obtained from Aerojet reports. In cal-
culating the neutron leakage of the NERVA engine, a KIWI B-1 core configuration with a
2200 pound reactor shield was used, assuming an 1120 MW power.
COMPUTER PROGRAM
The calculations have been carried out with an IBM-7090 computer program. The
component to be investigated is divided intoa large number of modules, each of which is
subsequently considered as a point source of decay radiation. Input information to the
program consists of:
• coordinates of each module centroid
• weight and types of alloys in each module
• fast and thermal neutron fluxes atthe module centroid
• coordinates of the points at which the dose rates are desired
The program has built into it:
• alloy compositions
• thermal and fast neutron reaction rates per unit neutron flux _
• isotope decay constants
• flux-to-dose-rate conversion factors
The dose rate contribution from each module is determined at the point of interest,
accounting for spherical divergence, and the sum of all contributions is computed. The
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program considers a total of 52 fast and thermal neutron reactions on 20 elements. For
thermal neutron reactions the 2200 m/sec cross sections have been used and, for fast
neutron reactions, effective cross sections measured in a U235 fission spectrum have
been used. In determining the flux-to-dose-rate conversion factors, the decay scheme
of each isotope has been considered.
As a check on the accuracy of the program calculations, a problem was set up to
duplicate the experimental conditions under which an alloy irradiation was carried out at
the General Dynamics-Fort Worth reactor facility. In this experiment, a number of
alloys were irradiated and the gamma dose rates were measured as a function of decay
time.
Figure 1 shows typical results of the comparison between measured and calculated
values, where dose rates per unit weight are given vs. decay time. The curves repre-
sent measured values and the points are calculated.
The agreement for aluminum alloys, as typified by 1100 Al is excellent in both half-life
and magnitude. The titantium alloys, as typified by RS-140 titanium showed good agree-
ment, as did the high temperature alloys typified by Inconel-X. The 4340 steel
calculations show a departure from the measured values in half life. The cause for this
departure has not been isolated as yet, but the comparison is still within the desired
accuracy of the program calculations.
RESULTS OF CALCULATIONS
The calculations of the activation of the NERVA engine, the RIFT stage and the static
test stand have been made using flux profiles calculated with the GE 04-4 shielding pro-
gram. In addition, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to estimate the thermal to
fast flux ratio within the shadow of a 2200 pound NERVA shield.
ALLOY ACTIVATION CHARACTERISTICS
Calculations of the dose rate at one foot from one pound of an alloy have been performed
for all alloys that have been considered for use in the RIFT program. The exposure
location considered was along the conical portion of the stage propellant tank where the
incident neutron flux is almost uniform, and engine operation of 1300 seconds at 1120
MW was assumed.
Figure 2 shows results for this location. Shown here is R/HR-LB vs. decay time, and
this offers a means of comparison of all alloys on a common basis. The relative
ranking of the alloys is clearly a function of the decay time. The aluminum alloys,
typified by 5456 A1, are relatively high in activity at short decay times, due to 2.6-hour
Mn56. From 10 hours to about 1 week the dose rate is due to 15-hour Na24, produced
mainly by (n,_) reaction on A1-27. The long-lived activities, which become controlling
at about i week, are due to the Zn64(n,'_ )Zn65 reaction and fast reactions on iron and
titanium. The curve shown here is representative of most aluminum alloys considered,
except 7075 and 7079 which are about an order of magnitude higher at long decay times
due to their higher zinc contents. The activity of the titanium alloy A110AT is relatively
low at short decay times, but is much higher than the aluminum alloys at long decay
times. The activity at short decay times is due to the A127(n,_X )Na24 reaction and (n, p)
reactions on Ti46, Ti47 and Ti48. The activity at l_ng decay times is due entirely to
the same (n,p) reactions.
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TheAZ31Bmagnesiumdecayover thefirst weekis dueto 15-hourNa24,formedby
Na23(n,_,_)Na24andMg24(n,p)Na24reactions.
TheInconel-Xactivity is aboutthesameastheMgandA1activities at short decaytimes,
andinitially decayswith the2.6hr. half life of Mn56,formedby theMn55(n,_-)Mn56
reactions. The71-dayhalf life activity from theNi58(n,p)Co58reactionbecomes
controllingat about20hours, andcontinuesto goventhedecayout to 10,000hours.
STAGEACTIVATIONCHARACTERISTICS
Figure 3 showstypicalresultsof thecalculationof doserates from thestageas a
functionof decaytime followinga 1300secondtest at 1120MW. Thevehiclewasdivided
into 1050modulesfor this calculation. Thepointfor whichthesedoserates aregivenis
indicatedonthefigure. Thispoint is consideredto be representativeof thepointsto
whichworkerswouldneedaccessin thestagedisassemblyandrework processafter the
hot enginehasbeenremoved. Thesedoserates showa rapid decayin thefirst week
after a test, wherelonger-livedactivities becomecontrolling. Doserates at this point
are below2.5mr/hr at about75hoursafter a test.
Themajor contributor to thedoserates at short times is thepropellanttankbottom
whichis composedof about3000poundsof5456A1. At longdecaytimesthe controlling
activity is that from thetwoattitudecontrolrocket packages,eachof whichis composed
of 25poundsof tantalum-tungsten,55poundsof stainlesssteeland70poundsof
aluminum.
Figure 4 showsthebuildupin thedoserate at oneweekafter shutdownfrom thestage-
less engineasa functionof thenumberof tests. Twocurvesare shown- onefor one
monthtest spacingandonefor twomonthspacing. For theone-monthspacingthe
buildupapproachesa maximumof a factorof about2, andfor thetwomonthspacinga
factor of about1.5.
NERVAENGINEACTIVATION
For calculationsof thedoseratesfrom theNERVAengine,theenginewasdividedinto
184modules. Figure 5 showsgammadoserates at themidplaneof theNERVAengine
at a distanceof 2 feetfrom thepressurevesselfor a 1300secondtest at 1120MW. The
uppercurveshowsthedoserates from corefission products. This curvewascalculated
with the GE04-4shieldingprogramandtheLockheed Perkins-King fission product
program. Dose rates from the activation of the NERVA engine-less the core are shown
in the lower curve. The decay is rapid in the first 100 hours where long half-lived
activities become controlling. The activation dose rates at this point do not drop below
laboratory tolerance, even out to 10,000 hours.
Comparison of the two curves shows that the activation dose rates are negligible as long
as the core is still in the engine.
STATIC TEST STAND
Close attention must be given to activation in the design of the static test stand. Many
tests must be performed on each stand and access is required to the test stand area
shortly after removal of a tested stage in order to prepare for the next test. Therefore,
the test stand must be designed to minimize activation dose rates shortly after a test and
also to minimize the buildup in activity due to repeated tests.
We have analyzed several test stand concepts, one of which is shown in Figure 6. The
essential features of this concept are:
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• thestageis permanentlyattachedto a dolly throughoutits wholetest
lifetime
• thedolly with stageis transportedto thetestarea ona trackway
• a split shieldof water-filled stainlesssteel tanksis placedaroundthe
engineat the stagediameterin order to attenuatetheleakageflux and
thusminimize activationof thedolly andthesurroundtest stand
structure
• at thecompletionof a test, thesplit shieldhalves, whichare the
greatestsourceof activation, are movedawayfrom thetest stand
area
Figure 7 showstheactivationdoserates after a 1300secondtestat a pointonthe concrete
pad. Thecontrollingactivity is thatfrom the split shieldhalvesassumedto bemoved
back200feet. Thesedoseratesdonot includeanycontributionfrom fission products
depositedin theexhaustduct. Whilea shieldcanbeplacedover theexhaustductinlet
beforepersonnelenter thearea, therestill mightbeanappreciabledoserate contribu-
tion throughthisshieldat pointsnear theexhaustduct.
Figure 8showsthebuildupin thedoserate at oneweekafter a test asa functionof the
numberof tests. For a 1 monthtest spacing,thebuildupapproachesa maximumof a
factor of about4, andthe2 monthspacinga factor of 2.
It wasassumedfor thepurposeof computingtheactivation, that thesplit shield reduced
boththethermalandfast fluxesby a factor of 106. The dose rates from the dolly at
points under and around the dolly range from 103 to 106 less than those from the stage
alone.
FUTURE PLANS
All calculations to date have been for a completely transparent system, i.e., no
self-shielding of the activation gamma radiation by large components has been accounted
for. The resulting dose rates, therefore, are upper limits for the assumed fluxes. The
departure of the dose rates from the stage-less engine from this upper limit should not
be too great because of the thin skin structure of most of the vehicle and its components.
However, the dose rates from the engine will depart considerably from these upper limits.
We are currently preparing to use the activation program in conjunction with the GEl4-1
shielding program to account for self-shielding.
Another area we are now studying is the effect on the dose rates of the difference
between the NERVA neutron spectrum and the model used in these calculations.
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NUCLEAR HEATING OF TORY II-C HAFNIUM CONTROL RODS
S. Kellman and A. Lorenz
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, University of California
Livermore, California
A. Introduction
A nuclear heating analysis of the control rod assembly within the TORY
II-C core was made to determine its power density at full power conditions.
The use of hafnium as control poison and the selection of an asterisk rod geom-
etry made a detailed study of the (n,y) heating necessary. Because of the com-
plexity of the heating process, a gamma-ray Monte Carlo code was developed
for use in this analysis.
B. Analysis
A drawing of the control rod assembly, in Figure l.a, shows the hafnium
rod surrounded by a Ren_-41 control tie-rod that is separated from the fuel by
one layer of unfueled BeO tubes. Gamma-ray interactions are the major
sources of nuclear heating in unfueled regions of reactors. The gammas arise
from three principal processes: prompt fission, fission product decay and
radiative neutron capture. In the present analysis of control rod heating,
three "sources" have been considered: gammas from prompt fission, fission
product decay and radiative capture originating in the core medium; radiative
capture gamma rays originating in the hafnium rod; and radiative capture
gamma rays in the Ren_-41 control tie rod. These sources are referred to
below as "external", "internal" and "tie-rod" respectively. The spectral
distribution of each source was constructed from the latest experimental data
available and expressed in terms of 30 energy groups, ranging from 0.01 to
10.0 Mev.
The gamma energy distribution in the control rod assembly was deter-
mined by means of a Monte Carlo code developed specifically for this analysis.
The YOGI-R gamma-ray Monte Carlo code, written in FORTRAN for the
IBM 7090, computes the fraction of gamma source energy deposited in the
components of a system described by a cell; the sides of the cell are parallel
to the three coordinate axes of a Cartesian coordinate system. A system of
infinite extent in the Z direction is considered; in the X and Y directions, the
cell is bounded by planes at which reflection is required. YOGI-R is equipped
to handle a system of 50 zones, composed of 10 different materials. Absorp-
tion is tallied by zone and by energy group in which it occurs. An average
incident energy "flux" is obtained by dividing the energy absorbed in a given
group in a given zone by the appropriate macroscopic absorption cross section.
A series of problems were run for each of the three source zones con-
sidered. In order to determine the effect that each of the components sur-
rounding the control rod has on the heating value, problems were run in which
each component was added successively to the cell. In the more exact models,
it was necessary to describe the rod by a cruciform because of the limitation
on the number of zones handled by the YOGI code (see Figs. l-b and l-c).
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4Wi£hin the statistical a£curacy of the Monte Carlo results, which ranged
between5% a.n:d I0%, the following properties were found to have little or no
effect or_tlf4 energy distribution analysis:
I) presence of the air gap between rod and fueled moderator regions,
Z) presence of the unfueled BeO region surrounding the control tie-rod,
3) variations of the uranium loading in the fueled moderator,
4) presence of tie-rods in the vicinity of the considered assembly.
It should be noted that both the asterisk and cruciform descriptions of the con-
trol rod were found to absorb comparable energy fractions. The control tie-
rod had an approximate 10% shielding effect on the external heating of the con-
trol rod.
The final results of this study, incorporating all corrections outlined
above, are:
Area in
Source Cell (in Z)
Fraction of Source Energy Deposited in
Unfueled Hastelloy
Rod Be© Tie Rod
External 7. Z9 0. 089 0.061 0.019
Internal 0. 0586 0. Z 57 0.075 0. 034
Tie Rod 0.02-96 0. 154 0.089 0.057
In this model the rod was represented by a cruciform having i/8" x I/Z"
blades; the BeO:U Z35 atom ratio in the moderator region was assumed to be
4Z3: I.
C. Results
The average heating density of a component in Mw/ft 3 per Mw/ft 3 of
local power density in the moderator region was obtained by multiplying the
fraction of source energy; deposited in the component by the factor,
(E_f/Ac)/(Em/Am); E_ is the source energy available per fission in the source
region considered, 92m the total energy produced per fission in the moderator
(i. e. 191.5 Mev), A c the area of the heated component in the cell, and A m the
area of the source region in the cell. Final heating power density values are
given in Mw/ft 3 in solid, hot component material normalized to Mw/ft 3 of
average core power density. Normalization is based on the active hot core
volume of 53.4Z ft 3. The anticipated power of the TORY II-C reactor is
510 Mw; the corresponding average core power density will be 9.55 Mw/ft 3.
The contributions from the three sources to the total heating density of
a shim rod (i. e. one at R = 8.9Z"), averaged over the total insertion length of
40" is:
External gamma source
Internal (n,y) source
External (n,_) source
(from Ren&-41 tie rod)
Total average heating density
(Mw/ft 3 per Mw/ft 3)
0.93
1.16
0.14
Z.Z3
The compound error in the nuclear heating calculations is approximately
±Z0%. The statistical uncertainty of the Monte Carlo problems was less than
± ]0%; additional errors arising from the uncertainties existing in the input
quantities for both gamma and neutron heating, are approximately ± 10%.
The axial distribution of the total heating density was compiled from the
individual contributions described above, each modified by its proper axial
dependence, and is given in Figure Z.
Independent heat transfer calculations showed that for the conditions
treated, the hafnium control rod attains peak temperatures of approximately
1600°F.
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The foregoing analysis treated fully inserted rods (i. e. _0:' into
reactor). However, the expected n_ode of high power operation is one in
which the shim rods will project approximately fifteen inches into the reactor.
This corresponds to Akrods = -0.03. Therefore the peak power density will,
in normal TORY II-C operation, exist at the rod tips and should be approxi-
mately g.g (Mw/ft 3 of solid hafnium)/(Mw/ft3 of average core power density).
The comprehensive treatment reviewed above a11ows one to estimate the
hazardous condition which might arise if a single shim rod were fully inserted
at high power levels.
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Fig. I. Drawings of control rod assembly: (a) actual assembly; (b) cruci-
form description used for YOGI code; (c) asterisk description.
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NEUTRON AND GAMMA ANGULAR LEAKAGE CALCI
OF A KIWI-B REACTOR
7LATIO_I
ByArthur D. Prescott
Research Projects Division
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
The reactor gamma number flux density and the reactor neutron
(prompt neutron) number flux density are machine calculated for a full power
operation of a 1000 MW KIWI-B1 reactor as a function of angular position
around the unshielded reactor at 1.5 meters and 4.5 meters from the fission
center of the core, using moments method differential energy spectra data.
The reactor core is divided into Z16 volume elements; and the neutron num-
ber flux density, gamma number flux density, neutron dose rate, and gamma
dose rate are calculated using a Convair-Ft. Worth code known as D-53. This
code uses the infinite media neutron and gamma moments method data gen-
erated by Nuclear Development Associates [ 2, 3 ] .
The calculated gamma flux densities are compared with Monte Carlo
leakage calculations of the magnitude of the gamma current densities carried
out by Dr. Glen Graves of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory [ 1 ] . The
gamma source spectrum consists of prompt fission gammas, U a35 capture
gammas, and short period delayed gammas, and is identical with the Monte
Carlo source spectrum. The gamma differential number spectra (or flux
density) agree remarkably well with the Monte Carlo histograms of the mag-
nitude of the gamma current density (Figures Z, 3,4, 5). By definition the
magnitude of the gamma current density is less than or equal to the gamma
flux density at a non-reflecting boundary, and agreement is even better than
indicated. The moments method calculations overestimate the low energy
portion of the leakage spectra, as is to be expected.
The D-53 calculated gamma energy leakages are within 13% of the
corresponding Monte Carlo calculations out the top and the side of the reactor
(Figures 6 and 7). Agreement is better out the top of the reactor than out
the side, or nozzle end of the reactor. Apparently there are two reasons for
this disagreement. For the detector points at 180 ° many of the path lengths
are oblique to the nozzle. The moments method data is more applicable when
the source-detector line is perpendicular to the surface of a medium bounded
in one dimension, i.e. the method underestimates the emerging integrated
energy flux density at oblique incidence. At 90 ° , this effect is counter-
balanced by the fact that the infinite media moments method data includes
back scattering beyond the detector. This contribution becomes more im-
portant at large penetration depths, especially in low Z materials; and thus,
at perpendicular incidence, the infinite media data, upon application to finite
media, overestimates the emerging integrated energy flux density. The
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average path length from the source points near the core surface through the
Be and C reflectors is greater than the average path length from the source
points near the top of the core through the aluminum support plate. The
neutron and gamma leakage curves are four leaf clover shaped, shifted in the
tank direction due to the off-center fission distribution, becoming more nearly
circular at 4.5 meters. The gamma dose rate is roughly independent of angular
position at 4.5 meters and is approximately 3 x 10 T r/hr (Figures 8 and 9).
The neutron number spectra at 0 ° and 180 ° are similar in shape indi-
cating that the aluminum support plate and pressure shell do not harden the
spectrum to any extent. Comparing the neutron number spectra with Watt's
fission spectrum, very rough fast neutron shielding calculations at 0 ° could be
made assuming the leakage spectrum to be a fission spectrum (Figures 10, 11).
The reactor leakage is highly peaked along the reactor-tank centerline due to
the absence of top or bottom reflectors. The 4.5" of Be and 2" of carbon
wrapped around the side of the core is a much better shield than the 6" of
aluminum support plate above the core. Reactor neutron leakages of 2.5 x 1013
n/cm z-sec andl.5x 10 lz n/cm z-sec were calculated out the top of the reactor
at 1.5 meters and 4.5 meters respectively (Figures 12 and 13). The corre-
sponding calculated neutron dose rates were 2 x 109 rem/hr and 1.50 x 108
rem/hr, respectively (Figures 14 and 15). However, the neutron leakage
calculations are over-conservative probably within a factor of 2.
Changing the radial power distribution to a flat distribution reduced the
fission intensity near the surface of the core thus reducing the neutron number
leakage and gamma energy leakage by a maximum of 16%. Total 7090 machine
time for the D-53 calculations was 30 minutes compared to approximately 18
hours for the Monte Carlo gamma calculations.
REFERENCES
I. Graves, G1enA.: "Leakage Spectra of a Typical i000 MW Reactor,"
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2. Goldstein, H.: "Calculations of the Penetrations of Gamma Rays," NYO-
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NOVEL RADIATION CALCULATIONS ON ROCKET REACTORS
R. E. Malenfant
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
Large numbers of localized and detailed calculations must be
made on a system as complex as a flying reactor. It has been
found that many of those associated with radiation can be readily
handled with a general-geometry point-kernel computer program,
QAD, even though the program was not specifically developed for
such particularized calculations. Two examples which fall into
this category are given here along with the method of approach
and results.
Possible alleviation of local energy deposition in control
materials prompted comparison of a material emitting gamma radi-
ation upon neutron absorption with one which emits particles.
Specifically, 20% (vol) Eu203 - 80% (vol) A1 was compared with
B_C - A1 as the control material. It was shown that the choice
ox a material such as the latter, which deposits its capture
energy over a large volume, could result in reduction in the local
energy deposition by a factor of ~ 20.
Both calculations were performed by estimating the absorp-
tions in the control material from DSN neutron transport calcul-
ations and determining the energy deposition from the reaction
products. As indicated by the geometry of Figure 1, the Kiwi-B
control rods consist of 12 beryllium cylinders, each of which has
a 120 ° sector covered with a thin vane of the control material.
(A 50 mils thickness of boral is presently employed). A cross-
section of one rod and its immediate environment of the beryl-
lium reflector is depicted in Figure 2.
Determination o_ the energy deposition from the B 10 (n,a)
reaction assumes that both reaction particles (_ and Li 7) deposit
all of their kinetic energy (2.3 mev) in the vane and that th
energy deposited from the 0.5 mev decay gamma from excited Li _ is
negligible. For 1000 Mw reactor operation, the maximum energy
deposited from reaction products occurs near the reactor midplane
and amounts to ~ 840 watts/gm of vane material while an additional
15 watts/gm arises from core gammas and neutrons for a total of
855 watts/gm.
Gamma energy deposition from Eu20 3 was determined by mocking
up one rod in the geometry of Figure 2-for a calculation with QAD.
Several hundred source points emitting 6 gamma groups were used
to represent the capture source in the vane. Results indicated
30 watts/gm deposited by reaction gammas and 15 watts/gm from core
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gammas and neutrons, for a total of 45 watts/gm. The calculation
was sufficiently refined to permit a very good determination of
the energy deposition contours, which are indicated on Figure 2.
The postulated total neutron absorptions and vane thicknesses
for these two representative vane-heating calculations were iden-
tical (0.23 n/fission and 50 mil thick vanes). While neutron
absorptions would be expected to be constant for equivalent con-
trol rod worth, vane thicknesses would be expected to change upon
changing the poison material, depending on the effective absorp-
tion cross section of the material used. Because of this, these
results are reported in watts per gram in order to apply to any
reasonable thickness of europium vane which might be considered.
Another calculation was made to estimate the photoneutron
production rate in the beryllium reflector of a Kiwi reactor both
during operation and post shutdown. Results were expected to be
of importance for estimating post shutdown core heating due to
photoneutron induced fissions.
The calculations were made by representing the geometry of
Kiwi-B in a realistic manner through QAD. After determination of
specific neutron formation rates as a function of position and
energy dependent photon flux, totals were determined by integra-
ting over the volume of the beryllium reflector. Using hundreds
of source points, a 19 line gamma spe_um, and the energy depen-
dent T,n, cross sections of Jakobsen,'_'it took only 10 seconds
per detector point to obtain the neutron production density.
Results indicated a total of 4 x 10 n/sec - Mw during reactor
operation and values as indicated in Figure 3 after shut down.
Although scandium and some other minor contaminants of beryl-
lium become activated during reactor operation, their decay gammas
are generally too low in energy to produce photoneutrons. As a
result, photoneutrons will not be present after separating the
reactor core and reflector, and will pose no hazards to reflector
reuse.
It has been determined from this calculation that core heat-
ing from photoneutron induced fissions should always be unimpor-
tant (_ 1%) in comparison with concurrent core gamma heating, but
the possible influence of the photoneutron production on reactor
kinetics remains to be evaluated.
Many different calculations have been made with QAD during
its one year existence. Others not mentioned have included esti-
mates of control rod actuator heating for several actuator geome-
tries and locations, radiation around an assembled beryllium re-
flector after removal from the re_or, radiation heating in and
around the core, and many others. _ All of these calculations,
as well as those presented here, were performed readily and
accurately with what has been proven an extremely useful flexible
program.
(I) Jakobsen, Physical Review, 123: 229 (July, 1961)
(2) Cf. Paper by D. M. Peterson, "The Leakage Radiation Field of
Kiwi Reactors", also submitted to this meeting.
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TRANSPORT CALCULATIONS OF THE
KIWI-B NEUTRON ENVIRONMENT _%_
D. A. McCutchan
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
Several one dimensional transport theory calculations have
been made for Kiwi-B-l, using the DSN code. Some results are
given here concerning the reactor's overall neutron economy, in-
terior flux, and leakage currents.
The 24 group cross-sections published by Mills(1)are those
which have been most widely used in Kiwi calculations. These
cross section groups are particularly effective in coping with
various thermal conditions, since there are ten energy groups
below 0.4 ev and there is provision for scattering to 4 groups
above and to 5 groups below an initial energy. The set is less
refined in the high energy region, possessing only two groups
above 1.4 mev. To gain more information about the high energy
reactor spectrum, these two groups have been replaced for the
present, by five new groups developed by Gordon Hansen of LASL.
The data reported here are all based on this revised 27 group
cross-section set, though there is no intention to use it contin-
uously in future Kiwi calculations.
Neutron Balance
Table I below gives some information on the neutron balance
in a Kiwi-B-I in a cold, dry critical condition.
Table I
Neutron Balance in Kiwi-B-I
Element Captures per fission
235 1.406
_238 .035
C .003
Nb .083
B .225
A1 (pressure shell) .003
Be .005
axial leakage .309
radial leakage .395
-2.454
The negative absorption cross section in beryllium refers to
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the difference between the production of n_trons by the (n,2n)
reaction and the loss of neutrons through (nl_) and (n,_) roac -
tions. The numbers in Table I are useful on±y as a gulae: in
particular, exact values of absorptions in Nb, A1, and B may vary
from those shown. Here the control vanes were represented by an
annular sheath with a boron loading chosen to reproduce an exper-
imental fission distribution. Though this magnitude is probably
correct, the actual boron absorption varies with control drum
orientation. The foregoing calculation represented the reactor
as an infinite cylinder in which fictitious absorbers of cross
section DB _ were introduced to simulate leakage in the axial
direction. While appropriate group values of the diffusion co-
efficient D were chosen for t_e different reactor regions, a
constant geometric buckling B was used, based on a 2.4 cm extra-
polation distance.
Interior Flux
The central flux in Kiwi-B-1p also obtained from the infinite
cylinder problem, appears in Table II. The absolute value of the
fission density at the core center which was used for problem
normalization is based on a power level of 1000 megawatts
(3.3 x 10 _ fissions/sec) and an experimental value of 1.6 for
the ratio of central to average power densities. These densities
are approximately 59 and 37 megawatts per ft _ respectively.
Table II
Central Flux in Kiwi-B-1 at 1000 Megawatt Power
Lower Fl_x
Group Energy n/cm -sec
1 6.0 mev 8.39 (13)
2 4.2 2.32 (14)
3 3.0 4.00 (14)
4 2.1 8.69 (14)
5 1.4 130 (15)
6 .9 1.49 (15)
7 .4 2.61 (15)
8 .1 3.82 (15)
9 17 kev 3.85 (15)
10 3 3.24 (15)
11 .454 3.15 (15)
12 61.4 ev 2.31 (15)
13 22.6 7.80 (14)
14 8.32 5.03 (14)
15 3.06 3.84 (14)
16 1.13 3.17 (14)
17 .414 3.10 (14)
18 .322 4.15 (13)
19 .251 3.02 (13)
20 .197 2.42 (13)
21 .152 1.54 (13)
22 .092 1.94 (13)
23 .056 7.91 (12)
24 .034 2.75 (12)
25 .025 6.43 (II)
26 .021 2.33 (II)
27 .013 4.24 ( )II
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In this table, the numbers in parentheses denote the mult_
plicative p_wer of ten. The summed internal flux is 2.58 X 10
neutrons/cm_-sec.
Leakage Currents
Table III shows the total radial leakage from Kiwi-B-I at
I000 megawatts power, as obtained from the infinite cylinds_epro-
blem. A preliminary comparison between the calculated S/U _U
threshold detector ratio, Kiwi-B-IA measurements at the Nevada
test site s_ws agreement to about 10%. In addition the activa-
tion of a S_(n,p) detector on the outer surface of the Kiwi-B-2
reflector* at mi_plane was found experi_ntally at Pajarito Site
to be 1.15 x 10-=/fission per gram of S °_. If we divide the
calculated radial leakage of Table III by the radial surface area
of the reflector, multiply by _/_oand interpret the result as an
isotropic _lux, the calculated S_(n,p) activation integral is
1.14 x 10-_/fission - gm. As the experimental values at this
location vary by about five percent, this close agreement is in
part fortuitous.
The average energy of the neutrons in the radial leakage is
~ .26 mev. The average curr_gt density adjacent to the side
pressure shell is 2.5 x 10 _ neutrons/cm_-sec.
Although axial leakage from the core may be approximated by
the product of the diffusion coefficient and a geometric buckling,
the axial core leakage spectrum given in Table III was obtained
explicitly from a DSN analysis of a bare slab of core compos-
ition. In that calculation, radial leakage was accounted for by
introducing a fictitious absorption defined by the ratio of
radial leakage to core flux in a cylindrical geometry problem.
(In the thermal groups the sign of the absorption was negative
because of thermalization by the reflector. Since the reflected
neutrons were introduced uniformly throughout the core by this
artifice, rather than at the periphery, the calculated thermal
leakage from the core may be too high). The core leakage shown
in Table III corresponds to the Kiwi-B-1 without end reflector
or shield. Upon dividing these values by the core end area, one
obtains _n average leakage current density of ~ 6.6 x 1014 neu-
tronsgom -sec. This value would be most applicable near the
reactor axis. The average energy of these neutrons is ~ .73 mev.
Comparison of these axial leakage values to S32(n,p) acti-
vation experiments with Kiwi-B-2 has been made. The _alculated
S activation at theodore end surface was 7.11 x 10 -_ per
fission per gram of sJZ; the observed activation on centerline
was 8.4 x 10-9/fission-gm. Activation at three radial positiRns
indicate an average of about 78% of this figure, or 6.6 x 10-_/
fission-gm.
The axial neutron leakage spectrum from the core was also
determined experimentally using the method of proton recoils in
nuclear photographic emulsions. The system was collimated to
Kiwi-B-2 and Kiwi-B-i are essentially identical neutronically,
though they differ in their mechanical details.
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confine observations to the core spectrum. Preliminary'analysis
of about 800 tracks confirms the spectrum predicted by a slab
DSN problem (Table Ill) using the 27 group cross section set.
The plate analysis is being continued to obtain better statistics
in the high energy tail of the spectrum.
Table III also indicates the summed leakage from one end
(only) of the graphite and the beryllium reflector cylinders, as
found from an infinite cylinder DSN result. These numbers are
the product of a volume integrated group flux and a DBv _ term.
(The DB z term was derived from an appropriate group diffusion
coefficient and a constant axial buckling corresponding to a 2.4
cm extrapolation distance). The average current density across
the end area of these reflector cylinders is ~ 1.7 x 1014 neu-
trons/cm2-sec; the average neutron energy is ~ .52 mev.
When all the leakages cited are totalled, one finds that an
unshielded reactor leaks ~ .7 neutron per fission; the average
energy of all the leakage neutrons is ~ .44 mev; and the total
power carried from a 1000 MW-reactor by neutrons is ~ 1.6 mega-
watts.
While propulsion reactors of this specifi_apower offer
new magnitude of internal flux (e.g., 2.6 x l0 v neutrons/cm_ -
sec), it is interesting to note that the rather high current den-
sities at the pressure shell do not really pose external radia-
tion problems of an unknown order, since more difficult radiation
environments may be found inside various existing test reactors.
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Table III
Leakage from Kiwi-B-1 at 1000 _.
Leakage from One End
n/sec
Core Reflector
1 6.0 mev 3.28 (16) 1.03 (16)
2 4.2 7.41 (16) 1.76 (16)
3 3.0 1.00 (17) 1.75 (16)
4 2.1 2.26 (17) 4.88 (16)
5 1.4 3.03 (17) 6.99 (16)
6
7
8
9
10
.9 3.04 (17) 5.93 (16)
.4 4.46 (17) 8.35 (16)
.1 5.51 (17) 1.09 (17)
17.0 key 4.78 (17) 1.02 (17)
3.0 3.79 (17) 9.25 (16)
11 .454 3.68 (17) 9.42 (16)
12 61.44 ev 2.70 (17) 8.66 (16)
13 22.60 8.95 (16) 4.55 (16)
14 8.315 5.90 (16) 4.17 (16)
15 3.059 4.81 (16) 3.81 (16)
16 1.1256 4.20 (16) 3.49 (16)
17 .4141 3.99 (16) 5.07 (16)
18 .3224 5.55 (15) 8.71 (15)
19 .2511 4.06 (15) 8.78 (15)
20 .1965 3.47 (15) 1.01 (16)
21 .1523 2.41 (15) 1.01 (16)
22 .0924 3.58 (15) 2.56 (16)
23 .0560 1.85 (15) 2.68 (16)
24 .0340 8.10 (14) 2.17 (16)
25 .0252 2.28 (14) 9.25 (15)
26 .0206 8.85 (13) 4.71 (15)
27 .0125 1.70 (13) 1.52 (16)
Radial
3.83 (i8) i. i4 (i8)
Leakage
n/sec
4.25 (16)
6.87 (16)
5.ii (i6)
2.48 (17)
5.23 (17)
4.08 (17)
5.93 (17)
9.16 (17)
8.87 (17)
9.76 (17)
8.52 (17)
9.10 (17)
6.36 (17)
6.49 (17)
6.46 (17)
6.28 (17)
9.21 (17)
1.76 (17)
1.80 (17)
2..12 (17)
2.19 (17)
5.74 (17)
6.14 (17)
5.04 (17)
2.16 (17)
1.09 (17)
3.08 (17)
1.31 (19)
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RADIATION INDUCED CONVERSION OF ORTHOHYDROGEN TO
PARAHYDROGEN ON THE RIFT PROPELLANT TANK
M. C. Johnson
The Bendix Corporation _.-_
Research Laboratories Division
Southfield (Detroit), Michigan
INTRODUCTION
The hydrogen molecule exists in either of two states, orthohydrogen or
parahydrogen. The equilibrium concentration of each of these states depends
upon the temperature. However, the transition from one state to the other is
strongly forbidden quantum mechanically, so that there is a considerable time
lag between a change in temperature and the establishment of the new ortho-
para equilibrium ratio. The importance of this process lies in the fact that the
conversion of orthohydrogen to parahydrogen is exothermic, producing more
heat than the heat of vaporization. If this conversion occurs in a propellant
tank, it represents an additional source of heat which may become a problem.
DISCUSSION
The distinction between the two states of hydrogen is in the directions of
the electron spin vectors. The lower energy configuration, in which the two
spins are in opposite directions, is parahydrogen; and the higher energy con-
figuration, with the spins parallel, is orthohydrogen. Considering a single
unperturbed molecule, the half life of the conversion is 300 years. But due to
perturbations in the liquid state, the conversion reaction proceeds much more
quickly, obeying the following equation:
dx kx 2 (1)
dt
or
where:
1 1
- k(At)
X X
0
x = fraction above equilibrium at time t
k = constant experimentally determined to be
1.14 x 10 -2 per hour
x = original fraction above equilibrium
O
As equilibrium is approached, the rate of conversion oecomes very slow.
At room temperatures (approximately 300°K), the equilibrium ratio of ortho-
hydrogen to parahydrogen is 3 to I. At the temperature of liquid hydrogen,
about 20°K, the ratio is 99.79 percent parahydrogen to 0.21 percent orthohydro-
gen. Since the conversion rate is so slow, hydrogen can be liquified from room
109
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temperature and r_.mai_ in its 75 to Z5 ortho-to-para condition. However, con-
version heating would completely vaporize this hydrogen within 48 hours.
Therefore, catalysts are used in the liquefaction process which greatly
increase the conversion rate, so that the heat of conversion is removed during
processing. Bulk liquid hydrogen generally is 95 percent parahydrogen. Con-
version of the remaining 4.79 percent orthohydrogen does not add significantly
to the evaporation rate, and the cost of converting the last few percent rises
disproportionately.
If the liquid hydrogen is used in a nonnuclear environment, there should
be no problems. The conversion will take place over a long period of time and
will probably provide a small thermal input relative to other heat sources.
However, an experiment by Capron published in 1935( 1 ) indicates that ionizing
radiation will induce the conversion. Eyring, Hirshfe[der, and Taylor(2)
published a theoretical treatment of Capron's experiment, deriving results
which agreed quantitatively with the measured data. This theory has been
extrapolated to liquid hydrogen in order to predict the possible effect of the
NERVA reactor radiation on the hydrogen in the propellant tank.
There are two interesting possibilities. One is that the conversion will
take place almost instantaneously while the tank is still full In this case, the
relief valve would have to vent a large amount of gaseous hydrogen very quickly
or the tank would burst in spite of supercooling. The other effect is less spec-
tacular but could be serious. The hydrogen might vaporize to such an extent
that there would not be sufficient fuel to complete the mission. If the radiation-
induced conversion rate is sufficiently slow, other sources of heat will com-
pletely mask the heat of conversion.
The calculation of heating rate is based on conversion due to bond break-
age and to atomic hydrogen interaction. In the first case, approximately one to
six molecular bonds are broken per ion pair. For every i000 free atoms
formed, on the average 48 which were originally ortho wi[[ recombine as para
in liquid 95 percent parahydrogen. The other interaction is the exchange
reaction,
H + H Z (ortho) _ H Z (para) + H (Z)
All of the free hydrogen is assumed to be lost by recombination.
The calculation proceeded as follows: Typical numbers for the radiation
at the bottom of the tank are I0 II n/cmZ-sec with an average energy of 1 Mev
and Z x 1012 Mev/cmZ-sec gamma radiation with an average energy of Z Mev.
The number of ion pairs per cubic centimeter can be determined assuming one
pair is formed for every 33 ev of energy deposited. Since the number of free
hydrogen atoms formed per ion pair is not we[[ determined, the calculation was
split at this point in an attempt to bracket the actual conversion rate with worst
and best cases. One set of curves was generated assuming one free hydrogen
atom per ion pair and a reaction rate of 105 cm3/mo[e -sec, while the other
assumed 6 free hydrogen atoms per ion pair and a reaction rate of 107 cm3/
mole-sec.
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where:
The average concentration of free hydrogen can be found from the formula
in Reference (3):
C H = Ko CH (3)
z.
C H = free hydrogen atom concentration in moles/cm 3
I -- rate of formation of free hydrogen, moles/cm3-sec
CH2 = concentration of molecular hydrogen, motes/cm 3
K -- recombination coefficient = 1016 cm6/mo[es2-sec
O
I
The constant K o was measured in gaseous hydrogen at standard temperature and
pressure. It is not known whether it is different in liquid hydrogen. Knowing
the reaction rate, it is possible to calculate the time required to obtain conver-
sion to a fraction x ab.ove equilibrium.
where : X ---
X ----
O
At =
K 1 =
1 X
_t = in _ (4)
I x
+ K C o
C H 1 H
2
unconverted fraction above equilibrium
original unconverted fraction, in this case 0.05
time
rate of the exchange reaction, 10 5 or 10 7
cm3/mole-sec depending on the assumption.
The constant K I is known to be temperature-dependent, decreasing by a
factor of 103 betweer_ 600 and 300°K. At 300°K it was evaluated to be 8.5 x 107 ,
but sufficient information prevented an actual calculation at Z0°K in the liquid
state. This is the reason for the assumption of the two different rates as worst
and best cases. Since conversion of 1 cm 3 of orthohydrogen to parahydrogen
releases 8.9 calories, the heat deposition per cubic centimeter versus time can
be plotted directly from Equation (4). This is shown in Figures 1 and 2 as com-
pared to the heat deposition rate due to natura[ conversion and to nuclear heating.
C ONC L USIONS
The heating is increased over that due to natural conversion; but nuclear
heating is much more significant than the conversion heating, even assuming the
high reaction rate. Un[ess there are changes in the values of the reaction rates
and recombination rates in going from gaseous to liquid hydrogen of magnitudes
much greater than seems reasonable at the present time, the contribution of
ortho-para conversion heating is not significant compared to nuclear heating.
It is concluded that this will not be a problem.
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STARTUP STUDIES OF A NUCLEAR ROCKET REACTOR
Part 3 STARTUP PHILOSOPHY*
J. Douglas Balcomb
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
I. INTRODUCTION
The startup of nuclear propusion reactors on liquid hydrogen has been a subject
which has caused a great deal of apprehension since the inception of the Rover
program. The fear arises because a small amount of hydrogen in the reactor core
greatly enhances the efficiency of the neutron chain reaction. Figure i shows
the core axial distribution of hydrogen reactivity worth in Kiwi-B. We estimate
that if the core were filled with liquid hydrogen, the increase in criticality
would be 30-40 dollars (k _ 1.3). For small amounts of hydrogen evenly distri-
buted through the core, the reactivity increase is about 4.2 dollars per pound.
This hydrogen reactivity is a negative feedback, self-control mechanism which
seems to be stable and well behaved. The fear is that violent local fluctua-
tions in the boiling of the liquid hydrogen in the reflector will cause blobs
of liquid to enter the core and cause extreme power excursions or reactor power
control problems.
To decrease the probability of blobs of liquid entering the core we have imposed
the ground rule that the average fluid temperature in the core inlet plenum
shall be maintained greater than 90 ° R.
The choice of 90 ° R as a lower limit is based on the properties of hydrogen.
Below the critical temperature, 59.3 ° R, hydrogen can exist as a two-phase
equilibrium mixture. Between 59.3 ° R and about 90 ° R, hydrogen heat transfer
continues to exhibit a two-phase nature. That is, there is a distinct separa-
tion of dense and light hydrogen. This region we call the pseudo-two-phase
region. Since the object is to avoid congregation of dense hydrogen in the
core inlet plenum, 90 ° R i8 chosen as the minimum allowable temperature. Above
90 ° R, hydrogen seems to maintain a single phase nature.
Other restrictions may limit the possible range of startup profiles. Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory is currently testing the Kiwi-B series of reactors at the
Nevada Test Site. For these tests, hydrogen will be supplied to the reactor by
an axial flow turbopump (NFS-I) developed by Rocketdyne. The flow facility for
these tests allows the hydrogen either to be bypassed around the reactor or to
be throttled by a valve in the line to the reactor. In this way the startup
pressure-flow rate relationship does not need to correspond to the operation
region of the turbopump. However, for flying reactors, it will probably not be
* Work performed under AEC Contract W-7405-ENG. 36.
115
a "
possible to b_ass flow. This paper includes the case in which flow cannot be
bypassed, thus, the ground rule is adopted that the reactor inlet pressure and
flow rate relationship shall be confined to the turbopump operating region.
Figure 2 shows the NFS-I "pump map" showing the operating regions.
During the initial portion of the startup the main hydrogen heating in the re-
flector is due to the initial stored heat content of the reflector which we
presume is at ambient temperature. Thus, in order to maintain the temperature
at the core inlet plenum as high as possible, it is advantageous to make the
startup as short as possible and to maintain flow rates as low as possible.
A third constraint on the startup profile is imposed by the permissible thermal
stress in the reactor core. This limits the maximum rate of rise of core tem-
perature and thus determines the minimum startup time. The maximum startup
rate is not known at this time; it may be that this information can only be ob-
tained from reactor tests. For the meantime, startup rates in the range of
25 ° R/sec to i00 ° R/sec are being considered.
II. STARTUP SEQUENCING
Figure 3 shows a t_pieal reactor system startup sequence. A typical startup
sequence might be divided into three ph_es as follow_
Phase I. Duration - i0 to 20 seconds. The purpose of this phase is to provide
the proper initial conditions for Phase II. The power at the end of Phase I is
to be of the order of I00 MW so that the reactor core temperature will be rising
at about i00 ° R par second. To accomplish this, power is brought up from a low
value on a constant period. Periods which are considered are in the range
i - 5 seconds. Flow is started at the end of Phase I so that the nozzle cooling
passages and inlet piping are chilled do_, flow is stabilized, and the pump is
running. A net result of Phase I is that the reactor core is heated to 700 -
i000 ° R, but the reflector is still near ambient temperature.
Phase II. Duration - i0 to 20 seconds. The purpose of this phase is to get
quickly through the hazardous part of the startup. Once the core and outlet
gas temperatures reach about 2500 ° R there is no longer danger of temperatures
in the core inlet plenum dropping below 90 ° R. The minimum duration of Phase II
is limited by permissible core thermal stresses. We have taken i00 ° R/sec as
the rate of change of outlet gas temperature permitted during Phase II. Thus,
core outlet gas temperature is programmed linearly from about 900 ° R to 2500 ° R
in Phase II. The flow rate profile is the parameter which is varied to deline-
ate between startup types. Power is programmed consistent with the desired flow
rate and core outlet gas temperature profile.
Phase III. Duration - greater than i0 seconds. The danger of blobs of hydrogen
entering the core is past and so this phase is very arbitrary. It can be pro-
longed, a half-power hold can be inserted, or the startup can be terminated
without going to full power.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTRAINTS
A typical plot of the temperature in the core inlet plenum during a startup
will show a decrease, a minimum, and a slow rise to about 200 ° R at full power.
This temperature is maintained greater than 90 ° R by the stored heat content of
the reflector, by the heat generated in the reflector, and by the heating in
the nozzle. The reflector heat content alone (initial temperature = 540 ° R) is
sufficient to maintain temperatures in the core inlet plenum greater than 90 ° R
for an integrated hydrogen flow of about 170 pourds. One desires to keep the
total hydrogen used during Phase II to a minimum in order to conserve this
116
stored heat; this is done by minimizing both the flow rate and the duration.
On the other hand, some minimum flow rate must be maintained in order to avoid
the stall region of the pump; this minimum flow increases as the core tempera-
ture increases. A logical way to program flow during Phase II is to demand, at
each point in time, the minimum flow rate at which the pump can sa_ely operate.
It is not clear at this time that pump operation needs to be confined to the
normal operating region. Operation in the soft stall regime may be permissible.
It has been experimentally demonstrated that such operation does not injure the
pump, but does degrade pump efficiency.
The second half of the startup is not nearly as critical as the first half.
This is because the power generation in the reflector region becomes sufficient
to maintain the temperature in the core inlet plenum above 90 ° R. Figure 4
shows steady state core inlet temperature as a function of flow rate for core
exit gas temperatures of 2000 ° R and 2500" R. We have selected 2500 ° R as a
conservative definition of the transition from the intermediate to the final
phase of the startup.
IV. RESULTS OF PARTICULAR STARTUP STUDIES
We have studied several startups by means of the HEX digital code. Three of
these studies are reported here in order to present a range of numerical
examples. The studies presume that Phase I of the startup is completed leaving
the core at an average temperature of 950 ° R and the nozzle and piping chilled.
The flow profiles during Phase II are shown in Fig. 5. Startup A is chosen to
barely avoid stall in the manner described above. Startup B is chosen to keep
temperatures in the core inlet plenum high by keeping flow rate low without re-
gard to the pump. Startup C is chosen to keep the pump well away from stall
without regard to the temperature in the core inlet plenum. The power profiles
are shown in Fig. 6. The calculation is terminated at 16 seconds, the time
when the outlet gas temperature reaches 2500 ° R.
The most important results are shown in Figs. 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the tem-
perature in the core inlet plenum vs. time. All three startups satisfy Ground
Rule No. I, however, Startup C is very marginal. Figure 8 shows the path of
the three startups on a plot of pump discharge pressure vs. flow rate. Also
plotted are dotted lines defining the pump operating regions for a 75 psia pump
supply pressure. Startup A narrowly avoids stall, Startup B goes well into
stall, and Startup C clearly avoids stall.
V. CLOSING COMMENT
Kiwi-B-iB, the first rocket reactor to be started on liquid hydrogen was tested
on September i, 1962. Reactor core damage occurred as the reactor approached
full power. However, the critical portion of startup, from ambient to about
2500 ° R exit gas temperature, went approximately as predicted by the HEX calcu-
lations. The minimum core inlet gas temperaturewas 160 ° R. No abnormalities
were noted which could be attributed to fluctuations in propellant reactivity.
We conclude from this that 160 ° R is well within the permissible range of core
inlet temperatures.
The results obtained from the Kiwi-B-iB test after the core damage note above
had occurred are inconclusive. However, they are very encouraging. During this
time there were large gaps in the core and holes in the nozzle. Conditions are
not sufficiently well known to make accurate heat transfer calculations. During
this period the observed temperature in the core inlet plenum fell to about
60 ° R (The measurement is not accurate at low temperature.). Flow rate was
varied over the range from 70 to 20 pounds per second; the pressure in the core
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inlet plenum varied over the range 390 psia to 55 psla. The reactor was near
critical this entire time, and the measured reactor power was observed to be
stable and free of fluctuations that would be expected from unsteady flow. It
appears that stable reactor operation may be possible for _nditions in the
core inlet plenum below 90 ° R, perhaps even for two phase conditions. If this
is true, it will modify future startup philosophy considerably.
A startup philosophy is evolving in the Rover program. This paper has pre-
sented some thoughts current today. The picture is certain to change as experi-
ments are performed and as new ground rules are laid down.
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4CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR A LIQUID-HYDROGEN-COOLED KIWI-B REACTOR*
+
P. J. Blake, R. J. Bohl, E. A. Brown, C. P. Milich,
M. J. Nutter, C. E. Stiles and B. G. Strait
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
INTRODUCTION
Kiwi-B-iB, the first nuclear propulsion reactor to be cooled by liquid hydrogen,
was run on September I, 1962. This test was highly successful in that it proved
that a Kiwi-B reactor can be started up and run in a predictable, well-behaved
manner with liquid hydrogen coolant.
The Kiwi-B-iB controls analysis done by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
was complicated by the uncertainties associated with heat transfer calculations
in two-phase hydrogen, and by the reactivity effects of dense hydrogen in a re-
actor core. Hydrogen acts as a moderator, thus increasing reactivity. Con-
ceptually, the hydrogen could add several times more reactivity than the control
rods were worth. If this were allowed to happen, a nuclear accident would have
followed. A secondary concern was the unknown character of the random noise
which could have been introduced by slugs and droplets of liquid hydrogen pass-
ing through the core.
The systems developed to control the operation of Kiwi-B-iB and a brief summary
of the hot run will be described in this paper. It was necessary to make cer-
tain simplifying assumptions and to restrict the mathematical treatment to
simply a presentation of the applicable transfer functions in order to keep the
paper within the specified length. More complete descriptions of most of the
systems have been printed_ %a. The most notable assumption was that the inter-
action of flow rate with power and exit gas temperature was negligible. Other
assumptions will be pointed out in the descriptions of the various systems.
Analog and digital computer data, which have none of the assumptions mentioned
in this paper, indicate that the assumptions are valid for the frequency range
of interest in studying the stability of the systems.
A simplified block diagram of the Kiwi-B-IB control systems is shown in Fig. I.
The primary controlled variables were the logarithm of power, exit gas tempera-
ture, and mass flow rate. The log power and turbopump speed control systems
operated as sub-loops in the temperature and flow rate systems, respectively.
During hot runs the speed demand voltage was developed by the flow rate con-
troller. The log power demand was the sum of two voltages - one from the master
programer and a second vernier correction from the temperature controller. The
master programs for log power and flow rate were designed to keep the exit gas
* Work performed under the auspices of USAEC and NASA under
Contracts W-7405-ENG. 36 and SNP-I.
+ On loan to Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory from Westinghouse
Astronuclear Laboratory, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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temperature at the desired value within the limits of accuracy of th_syst_m
calibrations. This arrangement permitted the operators to open the temperature
control loop if a malfunction occurred. The run could then be continued on log
power and flow rate control with reduced temperature accuracy.
POWER CONTROL
Kiwi-B-IB power was regulated with a five-decade log power control system.
Power was varied by positioning 12 rotary control rods located in a beryllium
reflector which surrounded the core. The rods were beryllium cylinders with
boral sheaths covering 120 ° of the cylinders. The core reactivity could be in-
creased approximately $9 by rotating the boral from positions toward the core
to positions directly away from the core. All of the rods received a common
positional command voltage from the power controller.
Referring to Fig. i,
bations were as follows:
Sa 2(0.6)S + i)
__%sI%! 6.67 (31-i-_f+ 31.4
c_(s) = _%(s) = s(3-_6+ i)
Gm(S ) 50(S) 1.8 58(S) De_rees
= _%(s) = _d(S) Volt
_)(S) 0.0006 Sin 8 degrees "IS (S) = s0(s) =
the log power system transfer functions for small pertur-
Assuming that temperature end propellant reactivity effects are negligible in
the frequency range of interest, the neutronics transfer function at infinite
period was:
(....%_s+ 1)
SO(S) 1350o 0.1
---- -- KW
%(s) 8(SKr)(S) S(y_ o + 1)
5__E_(S) 8.67 Volts
c.(s) = _Q(S) - Qo KW
The open loop transfer function for 8 = 90 ° and an infinite period was:
(S + i) Se 2(0.6)S + i)
Cq(S) = 8.43 o.1 (31-_ + 31.4 . _o(s)
S_(l-_o+ 1)(F_6 + 1) _ed(S)
Nichols' plots of the log power system open loop characteristics for the two
extremes of reactor period considered are shown in Fig. 2. The effect of sus-
tained period on the reactor transfer function has been described_; therefore,
it will not be given further treatment in this paper. Changing the average con-
trol rod position from 90 ° to either 15° or 165 ° lowers the open loop gain
approximately 12 db.
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
Kiwi-B-IB core exit gas temperature was controlled automatically with the system
shown in Fig. I. The gas temperature was measured with 3 tungsten/tungsten-
rhenium thermocouples 4 . The temperature error voltage was developed by com-
paring the temperature demand voltage to the amplified average of the three
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thermo_ouple voltages. A reject circuit was included which would automatically
reject any thermocouple which differed from the average by more thau 400 ° R.
The controller regulated temperature by applying appropriate corrections to the
programmer log power demand voltage. The temperature controller was clamped so
that it could not change the power by more than + 15% or - 50% of the demanded
power.
The llnearized transfer functions for the temperature control system are given
below. Bode plots of the open loop characteristics for two operating points
are shown in Fig. 3.
(s.i_ + i)
8_.._(s) o.I o,14
c_(s) =8_(s) = s (T_o + i)
._%_
c,v (s) = 6F_ = 8.67
8[Lo_ q(s)] KW
5[Log Qd(S)] Volt
(s__+ l)8z_l=_sCs_ 1,3
c-s (s) = 8Q(S)
4.O8Wo( + l)(_ + i)
o
8__(s) I Volts
= = .3.5S OR
c_(s) 8Zce(S) 50 t'76"-+ I)
°R
KW
The open loop transfer function of the temperature system was:
Gz(S) =
(s_._Qo o.14 + i)(i,-"_ + 1)
,_ 280s s (3.5= 1)
s(1.77)(10) Wo(-F-- + 1)( 7 + 1) ,fw "
TURBOPUMP SPEED CONTROL
The liquid hydrogen which cooled Kiwi-B-IB was pumped through the reactor by a
turbine-driven pump. The turbopump speed was varied by positioning a linear
valve located between the turbine inlet nozzle and a gaseous hydrogen tank farm.
The speed control system shown in Fig. i was used to regulate speed to the value
required to maintain the desired reactor flow rate.
The equations which represent the characteristics of the speed control loop
elements are as follows:
: 5F,,(s) : s (_ + I)(i-_0 + l)
Volts
Volt
5WWt(S) i. 22 (i0)_4 p= ib/s ec
c_(s) = _F_(S) - (s__+ 1)(___ + 2(0.5)s + 1) Volt
63 282_ 282
The equation which describes the pump torque is Lp = KI_ + EeNW + KsW_; how-
ever, this equation can be approximated by Lp = K4No 2 if the pump operating
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point is kept on a constant specific speed line. If we assume that
Lp = 2.03(10)-SNo 2, then
= _N___£__= 2050 O.0185No
4.sis l_G_2 (S) 5Wt(S) [4"06(10)-SNo + 0"0185Wt°][l'22(lO)-aNo + 0"555Wto +
G_ (S) _ Rm
= 8Wt (S) ib/sec
At No = 23,500 RPM and Wto = 6.9 ib/sec:
_ (s) = l'S(l°)3
(s_%_
7.2 + i)
GIs (S) _ 3.33(10) -3 Volts
= 8N(S) = RPM
The speed control system open loop transfer function at Ps = 3300 psi and full
flow was:
GN(S) =
22.1(8+ I)(_0 + !)
_ 2(0.5)ss( + 1)( + 1)(_0 + 1)(1-_0 + 1)(2_2 + 282 + 1)
A Nichols' plot of the open loop characteristics of the speed control system at
full flow rate is shown in Fig. 4. Reducing the speed increases the bandwidth
slightly and decreases the stability margin.
FLOW RATE CONTROL
The liquid hydrogen used to cool Kiwi-B-iB was stored in two 28,000-gallon
dewars. During reactor runs the dewars were pressurized to 60 psig with gaseous
hydrogen to provide suction pressure for the coolant pump. The reactor liquid
hydrogen flow rate was measured with a venturi located a few feet downstream
from the pump. The flow rate control system shown in Fig. i varied the turbo-
pun_ speed to keep the venturi flow rate equal to the programmed flow rate de-
mand. The reactor flow rate differed somewhat from the venturi flow rate at
appreciable frequencies due to the effects of the 8-inch diameter, lO0-foot long
pipe line between the venturi and the reactor.
Referring to Fig. i, the flow rate control system transfer functions were as
follows:
5ENd(S) 2(S+ I) Volts
G_4(S)- _zo(S) S(_ + i) Volt
G_5(S) = 5N(S) _^SNfS)= 4u_ RP__M
5ENd (S) Vo It
At full power and full flow:
_%(s)
Gzs(s) - _N(S) - 3(l°)'a _RPM
!23
5EI_ (S) i Volt
G_v (S) = 5Wv(S) = Ib/sec
The flow rate system open loop transfer function at full power and full flow was:
2.4(_0 + i) . _N(S)
Gi(S) = S(4 + i) _Nd(S)
A Nichols' plot of the open loop transfer function is shown in Fig. 5. The
rather conservative design indicated by this figure was chosen to increase the
ability of the system tO operate stably under the influence of relatively large
disturbances. Such disturbances were observed on several occasions while test-
ing the flow facility prior to the Kiwi-B-IB run. Two primary causes of the
disturbances were the action of the specific speed control system and the abrupt
transition from film to nucleate boiling in pipe lines which had not been thor-
oughly chilled prior to starting the turbopump. The specific speed control
system was an auxiliary servo system which bypassed liquid hydrogen from the
pump discharge line to atmosphere to keep the pump out of stall.
HOT RUN SUMMARY
There were two principal objectives of the Kiwi-B-iB full power run. The first
was to prove that a Kiwi-B reactor can be started up and run with liquid hydro-
gen coolant. The second was to see if the reactor and test facility would oper-
ate satisfactorily under full flow and full power conditions. The successful
completion of both these objectives was needed prior to the full power, rela-
tively long duration run planned for Kiwi-B-4A. Kiwi-B-4A will be the first of
several reactors having fuel elements similar to those planned for the Nerva
reactors.
The planned startup for Kiwi-B-iB was to change from a holding level of 1MW
and 2 ib/sec to iii0 MW, 70 Ib/sec, and 4100 ° R at a rate of 100°/sec. After
a hold of 30 seconds the operating level was to be reduced to 690 MW, 56 ib/sec,
and 3280 ° R for a second hold of approximately 2 minutes duration. Pipeline and
temperature control system dynamic measurements were planned for this hold.
The shutdown included a hold at 31MW and 20 Ib/sec to study the effects of
allowing the core inlet coolant to approach liquid hydrogen temperatures.
A preliminary analysis of the run data indicates that the startup on liquid
hydrogen was highly successful. The nuclear power and thermodynamic processes
inside the reactor followed well-behaved patterns essentially as predicted_
Random reactivity noise caused by liquid hydrogen slugs passing through the
reactor was negligible; however, one reactivity transient was observed following
what could have been the formation of a gas bubble in the pipeline leading to
the reactor. This transient lasted for approximately I00 ms., resulting in a
maximum corrective rod velocity of 16°/sec and a minimum reactor period of
approximately I second. Reactor power rose momentarily to a value about 40%
above the demanded power.
The run profile was changed rather drastically after the startup because eleven
fuel modules departed from the core over a period of approximately i00 seconds.
During most of this time the power, flow rate, and exit gas temperature demands
were left at the full power hold. After 6 modules had left, reactivity was so
decreased by the loss of carbon and uranium that the control rods went full out
in an attempt to maintain reactor power. The maximum rod velocity during this
process was approximately 36°/sec. After the control rods reached their full
out positions, reactor power and exit gas temperature were controlled entirely
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by the natural balance between positive propellant reactivity and negative core
temperature reactivity. After each subsequent module departure power quickly
dipped approximately 20%, then slowly recovered part way as the core cooled and
hydrogen density and reactivity increased in the core. This operation was smooth
and very similar to analog computer predictions.
As the flow rate was decreased during shutdown, power fell and the hydrogen in
the core inlet plenum got steadily colder. It is not clear yet whether liquid
hydrogen actually entered the core, though the hydrogen must have been very
dense.
The power instrumentation calibration was in error such that actual power was
some 25% lower than indicated power. This caused temperatures to be low through-
out the run. The temperature controller was in the +15% power correction clamp
during the entire run; therefore, no dynamic data were obtained for this system.
The flow rate and turbopump speed control systems operated well despite large
pipeline flow and pressure oscillations during most of the startup. The pipe-
line oscillations are believed due to an interaction between the specific speed
control system and pipe lines which had not been sufficiently cooled down prior
to the run.
REFERENCES
1. E.A. Brown, "Logarithmic Power Control in Kiwi-A Reactors", I.R.E. Trans.
on Nuclear Science, Vol. NS-9, No. I, Jan. 1962.
2. S. Singer, "The Period Equilibrium Effect in Reactor Dynamics", Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory Report LA-2654_ Jan. 1962.
3. E.A. Brown_ H. B. Demuth, P. B. Erickson, R. R. Mohler, S. J. Singer, and
C. E. Stiles, "Kiwi-B-IA Power and Temperature Control Systems"j Proceedings
of the Nuclear Propulsion Conference_ Monterey, August 1962.
4. A. R. Driesner, C. P. Kempter, C. E. Landahl, C. A. Linder, and T. E.
Springer, 'high Temperature Thermocouples in the Rover Program", I.R.E.
Trans. on Nuclear Science, Vol. NS-9, No. 1, Jan. 1962.
125
EB
TEMP.
_CONTROLLER._
- rTd
ELOGO,
R I
FLOW RATE
ITHERMOCOUPLE _"
E3 I LOG Q L
IINSTRUMENTATION I-
POWER I Ez _ el ROD
CONTROLLER[_ RODS [_REACTIVITY I
_kr
TEMR
REACTIVITY
CORE
HEAT
"XCHANGER
SPEED
es
REACTIVITY
Ppe
APL
E9
FLOW RATE I.
INSTRUMENTATION I-
SPEED ].
INSTRUMENTATION _-
8 = AVERAGE POSITION OF THE CONTROL RODS (DEGREES)
8k r : CONTROL ROD REACTIVITY (ABSOLUTE UNITS)
_k T : CORE TEMPERATURE REACTIVITY (ABSOLUTE UNITS)
Skp = PROPELLANT REACTIVITY (ABSOLUTE UNITS)
Q = REACTOR POWER (KW)
Tee = CORE EXIT GAS TEMPERATURE (OR)
Tco = AVERAGE CORE STRUCTURE TEMPERATURE (OR)
Pco = AVERAGE CORE PRESSURE (PSIA)
Pri = REACTOR INLET PRESSURE (PSIA)
Ppe = TURBO-PUMP EXIT PRESSURE (PSIA)
_PL : PRESSURE DROP IN PIPE LINE (PSIA)
E = VOLTAGE
t = TURBINE FLOW RATE (LBm/SEC)
W v = VENTURI FLOW RATE (LBm/SEC)
o
W r = REACTOR FLOW RATE (LBm/SEC)
N : TURBO-PUMP SPEED (RPM)
SUBSCRIPT o = QUIESCENT VALUE
FIG. I CONTROL SYSTEMS BLOCK DIAGRAM
126
q < .+llllll
dl_ 4 .,
i_) -leo 0÷317
+24
*le
+12
i 4
K _
_ ,o \
-18 _ --
t :It
-24 I0 -leo -150 -120 ''
O,lL 4b J
_ _ r
\
j_
-_zo - o -sO -_o
FIGUe _ 2
LOG POWER lLYSTEM
CNA RACTIERI tTICS FOR I • 90"
I ---I---- m _ER_OO
f _ O 5 S(_ PERIOO
F--\
I '\m
_lLs
*30
4*2
:'°,_°l \ I+,
+_.,,,__L
0P
i -m
/I I...
-IO +sO -3o
"\ i ....
I
_'I !o
LOOP PH&ILE,.,,_(KG), DEIMII_EIL
_ol _o_ o.i
FREOUE_K_y, RADIANS/S[CONO
izD -1111O -150 oi isO ..410 -3 O
F i+oeumt 4I
I | TUmllO- pUMP ILREO COWrie.
i S_tSTEM CHARACIERIST ICIL
* I No. 23.OO0 IIIqi. ill. ?O_l/IC
..... --t '-../ I I I \
\ /\', I \\...... \1 = ,.lL.+-o
_,- _+<-t
+IlL i n _ _ : , .
\ /\ _. \
W't _ +,o , _-',_
-ul _ _ _ _ _ - t :
, I
-24_2 ....... )L -+lLO _ -30
LOOe PH_K. ,4 (Kill, D[_EIL
+S
I
_M
_I0
+ill
+MI
*IlL
*lL
III
"lt,ll
-lio -_9 _+ sl
FiGt_ +'i IFLOW RAT(
¢ONTnOL SYSTEM OPEN
LOOP CNA_ACT(RIILT lOlL
_.zlL,sOO
: ./\ ,: \
\
\
.....
-- o _ \
-II10 -150 -IItO -lo -IO
LOOP PHAIIE, ,_( (KIll, O(GR[EIL
127
4mm_ , P
P 4
!
DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF ELECTROPNELrMA_TIC
SERVO ACTUATORS FOR2 THE NERVA ENGINE 1 [UID. J. Schaffer and A. J. Wetzel 3
The Bendix Corporation
This paper discusses the type of control actuators being developed by
The Bendix Corporation for use in the environments of the NERVA engine.
Included are slides showing the major work functions and the approach to
the design and analysis of sub-systems to accomplish these functions. The
factors affecting the design approach as well as basic sizing criteria are
reviewed. Slides and data showing the status of development tests on
components and materials for applicability to the temperature, nuclear, and
working fluid environment are presented. Ana/ytical and test data are
compared to indicate the validity of the mathematical models used to
evaluate performance. A
The material presented herein is only a summary, and this informationj_!
is amplified upon oral presentation using the slides shown.
INTRODUCTION
The need for controls which must operate in extreme environments and in
_the high intensity radiation fields of a nuclear rocket engine led to
sponsorship of a program for development of electropneumatic controls by
the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The technologies established under
this program have been extended and are being applied to engine controls
for the NERVA engine. Figure i shows schematically the relationships of the
controls to the engine functions. Cryogenic temperatures and high neutron
and gamma flux levels preclude the use of conventional hydraulic servo
systems; availability of power and operating fluid from the engine pumping
system enhance the use of a pneumatic system.
ipresented at Joint ARS/ANS/IAS Nuclear Propulsion Conference,
Monterey, California, August 15-17, 1962.
Supervisor, Nuclear Propulsion Controls Group, Mechanical Development
Dep_tment, Research Laboratories Division, Southfield(Detroit)Michigan.
Project Engineer, Propulsion Controls, Products Aerospace Division,
South Bend, Indiana.
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The basic configuration, applicable to many engine work functions,
consists of a high speed rotary element in combination with a speed
reducing transmission for either rotary or linear output motion. A high
speed motor with small volumes under compression minimizes compressibility
effects of the operating fluid and results in satisfactory performance
when using supply pressure either as low as lO0 psi or in excess of 1000 psi.
The indicated success of dry film lubricants would appear to permit operation
with gas at cryogenic temperatures and eliminates the need for external
lubrication systems.
TYPICAL PNEUMATIC POSITION SERV0 SUBSYST_
A functional block diagram of a rotary position actuator (Figure 2) and
corresponding simplified computer model (Figure 3) may be used to illustrate
typical components and their individual performance characteristics.
The computer model typifies the Bendix rotary actuator design approach.
The particular gain settings and loop compensation may be optimized for each
actuation system. Typical component characteristics are discussed in later
paragraphs.
Four types of servo amplifiers have been designed, fabricated and tested
with pneumatic servos; all have resulted in satisfactory performance. These
are (1) Magnetic Amplifiers (2) Transistor Amplifiers (3) Combination
Magnetic and Transistor Amplifiers(hybrid) (4) Ceramic Vacuum Tube Amplifiers.
A mag-amp design, which is probably the best compromise for radiation
tolerance, performance, and reliability, has been used in the analytical and
test comparisons made in this paper. A typical transfer function and dynamic
characteristics of the amplifier for one actuator are shown on Figure 4.
The torque motor travel is made proportional by the use of a spring tube
in which the rigid output member is centered. The spring tube also acts as a
pressure seal. Polarizing flux for moderate to very low temperature environ-
ments is supplied by permanent magnets. For extremely high temperature, in
O
another application where 1200 F operation is required, electromagnetic
polarization is used. The frequency response to voltage and the steady state
characteristics of an early design PM torque motor are shown on Figure 5-
The servo valve for this application is a two stage, four landed, closed
center, area control valve. The spool valve operating as the second stage
uses position feedback with one-to-one motion ratio to the pilot stage.
Stable operation is obtained by means of controlled volumes of "damping tanks"
at each end of the spool. These tanks, along with an entry bleed, are sized
as a function of ram volume/area ratio, the average pressure level, steady
state servo flow and servo medium. All other parameters remaining constant,
the damping volume is proportional to the gas constant. Dynamic performance
of the valve and torque motor combination is shown in Figure 6.
Typical torque-speed characteristics of the servo motor (shown on Figure 7)
are necessary for the nonlinear computer performance evaluation. The map
shown in Figure 7(a) is the idealized torque developed from the motor and 7(b)
reflects the friction torque characteristic of the motor. A three-gear motor
is used and various flow porting schemes are incorporated to obtain optimized
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performance' ch_acteristics.
It can be shown that to obtain optimum sizing with respect to gas con-
sumption and motor size, notwithstanding other requirements, the power
section of the actuator may be sized to meet frequency response requirements;
that is, the motor and transmission are sized to provide power saturation at
the specified amplitude and frequency. This method of component selection
will result in the typical generalized characteristics shown on Figures 8 and
9. Compromises are sometimes necessary since optimum power matching for
response to sinusoidal inputs may not result in desired slew rates or
acceleration potentials.
Actuation gas consumption may be small in comparison with engine require-
ments, nevertheless an understanding of motor leakage and its effect on motor
performance is necessary. Gas consumption is dependent upon motor speed and
system leakage; in addition, porting schemes used to achieve optimum dynamic
motor-valve performance may have a bearing on gas consumption.
Figure i0 indicates schematically the valve and motor leakage paths as
shown on the circuit in Figure iI. The calculation of leakage areas was
verified by stalled and free running motor tests on a typical design motor.
Flow-torque studies of the motor with various porting schemes have been made.
Typical pressure-torque characteristics with the ported and unported motor
are shown in Figures 12 and 13. The observed improvement in gain obtained
with the ported motor is caused by the increased separation of the pressure
curves.
A complete nonlinear simulation study of the steady state and dynamic
characteristics of the actuator was performed on an analog computer. Again
referring to Figure 3, two function generators_ (Figure 7) were used to
express the steady state servo motor performance and since this mapping
function permits the simulation of nonlinear effects, the correlation of
analytical and experimental tests was very good. A photograph of the
generator is shown in Figure 14.
One principle problem that exists from a test correlation standpoint is the
proper simulation of the load friction. Steady state performance and dynamic
stability or bandpass are not seriously affected, but the character of the
slow ramp response is affected by the load friction simulation. After
considerable effort good correlation with test results was obtained. Figure
15 shows the correlation of computer to actual hardware test results. A major
result of this work is the establishment of confidence in the analytical
techniques developed for pneumatic systems.
COMPONENT DESIGN AND TEST RESULTS AT CRYOGENIC TEMPERATURES
The most significant problem area with respect to actuators for the NERVA
engine is operation at cryogenic temperatures with either no lubrication or
with solid film lubricants. An extensive component test program has been
established on NERVA and some of the results and critical design problems are
reported in this paper.
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Tests on the servomotor, consisting of the torque motor, servo valve and
gear motor, havebeenperformedin a gaseousnitrogen environmentat -240°F.
While the servo motor functioned properly at low temperaturesand no seizures
or failures occurred, both dynamicandstatic friction increased slightly.
Thespeed-current gain changewasvery close to that predicted analytically
from the GasLawsdue to lower supply gas temperatureand the bandpasswas
reducedfrom 12 to 8.5 cps as shownon Figure 16. Thesmall, non-predicted
changeis attributed to the combinedeffects of leakage, friction and gain
changeof the servovalve. Since these are the results of the first tests at
low temperaturethey are felt generally to be satisfactory. Evaluation of the
componentsis continuing and recommendationsfor design changesare being made.
Rotary-to-rotary androtary-to-linear transmissions are undergoingtests.
Ball-lead screwsof different materials in combinationwith either no
lubricant or dry film lubricants havebeentested at -360°F. In one appli-
cation satisfactory operation wasachievedwithout lubricant; torque
efficiency of another unit fell off dueto accumulationof lubricant on the
balls. At this date no significant life test data canbe reported. Figure 17
showsthe rotary-to-linear transmission in the test fixture adaptable for cold
temperatureevaluation.
Theballs and retainers of ball bearings appearto present the greatest
problemand newlubricants are being investigated. For rotary-to-rotary high
reduction transmissions, Bendix is developingthe Nutator Drive. This device
is shownin schematicandassemblyform in Figure 18. In view of the bearing
problem, a significant advantageof the Nutator Drive design is the reduction
in total numberof parts (e.g., 5 bearings instead of 18 for a planetary
drive of equal ratio) as well as theoretically higher load carrying capa-
bilities. Satisfactory results havebeenachievedduring initial room
temperatureand cold temperatureoperation; life tests are nowin progress.
In general, the problemsassociatedwith pneumaticshavebeenminor --
most problemsbeing of a mechanicalnature. Also tests on amplifiers and
transducers at low temperatureshavebeenvery satisfactory. Thepotenti-
ometersused are of the conductive plastic type and there is negligibleochangein output as temperaturesare varied from 400°Fto -300 F. Theservo
amplifier as previously described is either a three or four stage mag-amp,
dependinguponthe application. Although, at this writing, the environmental
specifications for the electrical equipmenthave not beendefined, study and
preliminary tests of radiation hardenedamplifiers havebeenmadeand are
still in progress. Components,insulation, and encapsulatingmaterials were
chosenon the basis of a literature surveyand from results achieved in
actual reactor tests. Limited vibration tests showedexcellent results.
Performanceat a temperaturerange of +300°Fto -300°F hasbeenvery good.
Figure 19 is a photographof a control drumactuator fabricated and tested
during the NERVAPhaseI period. Figure 20 is a photographof the Bendix
ModelND-D1control designed, fabricated and tested for the Westinghouse
Astronuclear Laboratories under the NERVAprogram. Figure 21 showsa layout
of the TPCVactuator currently being fabricated for developmentstests. This
unit includes the high pressuredynamicseal and the features necessaryto
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facilitate the remote handling problem.
Figure 22 shows a design of the NERVA 5-HP Gimbal Actuator including
sizing to meet the projected reliability goals.
CONCLUSION
Electropneumatic actuators which will meet the performance and environ-
mental requirements of the NERVA engine appear to be both feasible and
practical_ however, continued development work is necessary to establish
reliability under low temperature operating conditions. Analytical
techniques have been developed to the point where fair correlation between
test and analysis is obtained for the pneumatic systems described. Some
of the observed phenomena is still inexplicable, however, refinements in
mathematical models as well as better test procedures should resolve
these differences.
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Figure 1 - Schematic of Engine
and M._jor Engine Controls
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Figure Z - Functional Block Diagram Bendix
Rotary Pneumatic Actuator for NERVA Application
m. ....
Figure 3 - Simplified Computer Mode[
Bendix Pneumatic Actuator
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SCHEMATIC-GEAR MOTOR END FACE
CLEARANCE LEAKAGE AREAS
Figure 10(a) - Schematic - Gear Motor End Face Clearance Leakage Areas
A A
Figure lO(b) - Servo Valve Spool and Sleeve Leakage Areas
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Figure 11 - Flow Circuit Schematic for Servo Valve and
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Figure 18- Nutator Transmission
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Figure 20 - ND-D1 Control
Drum Actuator
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Figure 21 - Model NT-B1 Turbine Power Control
Valve Actuator
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Figure 22 - NERVA Actuator - Thrust Vector Control
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CONTROL AND TELEMETRY TRANSD : _IEQUIREMENTS
FOR I
NUCLEAR POWERED VEHICLES* tJ I•
by M. C. Johnson
The Bendix Corporation
The development of new vehicles and new propulsion techniques results in
the need to measure some parameters to accuracies, magnitudes, or in
environments that have not previously been encountered. The nuclear powered
vehicle programs exemplify this. For example, measurements of pressures
and temperatures in a space vehicle environment which includes high level
neutron and gamma radiation, are new requirements demanding advancement
in the state-of-the-art.
Since there is sometimes a lack of good communication between those
engaged in producing transducers for vehicle applications and those develop-
ing the vehicles, a survey has been made to determine what transducers will
be required, what is available or under development, and in what areas
development work 'should begin to insure that a transducer will be available
to meet a new requirement.
In the following discussion, some of the major problem areas in Rover,
SLAM, and SNAP vehicles are discussed and some potential solutions are
mentioned.
A typical nuclear rocket configuration is shown in Figure I. The difficult
environments here are the nuclear radiation and the liquid hydrogen at Z0°K.
Some areas contain hydrogen at extremely high temperatures, and there is
fairly severe vibration throughout the vehicle.
Table 1 lists the measurements on the nuclear rocket vehicle which
exceed the present telemetry transducer state of the art. With two excep-
tions the problems are those of a combined low temperature and radiation
environment. The primary reason for this is the fact that test data in this
environment are so sparse that it is not known whether available transducers
will survive and operate in it. Some tests on standard pressure transducers
in liquid hydrogen were performed by the National Bureau of Standards at
Boulder, Colorado. They found hysteresis in a potentiometric type, but some
strain gauge pressure transducers operated quite well although rated to only
_65oF. A great deal of combined environment testing at cryogenic temper-
atures will be required to determine which transducers will operate reliably
in these locations on the nuclear rocket.
* The information in this paper is based on work performed by the Bendix
Corporation, Research Laboratories Division, for the Aeronautical Systems
Division under Contract AF 33(616)-8077, Project No. 4107, TaskNo. 410719-4.
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The two measurements required in extremely high temperature environ-
ments cannot possibly be made in that environment by any pressure or
vibration transducer that will be available in the foreseeable future. Environ-
mental control is imperative and in these cases can be achieved by cooling
with the cold gaseous hydrogen which is readily available. There is a possi-
bility of thermal shock at startup, so even this may be a low temperature
problem area.
Liquid level transducers can be constructed which will operate without
deterioration in the propellant tank environment; but boiling, zero g,and
ionization in the liquid hydrogen can introduce errors. Temperature measure-
ments also can be made in all the environments to be encountered, but a
general improvement in characteristics is required for better accuracy and
reliability. Mass flow transducers having rotating parts have a reliability
problem. They have been known to explode when a slug of gas passed through
the turbine due to runaway.
The SLAM vehicle is outlined in Figure Z. In contrast to Rover this
vehicle is characterized by an over-all temperature level as high as IZ00°F
(Table Z). There is also a high vibration level and, for the longer mission
times, an extremely high total radiation dose. In these cases the radiation
dose will be a minor problem compared to temperature. IIigh temperature
materials and construction techniques are inherently radiation-resistant.
Lifetime will be fairly short, in the range of 10 to 30 hours. Cooling with
IZ00oF ram air can be done for measurements other than those directly on or
in the reactor. These measurements do not appear feasible, barring some
break-through in high-temperature strain and vibration measurement tech-
nology. The measurements at IZ00°F are close to present capabilities.
Displacement transducers based on the differential transformer principle are
now available for operation at 1300OF. Application of these techniques to
pressure transducers should not be too difficult. Work has been done on
high-temperature alloys for strain and vibration transducers at 1600°_ -.
These are not commercially available items, and more work needs to be done
before useful measurements can be made at these temperatures. A 1000°F
ion chamber has been produced. A great deal of other work has been going
on to develop radiation detectors for use within reactors at temperatures
approaching 1000oc. The techniques developed should be applicable to tele-
metry detectors also. Temperature transducers will operate in all environ-
ments, but drift and vibration may be problems.
Figure 3 is a sketch of SNAP-8. SNAP-10A is similar in outline but does
not have the mercury turbine loop. Instead, electrical power is generated by
means of thermoelectric cells. The problem areas listed in Table 3 are for
both SNAP-8 and SNAP-10A. The lower temperature measurements are for
SNAP - l0A.
The measurement problelns on the SNAP are quite serious, the major
difficulty being the requirement for reliable operation over i0,000 hours in
the high temperature vacuum or NaK environment. Pressure measurements
have been made in NaK at 1400°F, but the transducers used were unsuited to
a space vehicle, and reliability and life were far less than required. Radiation
will not be a problem, in all likelihood; but no test data are available for
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reliability of these types of components exposed to a very long-term radiation ,
dose. Remote location and shielding are possible to ease the requirements.
For example, the pressure transducers could be brought down to the lower
temperature environment below the shield by using a few feet of tubing.
In general, environmental modification is undesirable for transducers in
all of these vehicles because of the size and weight penalty involved. In some
cases it must be done; for example, the pressure transducer on the nuclear
rocket exit plenum, because the measurement is necessary and the environ-
ment is intolerable. In others, it is relatively easy, such as relocation of the
SNAP pressure transducers below the shield. In most cases, however, these
difficult measurements will not be made unless a transducer is developed
which will withstand the environment and operate satisfactorily.
To summarize, the conclusions of the survey are:
(i) Many of the new requirements can be met by substitution of inorganics
for radiation-sensitive materials in the construction of the transducer.
(Z) There is a need for testing of transducers in combined cryogenic-
radiation-vibration environments.
(3) The high-temperature limit of most transducer types should be extended
up into the 1500°F range.
(4) Reliability data for long-time operation in high temperature and com-
bined high-temperature-radiation environments are needed.
(51 The desirability of high-level dc outputs indicates that the temperature
capability of potentiometers should be extended above 1000°F and down
into the cryogenic region.
(6) Most transducers will be subjected to heating by gamma radiation, and
adequate cooling or heat paths must be provided.
(7) Cables and connectors are a major problem area in the combined
temperature, radiation and vibration environment.
REFERENCE
Bendix Research Laboratories Division Report No. Z084,
"Transducers for Nuclear Vehicles, " Z4 January 196Z.
140
Table 1 - Rover Measurement Problem Areas-
TYPE
ROTARY
DISPLACEMENT
ROTARY
DISPLACEMENT
LINEAR
DISPLACEMENT
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
STRAIN
STRAIN
TORQUE
VIBRATION
VIBRATION
VIBRATION
MASS FLOW
OPERATING
TEMPERATURE
(OF)
-240
-300
-420
COOLED, MAY BE
.400 AT STARTUP
.310 FLUID
TEMPERATURE
.260 FLUID
TEMPERATURE
.300
-420
-420
.410
-410
4540
.407
RADIATION
DOSE
(n/cm 2)
1 x 1017
1 x 1016
5 x 1015
7 x 1017
3.6 x 1016
7 x 1015
7 x 1017
6 x 1013
1 x 1016
3 x 1016
5 x 1013
7 x 1018
1 x 1016
AMBIENT
MEDIUM
AIR VACUUM
AND GASEOUS H2
AIR AND VACUUM
AIR AND VACUUM
AIR, VACUUM
AND L H2
AIR OR VACUUM
AIR OR VACUUM
AIR OR VACUUM
AIR, VACUUM
OR L H2
AIR OR VACUUM
AIR OR VACUUM
AIR AND VACUUM
GASEOUS H2
L H2
RANGE
0 - 180 °
-5° TO +5 °
0 TO 2.5 INCHES
0-S50 PSIA
0-650 PSIA
90-650 PSIA
6 TO 100
LBS/SEC
COMMENTS
FLUID AT 4400°F
UNCOOLED
FLUID IS
GASEOUS H2
FLUID IS
GASEOUS H2
STATIC AND
DYNAMIC
STATIC AND
DYNAMIC
STATIC
OUTPUT
PROBLEM
OUTPUT
PROBLEM
LIQUID LEVEL - MAY BE RADIATION INDUCED ERRORS IN THE LH 2
STRAIN - BONDING MAY BE THE MOST SEVERE PROBLEM
TEMPERATURE- GENERAL ADVANCEMENT REQUIRED, PROBLEMS OF DRIFT, UNIFORMITY,
RELIABILITY, AND SIGNAL
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Table Z - SLAM Measurement Problem Areas
TYPE
LINEAR
DISPLACEMENT
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
DYNAMIC STRAIN
VIBRATION
NUCLEAR
NUCLEAR
OPERATING
TEMPERATURE
(OF)
2000
2250
1560
1200
2600
2600
1200
1200
RADIATION
DOSE
(n/era 2)
2 x 1018
2 x 1018
2 x 1017
1 x 1018
3 x 1019
3 x 1019
2 x 1017
2 x 1017
AMBIENT
MEDIUM
AIR
AIR
AIR
AIR
AIR
AIR
AIR
AIR
RANGE
20 INCHES
TO 226 PSIA
0 TO 2.7 PSIA
0 TO 350 PSIG
TO6x 1012nv
2x 106
ERGS/GM C-SEC
COMMENTS
FLUID IS AIR
FLUID IS AIR
FLUID IS AIR
INTENSE VIBRATION
NEUTRON RADIATION
GAMMARADIATION
TEMPERATURE • GENERAL DRIFT AND SIGNAL LEVEL PROBLEMS
Table 3 - SNAP Measurement Problem Areas
TYPE
ROTARY
DISPLACEMENT
ROTARY
DISPLACEMENT
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
STATIC AND
DYNAMIC STRAIN
DYNAMIC
STRAIN
OPERATING
TEMPERATURE
(OF)
1300
1000
1300 FLUID
TEMPERATURE
1100 FLUID
TEMPERATURE
900 FLUID
TEMPERATURE
800 FLUID
TEMPERATURE
1450
1000
RADIATION
DOSE
(n/cm 2)
i x 1020
! x 1019
9 x 1018
9 x 1018
1 x 1018
1 x 1018
4 x 1020
3 "x 1019
AMBIENT
MEDIUM
VACUUM
VACUUM
VACUUM
VACUUM
VACUUM
VACUUM
NaK
NaK
RANGE
0- 180°
0- 180°
0-31 PSIA
0-31 PSIA
0-40 PSIA
0-40 PSIA
COMMENTS
1 YR OPERATION
1 YR OPERATION
NQK FLUID
NaK FLUID
NaK FLUID
NaK FLUID
ON FUEL
ELEMENT
ON FUEL
ELEMENT
TEMPERATURE - SERIOUS DRIFT PROBLEM
ALL TYPES - SERIOUS RELIABILITY PROBLEM FOR 1YR OPERATION
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SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR RADIATION HEATING ANALYSIS AND
[ulROTARY ELECTROPNEUMATIC CONTROL ACTUATOR
By
James J. Edmond,
5OZ94^
FOREWORD
This paper reports work conducted at the Research Laboratories Division
of The Bendix Corporation, sponsored by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
under Atomic Energy Commission Contract AT (29-2)-705.
The author also wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Mr. C. W.
Hamilton ',_and Mr. B. G." Southward of Bendix Research Laboratories Division,
on gamma heating and neutron heating portions of this paper.
Superscript numbers in parentheses indicate references listed at the end
of the paper.
INTRODUCTION
The prototype electropneumatic actuators developed to position the
reactor control drums in Kiwi-B are mounted on the pressure vessel and
exposed to leakage radiations from the core. On Kiwi-B the anticipated radi-
ation intensity in this region at i000 Mw reactor power will produce an
estimated adiabatic temperature rate in steel of about 7°F per second. A
cooling method more effective than conduction or thermal radiation is required
to maintain equilibrium actuator temperatures within tolerable limits during
tests at full reactor power. Forced gas convection using a portion of the
hydrogen propellant was a logical choice as the basic heat transfer mechanism
of the cooling system.
The radiation heating rates in the actuator were determined from the
anticipated radiation environment, upon which heat transfer analyses were
conducted leading to the design, construction, and laboratory testing of the
convective cooling system.
DESCRIPTION OF RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
Data on the anticipated Kiwi-B leakage fluxes in the vicinity of the
actuator location were supplied by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The
radiation is assumed to be directed essentially outward from a spherical
surface defined by a 1.5 meter radius from the center of the core between the
conical coordinates superimposed on Figure i. The calculated spectra of the
gamma and neutron energies at the 1.5 m coordinate surface are given in
Figure 2. The total gamma flux through the surface is about 1.5 x 1014
Mev/cmZ-sec, peaked at Z Mev, with a neutron leakage of about one neutron
per fission, or approximately l014 neutrons/sec-cm Z at full reactor power.
_ Presently (1962) with Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
Los Alamos, New Mexico.
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DETERMINATION OF HEATING RATES
To enable a reasonably economical calculation program, a simplified
model of the flux and actuator geometries was chosen as shownin Figure 3.
The flux was approximated by a collimated beam intercepting the yertical
axis of a variable-mass-density model of the actuator at an average angle of
ZZo. These approximations ignored statistical deviations of the angle of the
incident flux vector, effects of scattering, and geometric attenuation of incident
flux intensity with distance from the source.
GAMMA HEATING
A series of iso-_x lines, or "lines of constant shielding" were drawn
connecting points within the actuator model shielded by the same mass density
along straight lines at the ZZdegreeangular inclination with the model center-
line (Figure 4). For the gamma radiation, these lines were then transformed
into contours of constant energy deposition rate pet unit mass by application
of the equation
N
dZE = _. A B _ e -_(°n)x
n n ni=l
dt dm
where
n
_n
_(on)
A
n
B
n
X
(i)
= identifies the gamma ray energy group EI_ E Z... E N
= energy absorption coefficient( l ) for this group
= total energy absorption coefficient( Z ) for the mean
energy of this group
= power carried by the nth group of gamma rays
= energy absorption buildup factor(1) for n TM energy group
= shielding distance from surface along a ZZ ° inclination line.
The computation was performed digitally for the eight energy groups
noted on Figure Za for increments of one-half inch penetration, which gener-
ated a profile of gamma energy deposition in the model based on the
assumptions made. The maximum gamma heating in the first half inch of the
base of the actuator is estimated at approximately 640 watts per pound{steel).
NEUTRON HEATING
Neutron energy deposition in the actuator was calculated by assuming a
most probable energy loss per collision of 3.4 per cent (one-half the maxi-
mum loss of 6.8 per cent) with a most probable elastic scattering angle of
approximately 90 degrees. The 1.44 Mev gamma occurring from inelastic
scattering of neutrons by chromium was not considered. However, a portion
of neutron attributable heating due to high energy gammas from the thermal
neutron capture was considered to occur in the base regions of the actuator.
About 85 per cent of the high energy portion of the neutron spectrum under-
goes first collisions; within the 8 cm diameter of the reference cylinder, the
number of collisions per neutron was considered to be 18 for those energies
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below i_O_0ev_, diminishing to 4 collisions for those energies above I00 key.
The bare and reflected sphere neutron spectra were mixed to represent the
direct and reflected neutron distribution, and the energy deposition (H) attribut-
able from neutron collisions per energy group was claculated from
n 034) j (Ei) ] c
Hi = l [ si (o.o341(i-o. Ei N + i N E
such that
m
E H.
t
i=l
where
Si=1 j=l
_.c. N(E.) E
i I
E S
i
= macroscopic scattering cross section of iTM neutron
group, cmg/g
(z)
z
1
E.
].
E,y
= macroscopic capture cross section of ith neutron
group, cmZ/g
= initial energy of neutrons in the ith neutron group
= energy of gamma photon from neutron interaction
other than elastic scattering
= 10 Mev (capture)
N(E i) = number of neutrons/cm Z sec in the ith energy group
n = number of scatterings = 8 cm/k i f
k. = mean distance traveled per collision, an inverse
l
function of neutron energy
Z Jf = k + k +k k = 4 k
X y Z X
The neutron heating rate is estimated at about 60 watts per pound in the
base assembly and about 26 watts per pound in the rest of the actuator,
roughly an order of magnitude below the gamma heating rates.
HEATING RATE DISTRIBUTION
The total estimated maximum radiation heating rate in the actuator base
is about 700 watts per pound (iron), which was conservatively assumed to
occur within the first half-inch of actuator material along the Z2 degree
average slant path. The geometric concept of iso-_x lines in the initial
mathematical model was then applied to a similar plot across an actual cross
section of the actuator, as shown in the view of Figure 5. Transverse sections
were then developed across certain massive portions of the actuator as shown.
The transverse plots show crescent shaped areas of variable heat gener-
ation, differing by as much as a factor of three across a given section,
resulting from the extensive approximations used. No further approximations
regarding smoothing effects were introduced and heat transfer analyses upon
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• the transverse sections were made to determine the tolerability of thermal
effects which would result from assuming the existences of the heating
gradients indicated.
INVESTIGATION OF VARIABLE TRANSVERSE HEATING RATES
The reference actuator design is not particularly susceptible to per-
formance decrements, such as increased friction or binding caused by
unrestrained thermal bowing of the cantilevered assembly under moderate
transverse temperature gradients, but may become a problem for transverse
temperature differences on the order of 150°F.
The heating gradient problem was studied by an electrical resistive-
surface analog method. The effects of various heat transfer coefficients and
coolant flow rates were investigated, with the simulation indicating that
transverse temperature gradients would not be excessive for axial coolant
flows and would tend to be overcome by circumferential cooling flows
introduced on the hot side of the components. The fairly uniform surface
temperatures were interpreted to indicate that uniform average values of
heating rates could be used for the convective heat transfer calculations,
varying in steps according to the axial location of the individual components.
DESIGN OF COOLING SYSTEM
Nominal design values were chosen of 300°i_ for the maximum actuator
operating temperature and 70°F for the coolant inlet temperature. A nominal
value of 0.06 ib/sec coolant flow rate per actuator was chosen, to represent
a reasonable balance between coolant temperature rise and realistic heat
transfer coefficients versus the desire to minimize the potential nonpro-
pulsive expenditure of hydrogen. Standard empirical convective heat transfer
correlations(3), (4), (5) of the form
m n
NNu + K N R Npr (3)
where
NNu
N R
Npr
K,m, n
= Nusselt Number
= Reynold's Number
= Prandtl Number
= empirical coefficients referring to the local flow process,
were applied to work out the design of the coolant channels and the local
coolant flow rates required.
Many components of the reference actuator have complex inner geome-
tries, with central rotating portions thermally isolated from housings and
external structure by bearings. As a result, cooling only the exterior
housing surfaces of such parts would not be particularly effective. Many of
these components have narrow gaps between rotating parts and other interior
surfaces, and fairly minor modifications (a practical requirement) could
effect high-velocity flows of coolant gas through these spaces. Baffles and
other secondary devices provided high local gas velocities over or through
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parts to be cooled. Often coolant was introduced into the interiors of complex
components through hollowed shafts or through their bearings from sealed
coolant inlet chambers. For more massive components, such as the gear
motor, servovalve, and base of the actuator, external thin metal shrouds were
designed to provide narrow coolant flow spaces between the shroud and
surface of the component. Metered flows of cooling gas were introduced into
these passages, designed to direct the coolant over the surfaces are required.
Such shrouds provide high local heat transfer coefficients by high local gas
flow rates per unit flow area with a minimum total flow rate of coolant, and
the carefully defined flow geometries allow more confident application of
standard empirical flow correlations.
The various cooling passages in the actuator constitute a complex system
of series-parallel flow paths between the coolant source and final exhaust. To
keep macroscopic distribution of flow to individual components independent of
local back-pressure effects in the actuator, coolant supply gas is metered into
individual sealed channel entrances by orifices operated far above the critical
pressure ratio.
A cross section of an early version of the actuator showing the cooling
system and flow distribution is shown in Figure 6. For initial Kiwi-B tests,
coolant gas was brought to the actuator from a separate high-pressure line,
was passed through a filterin the base and distributed to the various com-
ponents by an internal manifold. The exhaust gases were collected inside the
actuator cover and exited through a discharge port in the base.
COOLING SYSTEM TESTS
The heat transfer performance of the cooling system was evaluated by a
series of laboratory tests. The provision of a steady-state heat transfer
condition in a device as complex as the actuator in the laboratory by non-
nuclear methods is impractical, but transient heat transfer conditions (the
basis of the test method employed) are readily produced. Hot gas is applied to
the cooling system of an instrumented actuator to raise the actuator to an
elevated temperature; a cooling transient is then induced by applying a large
step change downward in the cooling gas inlet temperature. Thermocouples
attached to various surfaces of the actuator record the resulting temperature
decays.
Certain actuator parts, e.g., shafts, gears, housing, and the base assembly,
have negligible internal thermal resistance;:',_ when such parts at an elevated
temperature are subjected to a sudden cooling environment, the rate of change
of surface temperature approximately equals the rate of change of the average
temperature of the part, and the instantaneous surface heat flux at anytime
is
A
,_ Characterized by NBi 40.5; NBi ----h(s/k), where h is the local surface heat
transfer coefficient to the external environment and (s/k) is the ratio of the
dimensinn of the part in direction of heat flow with respect to its thermal
conductivity.
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W
C
dTs ]
"-gTTJT
=WC dT T
= weight of the part
= thermal capacity of the part (specific heat)
= Instantaneous rate of change of surface
temperature at time T .
(4)
The effectiveness of the cooling system for cooling these parts was thus
evaluated by comparing the (negative) rate of adiabatic temperature rise
(dT/dT)a for the anticipated local average heating fate'S, defined as
a c ' (5)
with the cooling test temperature decay curves. The point on the experi-
mentally derived cooling curve at which the instantaneous slope is equal to
the inverse heating slope represents the condition at which the surface heat
flux equals the magnitude of the anticipated heat deposition. The value
(ordinate) of the environmental temperature difference at this point was thus
taken as an indication of the equilibrium surface-temperature excess which
would exist for heat transfer from that part under the anticipated heating rate
for that flow condition.
The simple evaluation method of Equations (4) and (5) cannot be applied
to actuator components which have appreciable internal thermal resistance,
e.g., the clutch, motor and servovalve. Upon sudden cooling, the rate of
surface temperature change of these parts does not closely represent their
rate of average temperature change, and Equation {4) is no longer a reasonable
approximation.
Estimations of cooling system effectiveness of these parts from the
transient surface temperature data therefore include compensation for
internal conduction effects. The evaluation method used entailed the use of
Groeber's figures, {3) in which the external heat transfer coefficient h was
estimated graphically from a combination of the test data and geometric and
materials properties of the device. The equilibrium temperature excess 0"s
at the anticipated heating rate is then determined from the weight W and
surface area A by
_ _w (6)
s hA
The foregoing methods were used to evaluate data from three heat
transfer tests. The first two tests were run with nitrogen to evaluate the
uniformity of cooling throughout the actuator with the actuator inoperative.
The third test was conducted with hydrogen coolant and with the actuator in
operation. The over-all initial temperature difference of the third transient
test was about 400°F, with maximum initial rates up to 10°F/sec. The
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recorded cyclic output waveform of the actuator showed no perceptible changes"
throughout the test (Figure 7).
CONCLUSIONS
Anticipated temperatures at heat transfer equilibrium within the actuator
at various locations for the calculated heating rates and the design coolant
flow rate are shown in Figure 8. These temperatures are extrapolated from
the results of the cooling system evaluation tests and are given for two
conditions of coolant inlet temperature, +70°F and -ZZ0°F.
On an absolute temperature basis, the (indicated) equilibrium surface
temperatures for 70°F inlet temperature are within +8 percent and -Ii per
cent of the nominally chosen 300°F (760 °R) maximum surface temperature,
for the design conditions of 70°F hydrogen inlet temperature and 0.06 ibs/sec.
flow rate (750 psi inlet pressure). As noted, the operation of the actuator
remained unchanged throughout the maximum period of heat transfer.
The actuator is presently undergoing tests to establish its performance
at temperatures in the vicinity of -300 °F. Coolant temperatures this low also
represent a considerably greater heat transfer potential, from which further
increases in allowable heating rate would tend to become limited more by
internal temperature-difference problems than by a maximum allowable
surface temperature rise.
Certain margins of safety are present in the over-all design of the
actuator and present design of the cooling system should the heating environ-
ment be higher than predicted. The individual actuator components are
designed for operation up to 600°F, and the cooling system has been proof-
tested for operation at pressures up to i000 psi. The factors indicate a
margin of about Z.8 times the anticipated heating rate for average actuator
temperature not to exceed 600°F using room temperature hydrogen coolant
at i000 psi inlet pressure.
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8KIWI-B-IA POWER AND TEMPERATURE CONTROL SYSTEMS*
E. A. Brown, H. B. Demuth, P. B. Erickson,
R. R. Moh!er, S. J. Singer and C. E. Stiles
University of California
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Los Alamos, New Mexico
Kiwi-B-iA was the first of a series of reactors intended to culminate in a core
design suitable for the Nerva Program. The Kiwi-B-i core was designed for oper-
ation with liquid hydrogen propellant at a power of 1093 MW, a flow rate of
70 ibs/sec, and an exit gas temperature of 4090 ° R.
Early in the Kiwi-B-iA project it was realized that liquid hydrogen flow facil-
ities would not be ready in time to test the reactor; therefore, it was decided
to run Kiwi-B-iA on gaseous hydrogen at a power of 269 MW and a flow rate of
20 ibs/sec. The primary objectives of the test were to measure core tempera-
ture and flux distributions, to test the reactor structural integrity, to
measure the core temperature reactivity, and to test the exit gas temperature
control system.
The variables which were regulated by automatic control systems in Kiwi-B-iA
were flow rate, core exit gas temperature, and the logarithm of power. A
simplified block diagram of these systems is shown in Fig. i. The demand volt-
ages for the controlled variables were generated in a drum programmer. The log
power control system maintained the reactor power at the demanded value by
positioning 12 rotary control rods in a beryllium reflector which surrounded
the core. The rods were beryllium cylinders with boral sheaths covering 120 °
of the cylinders. The core reactivity could be increased approximately _9 by
rotating the boral from positions toward the core to positions directly away
from the core. The flow rate control system adjusted flow to the desired
value by positioning a valve in the propellant feed line. The exit gas tem-
perature control system adjusted temperature to the programmed value by apply-
ing appropriate corrections to the programer log power demand voltage.
The exit gas temperature control system was the major new reactor control
development for Kiwi-B-IA. The log power and flow rate systems were very
similar to those reported I,_ for earlier Rover reactors; therefore, the linear-
ized analysis portion of this paper will be devoted to the temperature control
system. This paper also describes the log power and temperature system re-
sponses to startup programs and to disturbances of reactivity, log power demand,
and temperature demand. In addition, the programming techniques and the per-
formance of the reactor and its control systems during critical tests are
presented.
TEMPERATURE CONTROL
The use of an exit gas temperature control system on Kiwi-B-IA was made possi-
ble by the development of a suitable thermocoupl_. The core heat exchanger
time constant of 14 seconds at full flow imposed a high gain requirement on
the temperature controller, but this was not considered to be prohibitive.
Work iperf_r_ned under AEC Contract W-7405-ENG.36.
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The lack of experience with reactor automatic temperature controls plus the
absence of a convincing amount of thermocouple reliability data dictated the
use of a conservative system design to make the reactor less vulnerable to the
effects of malfunctions in the temperature control system. Some of those
features were:
I. The average of three thermocouples was used as the measure of exit gas
temperature. A sample and reject circuit was used to reject any thermo-
couple which had an indication differing from the average by more than
400 ° R.
2. Power and flow rate were programmed to yield the desired temperature with-
in the limits of accuracy of the systems. The output of the temperature
controller acted as a vernier correction to the log power demand voltage
to keep the demanded and measured temperatures equal. If the temperature
control system malfunctioned, it could be de-energized and the run con-
tinued on log power and flow rate control.
3. The output voltage from the temperature controller was clamped so that it
could not demand a power increase of more than 10% of the actual power.
Referring to Fig. I, the transfer functions of the temperature control system
for small perturbations were as follows:
__%(s) 0.135 (s/0.022+ l) Volts
c_(s) --SE_iS) - S (s/no + I) Volt----;
GeCS) 5P (S) Pd SLo_ P (S) KW
= SEe(S) - 9.2 SLog Pd (S) Volt
Go(S) = STe_(S) i OR5P is) _.280 KW
3.88 Wt.-r-. S + i)
W
SE._(S) = i Volts
G4(S) = STag(S ) 50 --_ S + i)(3.5 OR
%(s) _ (s/1.28+ l) Volts
= SE s (S) = (S/67 + I) Volts
The temperature open loop transfer function was:
G(S) 7"57(10)-spd (S/0.022 + 1)(S/1.28 + 1) . SLo_ P (S)
- _ .280 3.5 S S SLog Pd (S)
s(--f-- s + 1)(---_. s + 1)(ly I. + 1)( D- + 1)
(i)
The characteristics of the log power control system are shown in Fig. 2. Com-
bining data from Fig. 2 with the remaining terms of equation (I), the open tem-
perature loop characteristics for full power and full flow are shown in Fig. 3.
This figure indicates a gain margin of 14 db, a phase margin of 66 =, and an
open loop gain of one at 0.55 cps.
_YNAMIC PERFORMANCE
l%e general method of attack in studying the Kiwi-B-iA control systems was to
simulate them on digital and analog computers. The digital computer and hand
analyses were used for linearized work in the frequency domain. The analog
simulation contained most of the system non-linearities, including an actual
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rod positioning servo. The analog computer was used primarily for controller
synthesis and time-domaln studies. Some of these studies are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
During the early Kiwi-B-IA control synthesis work it was found that the tem-
perature control system would become unstable following temperature demand
step changes of 150 ° R or larger. A recording of this phenomenon is shown in
Fig. 4. This difficulty was caused by the large transient error voltage at
the temperature controller output resulting from the relatively high controller
gain at high frequencies. This large voltage was transmitted through the log
power controller, driving the control rods into velocity saturation. The rods
were velocity limited to 45°/sec for nuclear safety reasons. The non-linear
effect of the rod velocity limiting was sufficient to cause an increasing
amplitude oscillation in the system. The addition of the temperature
controller output voltage clamp discussed earlier limited this voltage suffi-
ciently to make it impossible for the temperature controller to drive the rods
into velocity saturation in the power increasing direction. Since this clamp
was effective in stabilizing the system for positive step changes of tempera-
ture demand, an additional clamp was provided to avoid this difficulty for
negative-golng temperature demand steps. A voltage clamp equivalent to a 50%
power decrease clamp was found to be satisfactory. The response of the system
to temperature demand steps of 250" R after the clamps were added is shown in
Fig. 5.
The system response to a positive step reactivity disturbance of $1.40 is
shown in Fig. 6. The power increased 130% during this transient, but the exit
gas temperature increased only 75 ° R, and the system recovered satisfactorily.
The analog simulation would not recover from a step reactivity disturbance of
$1.50.
The responses to small and large step changes of log power demand are shown in
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively. The ability of the temperature control system
to correct the power to regulate the temperature following a step change in log
power demand is shown in Fig. 7. The step disturbance shown in Fig. 8 amounts
to a 150% power change, which is beyond the range of the temperature con-
troller clamp. As can be seen, the power did not return to the pre-disturbance
value in this case.
A portion of the simulated Kiwi-B-iA hot run is shown in Fig. 9. The exit gas
temperature demand was changed from 2000 ° R to 3600 ° R at a rate of 25°/sec.
At the same time, power demand was increased from I0 to 180 MW, and flow rate
from 2 to 16 Ibs/sec. The maximum temperature error during the run was 40 ° R.
The effect of the temperature controller clamp is evident on the power and tem-
perature controller output curves between 5 and 23 seconds.
PROGRAMMING TECHNIQUES
The exit gas temperature, power, and flow rate programs designed for Kiwi-B-iA
are shown in Fig. 9. There are three holds. The first hold was included to
expand the core thermally at low flow rates to avoid possible displacement of
internal reactor parts. The second hold was put in to obtain high-temperature
data from the core thermocouples at a temperature below their burn-out value.
The third hold, at full power and flow, was included to test the integrity of
the core, reflector, control vanes, etc. at high temperatures. The rapid power
increases at the end of each hold were designed to establish a desired rate of
change of temperature in the core and/or the exit gas. The magnitude of the
power "step" was approximately proportional to the product of the core mass
heat capacity and the desired rate of change of temperature. Appropriate step
power decreases were injected at the beginning of each hold to reduce the rate
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of changeof temperature to zero for the hold. The exit gas temperature de-
mand step decrease of I00 ° R late in the program was put in to obtain informa-
tion about the dynamic performance of the control system.
The programs in Fig. i0 were derived from a combination of hand calculations
and analog computer studies. A first approximation to the programs was ob-
tained by hand using a one-lump heat exchanger model with variable specific
heats for graphite and hydrogen. The first approximation was improved through
trial and error procedures with a relatively sophisticated analog computer
model of the system.
The three-input system with appropriate progran_ned demands offers the following
advantages over prograumling only exit gas temperature and flow rate:
i. Correct demands to the 3 inputs establish steady state exit gas temperatures
and core temperatures very quickly and thereby help obtain better test data.
2.
3.
It is possible to operate without the temperature loop, if necessary.
The right log power demand signal helps keep _ small, and makes the tem-
perature loop more effective by keeping the controller out of its voltage
clamps.
4. A prograu_ned log power demand in the presence of a ramp exit temperature
demand helps minimize the exit gas temperature error.
CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The log power and temperature control systems performed well in many cold crit-
ical tests prior to the full power run. In such tests, of course, the tempera-
ture control system was closed through a heat exchanger simulator.
In Experimental Plan 6A, the final full power run, all control systems behaved
well until the end of the first hold. The temperature loop was not particularly
effective up to this time because it was in saturation at one limit and then the
other. This behavior was expected because of the extremely large system time
constants at low flows, and the relatively narrow limits on the temperature con-
troller output voltage.
As the programmer started from the first hold, one of the exit gas temperature
thermocouples became noisy. Unfortunately, the thermocouple selector circuit
did not reject the offending device immediately. In the heat of the moment,
the power excursions resulting from the noise were attributed to a temperature
control system instability. Consequently, the temperature loop was opened and
the rest of the experiment was carried out without it. Ironically, the selector
circuit rejected the noisy thermocouple seconds after the loop was opened. The
rejected thermocouple soon lost its noisy characteristic and gave good data for
the rest of the run.
Once the temperature loop was opened, the accuracy of the exit gas temperature
depended on the accuracy of the log power instrumentation calibration. Although
the log power control system worked well during the rest of the experiment, the
log power calibration was off, and the exit gas temperature at the second and
third holds was low. It was so low, in fact, that the temperature loop, with
its +10% available power correction, could not have given a correct exit gas
temperature without a manual power correction from the operator.
Aside from the exception noted above, the control systems worked well. Unfor-
tunately, the opening of the temperature loop and the early termination of the
experiment due to a nozzle fire did not allow the I00 ° R exit gas temperature
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step to be inserted as had beenhoped. Thus, a recording of the temperature
loop step responsewasnot obtained.
CONCLUSIONS
The general control system with three programmed inputs worked well, and will
be used in the next reactor test.
The temperature control system performed satisfactorily before the thermo-
couple noise was encountered. Future temperature control systems should be
made resistant to noise. In particular, they should be made compatible with
appropriate thermocouple selection circuits in resisting noise. The exit gas
temperature control system should have a wider effective control range in the
next test so as to be able to compensate for inaccurate neutronic calibrations
more effectively.
The Kiwi-B-iA log power control system as such worked well, but neutronic in-
strumentation inaccuracies led to low exit gas temperatures at the two high
holds. The necessity for an accurate power measuring system will be relieved
considerably if a reliable exit gas temperature control system with sufficient
unclamped range is developed in the future.
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RE-ENTRY OF NUCLEAR ROCKETS INTO EARTH,S ATMOSPHERE_ l-If
R. I. Weiner t w_
Max'tln Com'pal_y - i'_ucleaA" Division __
ABSTRACT--This paper presents the techniques and results of a study of nu-
clear rocket re-entry into the earth,s atmosphere due to orbital and suborbital
aborts. Two cases are analyzed; an explosive destruct system is assumed to
have fractured the core into a subcritical assembly, and the initial size of par-
ticles that could be reduced to 25 microns at 100, 000 feet by passive aerother-
mochemical means is determined. Both continuum flow and free molecule
flow estimates were made and it was found that the initial sizes of debris at
destruction would have to be between 1/24 and 1/16 inch in diameter to satisfy
the boundary conditions imposed on the solution.
The second case considered the possibility of destruct system failure and
the re-entry of the intact engine from orbital and suborbital aborts. It was
determined that the engine will re-enter intact from any aborts below 400,000
feet and for any aborts above this altitude, engine afterheat not aeroheating is
the primary mode of engine structural failure. In addition, not enough energy
or exposure time is available in any of the ballistic or orbital injection mis-
sion aborts studied to appreciably destroy the engine fuel elements or reflec-
tors that fall free after a pressure vessel meltdown. _..41_,,0_,o_. J_a""_'JhdPl""r'-I_..'l
INTRODUCTION--A nuclear reactor re-entering the earth,s atmosphere due
to a vehicle system abort poses a major operational safety problem. Conse-
quently, methods of disposing of this reactor that do not compromise the nu-
clear rocket propulsion system performance and yet ensure the greatest pos-
sible reliability must be evaluated.
One method is an explosive destruct system activated by an abort that phys-
ically breaks up the reactor core. This destroys the critical geometry, but
the highly radioactive debris will continue to re-enter. This investigation is
concerned with the amount of destruction which can be achieved passively 'by
re-entry heating and oxidation, on the debris and intact engine if the destruct
system fails to operate.
To achieve these ends, five specific objectives have to be met; they are:
(1) identify the important physical phenomena which control debris burnup;
(2) develop an analytical model that would approximate all reactor debris
throughout the majority of the re-entry regime; (3) derive a unified aerother-
mochemical analysis which would predict the order of magnitude of the sizes
of all reactor debris that could be destroyed by these re-entry phenomena;
and (4) approximate behavior of an undestroyed re-entering complete engine.
PHILOSOPHY OF SOLUTION--The derivation of a precise theory to describe
the aerothermochemical phenomena that occur during re-entry of reactor de-
bris is a task that utilizes information from the very limits of our physical
environment. Since an exact solution based on known physical constants is
impossible, due to limited experimental information dealing with the early
portions of the re-entry environment, an approximate solution was proposed.
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The problem was approached from the standpoint of determining a re-entry
corridor or bandwithin which fuel graphite debris could be rendered harmless.
The bandlimits were taken as those created by assuming the most optimistic
andpessimistic atmospheric and materials characteristics. This bandis a
function of debris geometry, dynamics, velocity, re-entry angle, mass and
material.
The results of the analysis should then yield the upper and lower size lim-
its of the loadedgraphite debris which could be destroyed in any particular
type re-entry.
GENERAL ANALYTICAL SOLUTION--The objective of past re-entry studies
was to preserve the re-entry body, and analyses of these bodies assume a
constant mass throughout re-entry. Here the inverse problem must be con-
sidered andthis analysis differs in that it considers large mass changesin
the body. Consequently, for each step changein altitude a corresponding
change in mass of the re-entering debris occurs. This has a significant effect
on their velocity profiles by changingdrag on the body. A step-by-step solu-
tion of the problem as shownin Fig. 1 was followed.
BOUNDARYCONDITIONS
Analytical Model--The possible sizes and shapes of debris that would result
from the explosive destruction of a nuclear rocket engine are infinitely vari-
able. Therefore, to avoid analysis on many geometries a conservative ge-
ometry was chosen (i. e., if this particular geometry was destroyed all other
debris of different shapeswill definitely be destroyed). Hence, the analysis
need beperformed on only one model. A spherical geometry meets this re-
quirement since it has the smallest surface area-to-volume ratio of any ge-
ometry.
Concept of Debris Destruction--One of the most important boundary condi-
tions affecting the solution is developing those conditions which constitute
destruction of reactor debris.
The criterion chosenwas that all debris must be reduced to sizes below
25 microns in diameter by the time they reach i00, 000 feet or, effectively,
they are aerosols. This criterion was based on early AEC requirements for
SNAP re-entries. Future review of this boundary condition is suggested
since it may impose too severe a restriction on the destruct system, the ob-ject being to determine whether larger sizes than aerosols can be tolerated
as safe. However, this boundary condition was retained in this analysis as
certainly beingconservative.
MECHANISMOF ENERGYINPUT AND MASSLOSSFROM REACTOR DE-
BRIS--There are three significant mechanisms which make up the total en-
ergy inventory of a typical piece of reactor fuel element during its re-entry.
They are: (i) latent particle energy at initiation of re-entry heating due to
fission product decay heating; (2) aerodynamic heating during the re-entry;,
and (3) chemical heat-input from surface combustion of graphite debris and
effects of the resulting mass transfer.
Latent Energy of Debris--If it is assumed that the nuclear stage is fragmented
in orbit, the debris might contain significant latent energy at the altitude where
aerodynamic heating begins. Consequently, this heat must be included as part
of the total heat inventory available to act on the particle. The energy balance
that exists when the particle falls from abort to the sensible atmosphere,
where free molecule flow begins, can be represented for fuel element debris
as"
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where the first term represents the heat generated in a particle of the core by
fission product decay and the second represents the mechanism of energy loss
by radiation as the particle falls toward the atmosphere. The solution of this
equation shown in Fig. 2 yields temperature as a function of time for any ini-
tial conditions of temperature and particle size. Interpretation of Fig. 2
shows that thermal radiation is the controlling factor and the contribution of
decay heat to the potential energy of the particle at the inception of re-entry
is negligible. Therefore particle initial temperature, which is indicative of
its initial position in the core, initial mass and its re-entry angle, indicative
of total time from abort to re-entry, are the controlling factors in this case.
Simple Aerodynamic Heating--As the first step in determining the primary
mode of debris destruction, the total heat transferred to a typical graphite
re-entry model, from aerodynamic inputs only, was computed using the
basic analysis of Refs. 1 and 2. It was found that even when cold wall heat
rates were assumed (i. e,, no radiation heat losses) giving highly optimistic
values of total heat input during re-entry, burnup is far from being achieved,
as sublimation temperatures of graphite debris can never be reached. (Note:
12, 500 Btu/lb maximum available and 28, 000 Btu/ib is required.) Therefore
the only mode of complete passive destruction is thermochemical and appears
as a result of surface combustion during re-entry.
The only real value of the basic aeroheating is found in the early stages of
re-entry where it rapidly raises the particle surface temperatures to the
point where chemical reactions with oxygen begin.
Surface Combustion and Mass Transfer of Graphite--Having determined the
primary mode of reactor fuel element debris destruction to be oxidation dur-
ing re-entry, a meaningful analytical model to which the various theories of
graphite oxidation can be applied must be set up.
Due to the low volume fraction of uranium in a typical fuel element, it was
determined that if a suitable analytical description of pure graphite oxidation
during re-entry can be derived, only small changes in its coefficients and basic
form would be necessary to extend it to the fueled case. This results because
the effects of impurities and radiation on the graphite manifest themselves by
lowering the activation energy and increasing the active oxidation sites of the
graphite surface. In any case, the real fueled and irradiated debris should
demonstrate only slightly higher mass loss rates than the pure graphite. Con-
sequently, the assumption of the pure graphite re-entry was felt to give con-
servative results.
RE-ENTRY REGIMES--Any particle re-entering the earth,s atmosphere may
pass through three distinct regimes which affect the aerothermochemical
phenomena acting on the particle. When the particle first re-enters the at-
mosphere, it is in the region of free molecule flow, characterized by the di-
ameter of the particle being much less than the mean free path between mole-
cules. As the re-entering body descends lower into the atmosphere, the mol-
ecular mean free path decreases and the flow eventually may become of the
continuum type where the characteristic diameter of the body is much larger
than the mean free path between molecules. Reference 1 summarizes these
phenomena and indicates that small particles may well be in free molecule
flow throughout their entire re-entry down to 100, 000 feet.
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GENERAL ANALYSISFOR PURE GRAPHITE--FREE MOLECULE FLOW
ESTIMATES--Supplementing the definition of free molecule flow by assuming
that above a certain altitude, intermolecular collisions are infrequent com-
pared with collisions of molecules with the re-entering particles, an analytical
model of the body and flow interactions can be shown in Fig. 3. Since each mol-
ecule that collides with the re-entering particle suffers a minimum of energy
loss due to other molecular collisions in the vicinity of the body, the transfer of
momentum and energy from the atmosphere to the particle is particularly effi-
cient in free molecule flow. Therefore, for a given atmospheric density, the
effepts of drag (momentum transfer) and aerodynamic heating (energy trans-
fer) as well as any chemical reactions which might occur (mass transfer) are
more pronouncedthan in other flow regimes (Refs. 1 and 3}.
In addition, a re-entering body gives rise to a flow of nonuniform density,
that is, the mean free paths of molecules near the body where the density is
higher may be appreciably smaller than the free stream mean free paths of at-
mospheric molecules at the same altitude (Ref. 4). Therefore, the criterion
for the existence of free molecule flow was based on the mean free path of mol-
ecules in the immediate vicinity of the body.
The mechanism of graphite oxidation in free molecule flow is not well
knownand the calculation of oxidation rates must be best estimates. The ma-
jor obstacles are the unknownnature of the accommodation of free molecules
on a graphite surface and the unknownratio of the products of combustion.
The former affects the probability of a chemical reaction betweenan incident
oxygenmolecule and the surface, and the latter determines whether oxygen
molecules andatoms will react andform CO2, CO or some fraction of both.
This reaction is also temperature dependentwith carbon and in the range
of temperatures a typical particle undergoes during re-entry (300 to 3000° R)
for a 1/32-inch particle, the reaction goes from almost all CO2 at I000° R to
all CO above2000° R (Ref. 5).
Since typical temperature profiles show temperatures above 1000° R dur-
ing most of the re-entry (Fig. 4), the free molecule case was idealized by
assuming only the CO reaction prevalent. An analysis, based on the assump-
tion of free molecule flow over the entire re-entry trajectory, would be ex-
pected to give an estimate of the maximum size fragment that could burn com-
pletely in the atmosphere under the most ideal conditions.
Heat Transfer Analysis--Heat transferred to a high velocity sphere in free
molecule flow by direct energy exchangeand exothermic chemical reactions
on its surface is given by:
E = (KE + PE)g + ECHEM - ERAD (Ref.1)
where only a portion of the chemical energy serves to heat the particle. The
remainder is carried away by the products of combustion. It was also de-
termined that tb_eliberated chemical energy is much smaller than the energy
input to the particle due to the direct kinetic energy exchangein free molecule
flow.
Mass Transfer Analysis--In free molecule flow, the stream of oxygenmole-
cules flowing toward the surface of the graphite sphere is not as impeded by
the presence of combustion products or other air molecules as in continuum
flow becauseof the absenceof a definite boundary layer. Therefore, graph-
ite oxidation in the presence of free molecule flow is controlled by the rate
of the chemical reaction itself, whereas in continuum flow, the controlling
element is the diffusion of the oxygen to the surface and the counter diffusion
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of the products of combustion away from the surface through the boundary
layer (Ref. 5). In free molecule flow, mass is lost according to:
dm
dt - V S (6) O (P)
where
p = density of oxygen molecule and atom concentrations
p = probability of reaction
and
= e
( )[KE + PE] g
surface activation energy of graphite = 44, 000 gm/cal/mole based
on Hottels work (Ref. 6)
and 5 is determined by the relative quantities of carbon monoxide and carbon
dioxide produced at the surface.
Analytical Model Continuum Flow--If it is assumed that the particle is always
in continuum flow, with its inefficient heat and mass transfer mechanisms, an
overly conservative answer results which represents that size for which any
smaller particle than that calculated will definitely burn completely in the at-
mosphere. Figure 5 represents the analytical model used in the analysis of
the continuum flow case.
Continuum Flow Estimates--A preliminary evaluation of available graphite
oxidation theories, carried out by the Martin Company, resulted in the use
of Scalas results for continuum flow applications (Ref. 5). The results of
his work, using a large range of commercial graphites, are summarized and
indicate that although flight speed (stagnation enthalpy) and surface tempera-
ture (shifting chemical equilibrium) effects do exist in a hypersonic environ-
ment, the most importaut single independent variable is stagnation pressure,
or, effectively, altitude.
Since the equations hold only at the stagnation point, a method was devised
to determine mass loss at points away from stagnation and the dependence of
the mass flux parameter on particle dynamics (Ref. 1). A total average mass
loss from the particles can then be determined throughout its re-entry. This
was computed, in preliminary Martin investigations for rotating spheres, as
being approximately 13% of the stagnation point value, i.e., the whole rotating
sphere will lose mass at an average rate, 87% less than in the stagnation re-
gime of a stable sphere.
RESULTS--The difference in the two methods of solution is presented in
Fig. 6 which shows the curves derived from the analysis of both continuum
and free molecule flow regimes. The range of particle sizes which can be
destroyed is shown to be between 4/1000 and 5/1000 of a foot in diameter or
between approximately 1/24 and 1/16 inch; for the most optimistic re-entry
conditions considered, _ = -1 ° giving maximum exposure time and 25,000 fps.
Therefore a rather narrow band of maximum sizes which can be destroyed
is produced due to the choice of conservative or optimistic assumptions gov-
erning the methods of solution. The effects of flow transition from free mole-
cule to continuum flow were also studied and are shown for a typical size close
to the burnup band where burnup is slow enough so transition will occur. The
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effects of initial diameter and re-entry angle on burnup size were also com-
puted and are summarized in Ref. 1. In general, they show that re-entry
angles betweenone and eight degrees give maximum assurance of destruc-
tion. No burnupoccurs outside this band.
RE-ENTRY OF INTACT ENGINE--Destruct system failure is an ever present
reality; therefore re-entry of the intact engine was studied to predict the re-
sultant hazards (Ref. 1).
Figure 7 showsthe zone of pressure vessel meltdown for a series of or-
bital injection aborts. Pressure vessel meltdown of the hot engine is pri-
marily causedby afterheat with aerodynamic heating serving only to increase
the meltdown altitude. Thoughthe fuel elements and reflector segments of
the hot enginewill be released at relatively high altitudes following orbital in-jection aborts, there is insufficient aerodynamic heat or oxidation to destroy
them prior to impact. The orbital injection aborts occurring before or just
after nuclear stage startup do not result in the melting of the pressure vessel
of the cold engine, and the engine will impact in an intact condition.
CONCLUSIONS--Thefollowing general conclusions can bedrawn from this
study: (1) during re-entries contemplated for the studied RIFT missions, re-
actor debris will not be destroyed by aeroheating alone; (2) the most impor-
tant phenomenaaffecting debris burnup durihg re-entry is oxidation mass
loss; (3) the sizes of particles which will burn up are predominately in free
molecule flow throughout their entire re-entry; (4) continuum flow estimates
of the maximum size particle which can be destroyed will give conservative
answers; (5)particle burn-up range is between 1/24 and 1/16 inch for graph-
ite; (6) if the destruct system does not operate, the engine will re-enter in-
tact from anyaborts below 400,000 feet in both the orbital injection and bal-
listic missions studied for RIFT; (7) for any aborts abovethis altitude, engine
afterheat, not aeroheating, is the primary mode of engine structural failure;
(8} not enoughenergy or exposure time is available in any of the ballistic or
orbital injection mission aborts studied to appreciably destroy the engine fuel
elements or reflectors falling free during re-entry.
RECOMMENDATIONS--It is doubtful whether an explosive destruct system
alone could succeedin breaking the reactor into pieces small enoughto be
passively destroyed. It is recommended that other methods such as oxidizer
injection, fuel element additives and/or planned excursions be investigated to
supplement any explosive destruct system.
NOMENCLATURE
g--gravitational constant (ft / sec 2)
W--weight (lb)
Cp--Specific heat (Btu/lb-°R}
T--temperature (°R)
t--time (sec)
m - -mass (slugs/ft 3)
c_--energy production at time t
b--radioactive decay constant
a--Stephan-Boltzmann constant
e--surface emissivity
V--(particle) velocity (fps)
u--streamline velocity (fps)
5--rati° of products of combustion
(co/co 2)
p--density {lb/ft 3)
p--probability of reaction
E--activation energy (gm-cal/mole)
S--surface area (ft 2)
R--radius (ft)
x--direction along streamline
168
@--re-entry angle (deg)
J--778 (ft-lb/Btu)
Subscripts
rh--mass loss rate (lb/ft2-sec)
V2
KE--kinetic energy of particle = 2-_J(Btu/lb)
PE--potential energy of gas = RTg (Btu/lb)
i ith species w wall
S stagnation co free stream
g gas _ boundary layer interface
e entry B body
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Fig. 3. Analytical Model--Free Molecule Flow
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NUCLEAR ROCKET DESTRUCT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
BY
W. H. ESSELMAN
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
ASTRONUCLEAR LABORATORY
An important aspect in assuring the flight safety of nuclear rocket engine systems
is establishing the criteria for the design of the destruct system. These requirements can
be divided into those applicable prior to engine operation and those following operation.
The first, called anti-crlticality destruct, would perform the function of subdividing the
reactor into subcritical ports in the event of an incident prior to nuclear engine operation.
Since the most severe condition occurs when pieces of the reactor fall in water, this
system need only break the core into ports which will assure subcrltlcallty when immersed
in water.
A preliminary evaluation would indicate that the reactor should be subdivided into
integral parts which will remain _,,1_,._:,:_._1 ..,_,_ flooded and _1_,_._ _...... • .
................... _.,,_.,_ k,y vv,_,e,. For
example, a spherical geometry of perhaps 50 cm in diameter with water filling the coolant
channel voids could be assumed• Such a model is unrealistic since destruction of the
reactor will result in individual pieces of fuel elements being dispersed into the water as
illustrated in Figure 1. These fuel element arrays must be subcrltlcal as they descend
through the water and,settle on the bottom. The chemical action of the water must also
be considered• At this stage of the development it must be assumed that the fuel element
will disintegrate. More optimum mixtures of water and uranium could occur and Finally a
layer of fueled graphite particles could exist. To account For these cases, a philosophy
has been tentatively adopted to disperse the fuel elements such that the pieces cannot
combine in critical geometries.
Calculations (1) were made to establish the ratios of water to graphite fuel mixtures
which will result in the minimum critical mass. This analysis was performed For five
different Ioadings of the reactor fuel From .500 to .03 gm/cm 3. The corresponding carbon
to uranium ratio ranged from 1270 to 77.5. The model used was a sphere with uniform
dispersion of graphite Fuel and water. This sphere was reflected with eight inches of
water. It was shown that a water reflected sphere of fueled graphite and water has a
minimum critical mass of .89 Kg For a carbon to uranium ratio of 74.47 and .93 Kg For a
carbon to uranium ratio of 157.04. These ratios cover the range which could occur with
the Nerva design. To allow some margin a tentative criteria has been proposed that the
Fuel in one area of the water be limited to 750 grams. Figure 1 indicates this condition
and shows the fuel dispersed with an optimum U235/H 2 ratio. Such a mixture can be
allowed to Fall into a 27" cylinder of water. When the particles reach the bottom, they
could result in a uniform U 235 layer of .2g/cm2 which is about 1/2 that which would
cause criticality of a slab of this type. Areas of this type could be adjacent to each other
without risking criticality. Preliminary investigations indicate that this criteria can be
achieved in a practical system without excessive difficulty.
Following engine operation, the requirements of the destruct system are vastly
altered and more difficult to achieve. The purpose of the post--operatlve destruct system
is to dispose of reactor parts so that no excessive radioactivity returns to a populated area
177
of the earth. To focus t'he discussion on a particular case, a model for discussion is
postulated. This model consists of a reactor engine in orbit at an altitude of 1.8 x 106 ft.
following 30 minutes of operatlon at 1120 megawatts. Thirty seconds following such opera-
tion, the reactor will contain 2.31 x 1010 curies of activity. It is postulated that at tMs
time the engine is broken into small particles by some form of destruct system. The question
to be answered concerns the tolerable size of these particles.
A severe condition would be an immediate re-entry of the particles following this
operation. It is estimated that a re-entry angle of 5° could result from the destruct system
action or other system malfunction. It is believed these initial conditions could be some-
what pesslmlstic, however, a discussion of this case gives an order of magnitude appreci-
ation of the problem.
To establish the history of reactor fragments during the re-entry period, a combined
analytical and experimental program was undertaken. The range of initial particle size
chosen For investigation was from about 1/8 in. down to 1/64 in. diameter. These particles
will experience loss of mass due to oxidation and sublimation during the re-entry into the
earth' s atmosphere. It is assumed that the loss of fission products will be proportional to
the loss in mass. This is a conservative initial assumption in that some benefits will be
obtained by the diffusion of fission products during this operation. From 1 x 105 ft. down
to the earth, no additional mass losses occurred; but radioactive decay results in reduction
in dose rate expected from the Fragments.
The theoretical approach which was used involves the incorporation of one of the
existing oxidation theorles(2) into a digital computer program. This program calculates
the fate of re-entry particle based upon various initial velocities and angles of re-entry.
The analysis includes the effects of aerodynamic heating, radiation from the particle and
decay heat from fission products. Concurrent with the development of this program, a
series of experiments were performed using an arc plasma wind tunnel in which specimens
of graphite and fuel graphite were exposed to simulated re-entry conditions. The re-entry
conditlons for a particle at a particular altitude and velocity were simulated by proper
adjustment of gas stagnation enthalpy and pressure in the experimental equipment. Mass
losses due to oxidation were measured for various particle sizes at various exposure times.
The results of the theoretical analysis and the experimental data were compared to
determine the degree of validity of the theory. The first phase of experimental work dealt
primarily with unfueled material (pure graphite) which was chosen because the available
theory applied only to this material. The subsequent phases of the work were performed
with fueled material. Table I shows a comparison of the experimental mass loss rates for
grapMte samples and fueled graphite samples under three test point conditions. The sample
material contained 400 mg/cc of uranium. It was initially hoped by many people that
fueled graphite material would have a much greater rate of mass loss than graphite samples.
It can be seen that the difference between the two materials is not great. Table II com-
pares the predicted mass loss rates with the experimental results. It is also seen that the
theory agrees with the experimental figures within a factor of 2 or 3.
Using the above analytical model and initial conditions, the fate of various sized
particles was calculated during the re-entry. Figure 2 shows the velocities of a 1/8 in.,
1/16 in. and 1//32 in. particle versus altitude. These curves are all shown for 5° re-entry
angle. It is seen that small particles reach low velocities at relatively high altitudes.
Figure 3 is a typical particle size reduction curve run in the computer program for a 1/24"
particle. It was assumed that size reduction ceased at a surface temperature of 1000°R
since oxidation is negligible below this temperature. Figure 4 is a similar typical curve
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•deplcHng percent mass loss as a function of altitude For 1//24 '' and 1//32 '' particles. It is
seen that mass loss becomes negligible between 200, 000 to 250, 000 ft. where the parHcle
velocity has been reduced to below 1000 fps.
A summary of the conditions of the particles as they approach the earth is shown in
Table III which indicates the final particle diameters obtained from the re-entry computer
program. It is shown, for example, that a 1//8 in. particle loses 42% of its mass while
1//64 in. particle will lose 96%. The settling time to earth which is shown in this table is
a combination of re-entry time plus the time for the particle to drift from 105 ft. to land.
This time to drift to land for different particle sizes is given in Figure 5.
The last two columns in Table III are the key ones which can be used to evaluate
how large an irfitial particle size must be established as a destruct system criteria. If one
considers a particle of initial size of 1//24 in. diameter, it is seen that when it hits the
earth, it is .026 in. in diameter. Such a particle would contain .03 curies of activity, and
the dose rate at 1 ft. would be .159 r per hour. A particle of 1//32 in. initial diameter
would contain .0038 curies, and the dose rate at 1 ft. would be .018 r per hour. Activities
of the latter level are in a reasonable range. It is further indicated that if the initial
particle size diameter is as small as 1/64 in., a notable degradation in activity would
result.
For practical reasons, it is desirable to be able to tolerate as high a value of
initial particle size as possible and, therefore, a number of effects are being investigated.
It has been shown that some reduction in particle activity will be obtained by the diffusion
of fission products from the fuel pieces during the heating cycle of the fuel, during decay
heating, and during re-entry. Estimates are presently being made of the benefit that can
be derived from this source. A second benefit may be derived from more definitive es-
tablishment of the validity of the re-entry calculations and the experimental plasmajet
results versus the calculated values.
It is not anticipated that either of these effects will result in an order of magnitude
reduction of activity of the returning pieces. When combined, however, a factor of ten
may be realizable and a consequent easing of the destruct criteria could result.
(I)
(2)
W. R. Stratton, "Critical Dimensions of U(93.5) - Graphite - Water Spheres,
Cylinders, and Slabs.
S. M. Scala, "A Study of Hypersonic Ablation", General Electric Missile and
Space Vehicle Department - T.I.S. Document No. R595D438 (September, 1959).
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Simulated Conditions
TABLE I
Comparison of Experimental Reaction Rates of Fuel Graphite and Graphite.
Mass Loss Rate x. Radius 1/2-
Velocity Altitude Fueled Unfueled
(ft/se¢). (if) (Ib/ft3/2-sec)
17,250 21..5,0o0 2.6 +0.3 x 10 -4 2.5 +0.6 x 10 ...4
22,500 240,000 2.8+_0.3 x 10 -4 1.9 +_0.3 x 10-4
25,000 280,000 1.8 + 0.2 x 10-4 1.5 +0.2 x 10-4
SIMULATED CONDITIONS
TABLE II
Experimental and Predicted Reaction Rates for Fueled Graphite Under
Simulated Re-Entry Conditions.
MASS LOSS RATE x RADIUS
1/2
VELOCITY (FT/SEC) ALTITUDE (FT) EXPERIMENTAL ** PREDICTED
17,250 215,ooo 2.6 +--0.3 x 10 -4 1.4 x 10 -4
22,5o0 24o,ooo 2.8 +-0.3 x IO-4 1.1 x 10 -4
25,ooo 28o,ooo 1.8 4"0.2 x 10 -4 0.5 x 10 -4
*°(LB/FT 3/2 -SEC)
TABLE III
Mass Loss and Radioactivity History of Core Fragments.
INfflAL RADIOACTIVITY
INITIAL PARTICLE INITIAL PARTICLE FINAL PARTICLE FINAL PARTICLE RADIOACTIVITY MASS LOSS SETTLING TIME CONTENT DOSE RATE
SIZE (DIA.) VOLUME (IN 3 SIZE (DIA.) VOLUME (IN 3) CONTENT (%) TO EARTH* ON EARTH AT I FOOT
11111 ,12S" 1.02 x 10 -3 .1042 IN. 6.16 x 10 -4 7.32 x 102 42.37 3.1 x 103 S.Oll 24.4 R/HR
CURIES SEC CURIES
1/16 .0625" 1.28 • 10 _4 4.632 x 10 -2 5.19 x 10 -5 92.2 S9.$5 4.84 • 14_3 2,84 • 10 -I 1,36 R/HR
IN. CURIES SEC CURIES
1/24 04167" 3.79 • 10 -5 2.568 x 10 -2 3.72 x 10 -5 26.2 76.64 6.94 x 103 3.32 x 10 -2 .159 R/HR
IN. CURIES SEC CURIES
1/32 03125" 1.60 x IO -s 1.52 x 10 -2 1.84 x 10 -5 I1.S 88.48 1.16 • 104 3.81 • 10 -3 .018 R/HR
IN. CURIES SEC CURIES
1/64 .015625" 1,99 • IO -6 7.67 • 10 -11 96.20 2.41 • 106 4.35 • 10 -7 _ .01 MR/HR
SEC CURIES
5.26 • 10 -4
IN.
1.43
CURIES
*INCLUDES TIME DURING ABLATION
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FIGURE 1
Model of Core Parts Falling in Water.
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ROVER REACTOR POWER TRANSIENT CALCULATIONS
W. R. Stratton and C. G. Chezem
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
ABSTRACT
Two of the codes currently in use for analyzing nuclear
power excursions in Kiwi-B-4 type reactors are discussed. These
are the Los Alamos RTS and RAC codes. The RTS code allows an
exact treatment of delayed neutron effects but is space inde-
pendent. The RAC code provides for detailed treatment of mate-
rials (thermal expansion, phase change, etc.) and some geometries,
but contains only a very simple neutronic scheme. Accidents
severe enough to create about 2 x 1020 fissions will vaporize
some graphite and create a small explosion. Control rod created _
excursions do not reach this as large as 3 x 1020 fissions._/
magnitude, but conceptual water, t_
immersion accidents ould be
Codes and Surveys _@#t_._,D. _[_AJtA/_
Rover reactor power transient calculations have been per-
formed with the aid of two digital computer codes. These are the
RTS code (G. R. Keepin, Nuclear Sci.& Eng. 8, 670 (1960)) and
the RAC code (C. G. Chezem).
RTS Code
The RTS code integrates the reactor kinetic equations with
no approximations beyond the usual space-independent and one-
velocity assumptions involving the introduction of an effective
delayed neutron fraction and an effective prompt neutron gener-
ation time. For Kiwi-B-4 reactors the delayed fraction, S, and
prompt generation time, Z, are 7.3 x 10 -3 and 2.5 x 10 -5 sec,
respectively. Input to the RTS code may include a completely
arbitrary reactivity function and a constant or time varying
energy coefficient of reactivity such that
5k(t) = 5ko(t) - bEf(t)
In equation 1, 5ko(t) is the imposed reactivity function, E f is
the fission energy density at time t and b is a negative energy
coefficient of reactivity appropriate to a Kiwi-B-4. To obtain
results pertinent to any given reactor additional assumptions
must be formulated about the spatial flux densities, constancy
of the reactivity coefficients over the range of interest and
the physical state of the reactor core material during the
transient.
(i)
This code is most useful and important in the reactlv-
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ity regions between delayed critical and prompt critical and
somewhat above prompt critical.
RAC Code
The RAC code is relatively new and is a first attempt to
describe in some detail the dynamic behavior of a Rover reactor
during a power transient. For calculational purposes the core
is imagined to be homogeneous (solid core of density _1.57) and
divided into an arbitrary number (usually _16) of squat, adjacent
cylinders with a flux (or fission) density assigned to each such
region. This arbitrary distribution can be forced to simulate,
for example, a control rod transient with a normal cosine type
flux or a water penetration type transient with a very peaked
flux at the end of the core subjected to flooding. Given an
assumption on the imposed reactivity function (step or ramp),
the code then cyclically generates fission energy in each region
(or mass point) increasing temperatures and internal pressures
as demanded by heat capacities and an assumed graphite equation
of state. Also, during each time cycle, each mass point is
allowed to perform thermodynamic work on its neighbors through
the common interface and thus relieve internal pressures (thermal
expansion) and in extreme cases physically to set the core mass
into motion. The fundamental equation for each region is
dE(T,p) dE f dv
dt = _ + P_ (2)
and for each interface is
d2R 1 bP
d--_t = p _R
(3)
where E(T,p) is the internal energy assumed to be a function only
of density and temperature, E f is the fission energy, P is the
pressure, v - i/p is the specific volume and R is the interface
coordinate. Reactivity is decreased as the core expands; the
amount of the change is proportional to the change in length.
Assumptions about the graphite equation of state are of most
importance in this code. The low-temperature function is a
linear combination of temperature and density change of the form
P(p,T) = CI(T-T o) + C 2 (p-po)
P
(4)
where the C i are adjustable constants related to graphite thermal
expansion and compressibility. Negative pressures are allowed to
simulate tensions, but a maximum allowable tension is defined
beyond which a rupture is assumed and the pressure in the given
region is no longer allowed to assume negative values. At low
temperatures this "breaking tension" is -300 atm but above
_3600°K its magnitude decreases and is zero at and above the
triple point (3960OK). Above 3600OK, the graphite vapor pressure
becomes significant and at about 3960°K, the graphite triple
point, the equilibrium vapor pressure is 100 atmospheres. One
form of the graphite P-T diagram for this temperature range is
illustrated in Figure I. Credence in this figure is limited,
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but the triple point pressure seems to be better established th_n
is the temperature. The code allows for the production of graphite
gas (latent heat of sublimation, L, equal to 172 Kcal/mole), but
for temperatures at or below 3960°K, the vapor pressures are not
allowed to exceed a limiting function of the form
C 4
RT
P = C3e (5)
The limiting values of equation 5 do not apply to equation 4. If
temperatures exceed 3960OK, a second limiting function similar to
equation 5 is used, but in this temperature regime another heat
sink is possible - the conversion of solid to liquid, for which
the latent heat is estimated to be ii Kcal/mole. It is assumed
that equation 4 is descriptive of the liquid as well as the solid
state, except that tensions are disallowed.
To gain an understanding of characteristics and general
behavior, some results taken from a series of problems with
appropriate constants for a Kiwi-B-4 are illustrated in Figures
2, 3, 4, and 5. These problems were initiated by use of a step
increase of reactivity - a scheme that reasonably approximates
very fast control rod motions, abrupt changes of reflection,
moderation, etc. The fission energy release for a wide range of
initial reactivities (relative to prompt critical) is illustrated
in Figure 2. The initial prompt a (reciprocal period) for any
reactivity may be obtained from
5kpB
a = _ (6)
where 5k n is the reactivity in dollars relative to prompt crit-
ical. T_mperature coefficients of reactivity equivalent to 0.60
and 1.20 dollars/1000°C have been used for this survey.
For initial reactivities somewhat less than _1.5 dollars
over prompt critical the fission yield is nearly proportional to
the excess reactivity - the core expansion is in near-equilibrium
with the fission rate and no physical explosion should be expected.
However, above this initial value and depending on the value of
the energy coefficient of reactivity, the maximum central temper-
atures and pressures are found to be in the neighborhood of the
triple point and some portion of the core will vaporize and/or
melt. The resulting high internal pressures (Figure 3) produce
a more effective quenching mechanism leading to an asymmetry in
the power spike. This effect produces a fission yield, initially
somewhat less than that expected from an extension of the yield
line from the lower reactivities. At still larger step inputs,
the core expansion lags the energy release and the total fissions
increase at a higher power of the initial reactivity.
The introduction of a high pressure gas can impart signifi-
cant kinetic energy to the core and a physical explosion might
be expected. These results from the RAC code are illustrated in
Figures 4 and 5 as functions of the initial reactivity and the
total fission energy release, respectively. The latter presen-
tation removes some of the uncertainty in the value of the
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temperature coefficient of reactivity. The kinetic energy (in
units of pounds of high explosive equivalent) shows a distinct
and sharp threshold at about 1.5 dollars or 1.5 x 1020 fissions;
the knee of the curve near _4 lbs. is associated with the liqui-
faction of graphite.
Because estimates of explosive energy are most uncertain
(perhaps by a factor as large as ten) the energy used to create
graphite vapor is also plotted in Figures 4 and 5 to serve as an
upper limit to the possible kinetic energy.
The assumption of a homogeneous core now assumes more signi-
ficance. In effect, the assumption is equivalent to the suppo-
sition that the vapor pressures shatter the graphite and plug the
flow channels for a time at least of interest to the problem
(of the order of milliseconds). If such gases could escape, the
yield curve would be more nearly linear with excess reactivity
(additional reactivity would still be lost as core material left
the reactor or migrated to regions of lower worth) and explosive
energies (from this source) would be much lower.
An assumption implicit in these calculations is that the
graphite matrix contains no adsorbed gases. This situation is
unlikely and when through auxiliary experiments (TREAT reactor,
chemical analyses, etc.) the amount and nature of possible
adsorbed gases are known some reasonable assumptions may be
incorporated into the RAC code to allow for this. The effects
will be similar to those from graphite vapor pressures, but will
most likely occur at lower temperatures and fission energy
densities. The magnitude of explosive energies will depend on
the volume of adsorbed gases and the rate at which they are
released.
Control Vane Transients
To calculate the maximum accident from control vane motion,
the improbable and simultaneous failure of the servo-control
system, the scram circuit and the safety springs of all vanes
is assumed along with the appearance of a signal which forces
all vanes to add reactivity at the maximum possible rate. Since
vane speeds have not yet been set, three values are considered -
22-1/2, 45, and 90 degrees/sec with all vanes moving together.
For this study, the RTS code was used and results were
normalized through special RAC problems. A maximum of five
dollars over delayed critical was assumed to be available and,
for the 45 deg/sec case, the input reactivity (in dollars) was
forced by
5ko(t ) = 3.927 t - 0.177 t2 - 0.26825 t2 (7)
which may be scaled for the other two speeds.
Figure 6 illustrates the power history of these three
transients. The fission energy releases following the spikes
are 3.1 x 1019 , 4.7 x 1019, and 6.2 x 1019, the larger value
corresponding to the greater rate.
As was determined earlier, at least 1.5 x 1020 fissions are
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necessary to bring the central portion of the core to vaporization
temperatures. Even the extreme case of 90 deg/sec would reach
this value only long after the initial power spike. Thus, a
graphite gas explosion should not be expected, but some explosive
force from the release of adsorbed gases could occur.
Liquid Hydrogen Accidents - An Upper Limit
The accident caused by the sudden flow of liquid hydrogen
into the reactor system can be overestimated by making some
grossly simplified assumptions. It is assumed that hydrogen in
the core is worth about two dollars per pound and that the pump
can start the flow of liquid hydrogen at the rate of seventy
pounds per second with no time delay whatsoever. In addition, it
is postulated that this flow is directed into a room temperature
reactor (no cooldown) and no choking in the nozzle, reflector or
core occurs.
With these assumptions, the energy release from a transient
created by a steady insertion of 140 dollars/sec is calculated
by the RAC code to be 2.8 x lO 20 fissions. The kinetic energy
(from Figure 5) is about 4 ibs. HE equivalent.
This energy release must be an overestimate for reasons
cited above, but also because some exploratory calculations with
the RAC code in which the axial fission density is highly peaked
at one end of the core show a lower fission yield (compared to a
cosine flux distribution) for the same insertion of reactivity.
Such a peaked distribution tends to destroy one end of the core
and quench the transient before the central part reaches destruc-
tion temperatures. Thus, the fission yield from such an accident
is certainly less than 3 x l020 fissions by some unknown factor;
one guesses that the factor is no less than two and no greater
than ten. The kinetic energy is more difficult to estimate.
The effect of hydrogen gas in the core could appreciably increase
this quantity relative to the fission yield.
Water Immersion Accidents
If a Kiwi-B-4 reactor were to fall into water, the immediate
consequence would be a very rapid, near-step increase of reac-
tivity. From Los Alamos critical experiments, end reflection of
the core with polyethylene contributes 2.17 dollars and complete
side reflection (outside the pressure shell) contributes 2.6
dollars. Thus, if the reactor were initially just critical, it
could find itself some 3.77 dollars super prompt critical,
creating an energy release of _3 x l02D fissions. However, it
is unlikely that complete reflection could be accomplished
quickly enough, and the excursion most likely would be of lower
magnitude.
Another possible state of the reactor could be several
dollars subcritical. In this case, the reflection might change
the state of the core to near-delayed critical and water could
penetrate the flow channels at a rate of several feet per second.
Since 2 inches water penetration is worth about 2 dollars and
4 inches is about 5.5 dollars, it is clear that the reactor
could not survive the subsequent power transient.
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This paper presents the potential safety problems associated with nuclear
rockets_ countermeasure philosophy, and the current safety program. Reference
is made to causal non-nUclear accidents, which are defined as the event or
series of events cullminating in a nuclear incident. During the past two years
the subject has been extensively studiedl, 2 so that both the causal accidents
and potential nuclear incidents are sufficiently well known to proceed with
the engineering of safety devices and the formulation of safety procedures to
prevent, override, or minimize nuclear incidents. The philosophy adopted is
to assume that certain credible causal accidents will occur and provide_, _
reliable countermeasure devices to assure nuclear safety. /_ J/
6 o I Ig', p, i'd z ,l <sv
1. Tt_ h3JCI_ ROCKET REACTOR - Since the nuclear rocket reactor is a
uranium-graphite system designed to operate in the 2000°C. temperature range,
it is inherently a large energy sink. Some L_mdament_ estimates of its
behavior can accrue from a comparison of its energy capacity and energy
potential to various sources of energy that it can be exposed to over its
operational history, as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
CORE ENERGY CAPACITY VERSUS SOURCES OF ENERGY (APPROXIMATE 1
CORE ENERGY CAPACITY
Energy required to raise core from 0° C. to 4000 ° C.
Energy required to raise core from 2000 ° C. to 4000 ° C.
Heat of vaporization
Energy required to completely vaporize cold core
MWS
6,800
4,000
72,000
78,800
CORE ENERGY SOURCES
Afterheat to 1/2 hour after shutdown
Nuclear Transients:
1. Spherical collapse (Maximum Impossible Accident)
2. Extre_ae control drum failure (B-4)
3- Liquid hydrogen flooding (B-4)
4. Extreme water flooding (B-4)
5. Threshold range for carbided fuel destruction
from TREAT
3,960
75,000
1,500
900 - 9,000
16,000
53000 - ii,000
(1)
(1)
(3)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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OTHER i%[ERGY SOURCES MWS
Heat of combustion of core 40,000
Maxin_ml kinetic energy of core at orbital reentry (25,000 fps) 33,000
Kinetic energy of core impacting at terminal velocity (500 fps) 13
Kinetic energy of lO0 pounds of TNT to pulverize core 145
Maximum energy derived from Saturn (C-2) propellants 7,600,000 (6)
under ideal stoichiometric mixing conditions
A number of nuclear transients have been cataloged in Table I. These
range in n_gnitude from 1500 to 75,000 megawatt-seconds (MWS) depending upon
the core model analyzed, the initial core conditions, the amount and rate of
reactivity insertion, the method of analysis, and shutdown mechanismlPosty-
lated. The upper limit or maxi_a_nincredible accident of 75,000MWS is
derived from spherical collapse_ removal of the core void volume, and
reflection of the core and approximates the maximum thermal energy capacity
of the core. Lesser energy releases are derived from more credible accidents
recently analyzed by Stratton3, . Some preliminary empirical estimates of
the fission energy required to bre_-up the fuel have been derived from the
TREAT experiments.
Other energy sources include the exothermic heat liberated by complete
combustion of the core and the kinetic energy of the core at reentry. When
combined, these two sources approxinmte the energy capacity of the core.
However, during actual reentry of a complete engine these combined sources
of energy cannot be effectively coupled and fully applied to the core because
of chenical reaction inefficiency and system heat loss, yielding the intuitive
conclusion that reentry heating and oxidation alone _dll not completely
consume the core. However, the deton_Lion of lO0 pounds of explosives,
representing a comparatively small energy input, in the core prior to reentry
would enhance the aerothermochemical reaction efficiency by exposing the fuel
and creating more surface area. Also of interest is the theoretical upper
limit energy inventory of Saturn propellants which over-shadows the potential
nuclear energy releases of the nuclear rocket engine.
2. RADIONUCLIDE INVENTORY - A relative measure of the magnitude of safety
problems associated with nuclear rockets is the inventory history of fission
products developed by the reactor, shown in Figure 1. Of note is the com-
paratively small contribution of a hypothetical terminal excursion occurring
at impact in the deep ocean do_range to the inventory developed by normal
full power operation. Depletion of the inventory by fission product diffusion
is expected to be a few percent during full power operation, about 80% during
typical afterheat conditions, and from 30-60% during excursions. Radioactive
decay achieved by residence of the nuclear rocket in space and temporary
retention of engine particulate debris in the upper atmosphere as fallout,
and fission product boil-off, all serve to decrease the magnitude of the
safety problems associated with operational nuclear spacecraft.
3. CHARACTERISTIC MISSIONS - Present planning for RIF2 considers the testing
of the nuclear rocket as an upper stage on four variant ballistic flights
including the following: (1) a dummy engine test, (2) continuous application
of thrust, (3) powered operation with one restart, and (4) powered operation
_ith two restarts. 7 The full power operation of the nuclear stage will occur
at high altitudes downrange, where its instantaneous impact point will be in
deep water downrange.
The following future nuclear stage modus operandi are eBvisioned: (1)
pre-orbital startup, orbital parking_ and restart to escape u, (2) pre-orbital
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startup direct to escape, and (3) chc_mical injection i_rbo a parking orbit _ith
orbital startup.
4. POTE_FflAL SAFETY PROBLEMS - Potential safety problems associated with
nuclear rockets can best be isolated in an orderly manncr by discussing them
within the chronology of conceptual operational phases. A parallel sequential
discussion of safety countermeasures is also appropriate since they are de-
signed to prevent nuclear and radiation incidents for a _ride spectluan of
assumed causal primary non-nuclear failures and accidents. Figures 2 and 3
show the relationship of conceptual operational phases, safety problems, and
counte_neasures during transport_ ground handling, and flight.
A. DURING ENGINE TRANSPORT - Conceptually_ the nuclear rocket reactor core
will-be transported to Cape Canaveral in a fully assembled conditio_ and the
remaining engine components _ll be s1_pped separately. The core _ll be
heavily poisoned to maintain it subcritical even when immersed in _ter, con-
tained in a _ter-tight structure designed to withstand impulsive loads, and
shipped in a preferential manner. At least three simultaneous failures must
occur to cause a nuclear incident, as follows: (1) a catastrophic carrier
accident, (2) structural or thermal failure of the shipping container, and (3)
poison removal in an undetermined manner while still maintaining a critical
geometry. Because of the infinitesimal probability of this event when counter-
measures are used, safety analysis in this area has yielded to countermeasure
engineering.
B. DURING GROtECD HANDLING - Progrsmmatic philosophy is to safe the reactor
whenever possible by maintaining a dual poison capability by inserting poison
wires in the core coolant channels and locking the control dln_as in the most
sub-critical position during ground handling. Dual poison usage is effective
since the core poison will override the reactivity available in the control
drums even if they are rotated to the most critical position.
(i) NUCLEAR ENGINE A_ STAGE ASSEMBLY - The reactor _ii be assembled
in the Nuclear Assembly Building (NAB) following its arrival at Cape Canaveral.
During assembly poison wires will remain in the core and the control drums will
be locked. Dry criticality incidents during reactor assembly are not deemed
credible when the reactor is thus poisoned.
Following reactor assembly the poison _res _._ii be removed and
the control drums unlocked preparatory to critical testing. The critical test
constitutes the only discontinuity in poison usage during the ground handling
phase and appears intuitively to be one of the more credible places; for a
nuclear accident to occur, because the countermeasure devices are virtually
negated. Should a nuclear incident occur; it's worst form would be a dry
excursion due to excessive, but velocity-limited, drum rotation resulting in a
maximum energy release of from 1000-2200 M]_ estimated for similar excursions
of Ki_-B type reactors. However, up to May, 1962 some 953 sin_lar tests9 had
been run on Kiwi-B type reactors _thout incident and several thousand such
tests }_ll be run before the NERVA reactor is tested at the NAB. Hence, it is
expected that a high degree of personnel competence and hardware reliability
will be inherent in the NAB critical tests. During critical tests at the NAB,
a personnel exclusion radius of one-half mile is tentatively planned even
though the test cell will offer a high degree of aerosol containment and direct
radiation attenuation.
Following critical testing; the poison _res will be reinserted
and the control drums locked before the reactor is assembled with the remaining
engine components. The nuclear rocket engine will then be mated to the nuclear
stage and the stage moved to the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB). Movement of
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the fully poisoned reactor on a velocity-limited carrier through a controlled
area does not appear to constitute a significant potential nuclear safety
problem.
(2) RI_T VEHICLE ASS_LY - Upon arrival at the VAB, the nuclear stage
will be mated to the Saturn cheF/cal stages to constitute the RIF_ vehicle.
Since the VAB is a "cold" area of high personnel density: the reactor _ill be
doubly poisoned in the manner previously described. A concei=able, but un-
likely, non-nuclear causal failure would be the inadvertent dropping of the
nuclear stage from a height of more than 200 feet atop the Saturn booster as a
result of human error or equipment n_lfunction. In this case, the free fall
impact velocity would be about ll0 feet per second, _th a corresponding impact
pressure of about 15,000 psi, and considerable distortion of the engine would
be expected. However, hydrogenous materials _uld not be present in the VAB,
and in order to induce a "dry" excursion critical geometry would have to be
maintained while at the same time the poison would have to be removed from the
core and the majority of the control drums rotated in the "poison-out" position
by in_act. Current analyses of the response of the reactor core, control
systems, and poisons to impact loads will shed more light on the credibility of
this incident. _en the RIF2 vehicle is completely assen_led, it _ll be moved
from the VAB to the launch position _th the reactor remaining in a doubly
poisoned condition.
(3) VEHICLE TRANSPORT A/_DPRE-LAUNCH PREPABATIONS - Conceptually,
movement of the unfueled RIF2 vehicle _ll be accomplished in a vertical
position on a massive crawler-type Transporter-Launcher (T-L). The T-L will
move from the VAB to the launch position via the arming tower, _ere pyro-
technics and certain ordnance equipment _ll be installed on the RI_-T vehicle.
_en the T-L has reached the launch position_ it _ll be stabilized as a launch
platform.
One very unlikely non-nuclear causal failure during the vehicle
transpo_ phase appears to be the fallover of the complete RIF2 vehicle or its
nuclear stage from the Transporter-Launcher during trem.sport or after stabili-
zation at the launch position. Since the center of mass of the loaded T-L is
quite low, it appears that departure of the RI_-T vehicle from the T-L _ll be
dependent upon the integrity of the vehicle lock-doom mech__nism. _ne T-L _ll
be designed to suppo_ the vehicle during a line .....77 _th ma_ _nd
velocities of 60-65 knots. This accident is quite si_:i!ar to the one described
earlier for vehicle assembly in the _LiB. The sole difference is _zhether or not
_._ter is present along or adjacent to the route of the T-L from the VAB to the
launch position. _{uclear incidents as a result of fall over _;ould be more
lihely _en in_]uersion of the reactor in _ter is possible. Because of the
massive nature of the T-L it does not appear that it _ll cross bodies of %_ater
over bridge-type_ structures, _a_ner if _._ter _st _ Lraversed at all, earth
fill roadways _ight be utilized.
T_C. DURIL_ C_TCAL BOOST - The che_:Acal boost phase is arbitrarily defined
as the time period beginning _,__th the cotmtdo_m and zA_eling of the vehicle and
ending _,__th nuclear _ _ .s ag_ start-u_o _ad booster senaration. Potential nuclear
incidents during this phase are clearly dependent upon: (!) the probability
of causal failures of the vehicle _ud (2) the reliability o.i'counter_,_easures
utilized to preclude nuclear incidents in the even_ of vehicle failures.
The conceptual use of co_te_easures during chemical boost _rrants
discussion. It is currently pla_ed to maintain poison _res in the core and
the control drums locked until hhe countdown. At this point the poison _res
would be _thdra_ and replaced by the Anti-Critica!ity Destruct System (ACDS)
which in turn is connected to the vehicle destruct system. The ACDS is only
operative during chemical boost and is designed to render the reactor
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permanentlysubcritical with shapedcharges, which cut the pressure vessel and
fragmentthe core. Hence,if range safety destruct action is necessaryduring
chemicalboost_ the vehicle ta_age is disrupted, thrust is terminated, and
the nuclear rocket reactor is neutralized without a nuclear incident.
(i) LIFr-O_-_F AND VERTICAL BOOST - An accident that has been observed
in the past is the vehicle fal!bacl_ accident or launch pad abort in which the
vehicle fails on the launch pad or vertically above it during or after lift-
off. The fallback area in which the vehicle can impact during its vertical
flight can encompass an area a mile or more in radius from the launch position.
In such an accident the ACDS would be fired by a co_.%and destruc_ signal from
the ground. Reliability of the vehicle and engine destruct system would be
quite high. Should the ACDS fail to ftuuction, the nuclear rocket engine would
sustain appreciable inLoact damage and become involved in a major propellant
conflagration and/or detonation. ° The probability of a nuclear excursion
during this event is at best tu_no_m_ since it is not conducive to straight-
forward numerical analysis or experimentation. Another related problem is one
of the possible chemical toxicity of beryllium that imight be vaporized by the
conflagration. Here it appears that o1_ly small fragments of beryllium could
be vaporized by a sustained propellant fire_ and propellant detonations with
high kinetic energy yields would present an insufficient the_nal pulse to
vaporize any appreciable amount of beryllium. As a safety precaution an off-
site exclusion radius of eight miles and an on-site personnel exclusion radius
of three miles is planned around the launch position during launch.
(2) GRAVITY TILT PEOGRAI4 - During the gravity tilt program,_]ieh is
initiated ten seconds after launc_ structural failure, thrust-cut-offs, and
guidance malfunctions are credible vehicle failures. Should the vehicle
deviate from its planned azimuth immediately downrange and cross the destruct
limit fin% destruct action involving the firing of the ACDS would be necessar_
Again both the engine and vehicle destruct systems would have a high degree of
reliability. However, should the ACDS fail to fire, the nuclear rocket reactor
would impact in the ocean from one to 250 miles downrange where the water
depths vary from several feet to 3600 feet respectively. If the critical
geometry of the core is not destroyed by the impulsive load (about 17,000 psi),
an amount of positive reactivity far above the negative reactivity available
in the control system would be inserted as water entered the core, and a
nuclear excursion (probably non-cyclic) and attendant release of fission
products would result. This event does not appear to be serious as the impact
point approaches the Blake Escarpment, but takes on somewhat serious temporary
aspects early in the tilt program when the instantaneous impact point of the
vehicle is in the shallow water zone from one to twenty miles downrange. How-
ever, a range safety zone would be established during chemical boost, exclusion
from the impact point could be enforced, and monitoring of the area could be
accomplished until the radioactive contaminants had been diluted by natural
diffusion and advection.
(The previous treatment of potential nuclear rocket safety problems during
engine transport, ground handling, and chemical boost applies equally to both
RIFf missions and operational missions. The safety problems and counter-
measures remain essentially the same during these phases for all types of
missions. The subsequent discussion reflects the divergent nature of safety
problems, during the nuclear stage operation and post-nission disposition
phases, between RIl_f ballistic missions and the more complex operational
missions.)
D. DURinG }_CLEAR STAGE OPERATION AIrD POST-MISSION DISPOSITION
(i) RIFT BALLISTIC _SSIONS - A gro_id rule for RIF2ballistic
missions is that the nuclear stage does not come to full power until its
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instantaneous impact point is beyond the Blake Escarpment which is approxi-
mately 250 miles downrange. Hence, once that the nuclear rocket has developed
any appreciable fission product inventory, any subsequent in-flight failures
would result in ballistic reentry over a zone where the average water depth is
three miles. The final resting place of the nuclear rocket engine or its
debris would be on the ocean floor beyond the active biosphere.
On RI_T there are two options for the disposition of the nuclear
rocket engine, namely: (1) allow the reactor to reenter and impact in mid-
ocean, or (2) proof test the Engine Destruct System (EDS) at or beyond apogee.
Referring back to Figure l, it has been shown that a terminal excursion at
impact represents only a small contribution to the fission product inventory
developed by the powered operation of the nuclear rocket, so that it is some-
what of an academic matter whether or not the reactor is allowed to impact in
deep _zater. On the other hand_ testing of the EDS on RI_ appears mandatory
to qualify it for operational flights. The Engine Destruct System is oper-
ative during and after nuclear stage operation, and its ultimate purpose is to
resolve the reactor core into small particles which will not survive the aero-
thermochemical environment of reentry. In stumnary the EDS is not required to
make RI_?_ missions safe, but RI_T provides an ideal means for testing the EDS
preparatory to operational flights.
(2) OPERATIONAL MISSIONS - The predominant safety problem posed by
operational nuclear rockets is one of the random reentry of the reactor and
its entrained fission products. In the case of suborbital start-up of the
nuclear stage_ velocity decrements short of orbit or escape could result from
thrust cut-offs and guidance failures. Large decrements yielding velocities
well belo_¢ orbital velocity would result in ballistic reentry over the mid-
ocean and relatively safe disposal of the radioactive engine debris in deep
water. Small velocity decrements would yield a spectrum of cases ranging
from prompt reentry downrange to a variety of poor orbits of varying lifetimes.
Following orbital regression_ the nuclear stage could reenter at random.
In the case of orbital start-up or orbital restart to escape, a
somewhat different situation exists. D. B. Cross has examined a series of
orbital start-up failures 2 assuming a nu_ber of thrust cut-offs and guidance
failures. It was concluded that early thrust cut-offs of a nuclear rocket
with proper guidance control would result in orbital lifetimes which are
al_ays greater than the lifetime of the parking orbit. In cases where the
planned thrust is derived, the angle of thrust application can vary between
approximately _ 40 ° and _40o and still yield escape conditions. However_
more acute guidance failures can yield elliptical orbits of varying lifetimes
or hyperbolic and parabolic flight paths resulting in prompt random reentry.
With adequate guidance control_ early shutdown of the nuclear rocket will not
significantly decrease its orbital lifetime but generally will increase it.
Since only acute guidance failures can result in prompt random reentry with
a full radionuclide inventory, a guidance-propulsion interlock to prevent or
terminate thrust if attitude control fails would be an effective safety device.
The random reentry problem has stimulated the development of the
Engine Destruct System previously mentioned. The requirements for this system
are: (1) high reliability, (2) uniform and effective destruction of the
reactor core into fragments that will be consumed aerothermochemically, and
(3) fast response time. The engine destruct systems under investigation are
described under the countermeasure development program in the nex% section.
The relationship of the operational phases_ safety problems_ and counter-
measures are summarized in Table II.
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5. SAFETY PROGRAMS - The safety program for the nuclear rocket shown in
Table III consists of the following three parts: (A) Countermeasure Develop-
ment, (B) Safety Analysis, and (C) Envirolnnental Safety. This three-fold
approach follows the philosophy of developing adequate countermeasures (safety
engineering), continually refining the many safety analyses, and determining
the effects of nuclear rocket flight operations on the environment for purposes
of facility siting, operational planning_ and establishing e_aergency pro-
cedures. A fourth program, often overlooked as routine, provides the important
operational safety support of Kiwi reactor and NERVA engine development program
activities such as critical testing, reactor transport, propellant handling,
and reactor and engine testing in Nevada.
The countermeasure development program shown in Table III, Part A, is
directed specifically at the major potential safety problems posed by trans-
port and ground handling accidents, latu_ch pad aborts, shallow water impact,
and the post-mission disposition of the engine. The counter_easure tasks
constitute the nucleus of the overall safety program and, without exception,
are devoted to the prevention of potential nuclear or radiation incidents,
assuming a variety of independent yet credible non-nuclear causal failures
(e.g., rocket vehicle aborts, carrier accidents, human error).
The safety analysis program shown in Table III, Part B, defines the
various safety problems by analyzing the safety neutronics of the system, the
radiation source term, the response of the system to various physical forces,
and spatial and temporal factors characteristic of its operational mode.
This is envisioned as a continuous progr_ with constant refinement.
The environmental safety progr82_ sho_m in Table III, Part C, is four-
fold including meteorological, oceanographic, and terrestrial sub-programs and
a general sub-program to correlate the many diverse environmental tasks. This
is a cooperative program between the USAF, AEC, and NASAwith active support
from a large n_nber of specialized environmental organizations.
CONCLUSION
The anal_Sical model, safety problems_ and safety programs for the nuclear
rocket have been presented in a macroscopic fashion in order to correlate and
summarize the program. Closer examination of the work being done by the Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the _clear Vehicle Projects Office, the NASA
Launch Operations Center, the Space _clear Propulsion Office, and their
various contractors will reveal the depth of the safety program.
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NUCLEAR SAFETY AND HAZARDS
ASPECTS OF RIFT FLIGHT OPERATIONS
by
James Malcolm Rives*
ABSTRACT
$"o $o o
The nuclear safety and hazards considerations for RIFT static
test operations at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Nevada,
and RIFT flight tests at the Atlantic Missile Range, Cape Canaveral,
Florida, are discussed in general terms. The RIFT vehicle system
and facilities are briefly described with particular emphasis on the _.
safety aspects. Since the RIFT Program has as one of its main
objectives to demonstrate safe operation of the RIFT vehicle, the
safety features and mechanisms incorporated into the system design
and operation will be thoroughly evaluated. Safety analysis will be
conducted to determine all conceivable hazards for all RIFT operations.
An ambitious safety program is already underway by the KIWI, NERVA
and RIFT Organizations. With safety successfully demonstrated in
the RIFT Flight Program, a major preparatory step toward an
operational nuclear vehicle for space flight missions would be
achieved.
*Nuclear Vehicle Projects Office
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama
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8I. Introduction "
The RIFT (Reactor-In-Flight-Test) Project is one of the major projects
now underway in the Nuclear Rocket Program. The basic objective of the RIFT
Project is to advance the technologies necessary for development of an
operational Nuclear Vehicle System for space flight missions. The other major
projects are the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory KIWI Reactor Development
and NERVA Engine development by Aerojet General Corporation. The NERVA
Engine will incorporate a KIWI type reactor. The RIFT Project will develop
a complete vehicle stage by captive tests and flight operation using C-5 boosters.
The RIFT research and design effort is with Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company.
Design and development of the RIFT Nuclear Vehicle System will present
problems that are typical and comparable to the problems experienced with
chemical vehicles, except for the nuclear radiation environment and nuclear
hazards which present new problems for resolution. With nuclear propulsion
as a very desirable means of propelling upper stages of launch vehicles, much
consideration will be given to the nuclear safety aspects of the RIFT Program
from both technical requirements and public interest viewpoints. The purpose
of the RIFT Nuclear Safety Program is to insure maximum human safety
against all possible radiological and toxicity injury during the static and flight
test operations of nuclear stages and vehicle systems. Emphasis is placed on
nuclear safety by imple:nenting an active safety program early in the design
phase. The RIFT Program is designed to demonstrate nuclear safety in the
static tests and particularly during flight test of the RIFT vehicle.
A ROVER Flight Safety Panel was organized in mid-1961 by the Space
Nuclear Propulsion Office and is made up of members of the Space Nuclear
Propulsion Office, Atomic Energy Commission - Assistant Director for
Nuclear Safety, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Lewis Research Center,
Launch Operations Center, Atlantic Missile Range, and Marshall Space Flight
Center, with participating contractors; Lockheed Missiles and Space Company,
Aerojet General Corporation, and its subcontractor, Westinghouse Astronuclear
Laboratory. The functions of this Panel are to identify hazards and determine
means of countermeasures. Safety is defined such that it consists of two major
parts, i.e. accident analysis and hazards analysis. The accident analysis
involves analyzing potential accidents resulting from failure modes with
consideration given to the conditions pertaining to each particular event in
time and location. Hazards analysis involves defining the fission product
release and toxic source terms as may result from an accident, tracing the
transport of this material through the environments, and determining the
results or consequences to man.
A Nuclear Safety and Hazards Working Group was established in mid-1962
by the Marshall Space Flight Center with membership from the various MSFC
Divisions and Offices, Launch Operations Center, and Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company. The objectives of this Group are to review and recommend
safety features and techniques for vehicle system design, test operations,
procedures and to integrate the safety aspects of the RIFT Program including
these activities at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS), Nevada,
and the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR), Cape Canaveral, Florida.
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II. RIFT Nuclear Vehicle Description
The RIFT nuclear vehicle configuration incorporates the S-IC booster
stage, S-II dummy second stage, RIFT third stage, the instrument unit, and a
nose fairing compartment which contains the payload components. Shown in
Figure l is a comparison of the RIFT vehicle with a nuclear escape vehicle.
For the RIFT vehicle, the S-IC booster stage is approximately 140 feet in
length and incorporates five F-1 engines which utilize LOX and RP-I as
propellant producing 7.5 million pounds thrust. The propellant capacity of
this stage is 4.5 million pounds of LOX and RP- I. The S-II stage is approxi-
mately 80 feet in length and will be used as a dummy stage for the RIFT flight
tests; however, it would be a live stage for the nuclear escape vehicle. The
RIFT stage incorporating the NERVA Engine has a length of 137 feet including
the nose fairing section. The nuclear engine utilizes LH Z as propellant and
produces approximately 56 thousand pounds thrust with a burning time of about
Z0 minutes in a RIFT flight test. The propellant capacity of the RIFT Stage
is approximately 156 thousand pounds of LH_. The total RIFT vehicle is 357
feet in length with the NERVA Engine locate_ approximately 240 feet from the
vehicle base. Shown in Figure 2 is an outline of the RIFT Stage with the NERVA
Engine mated to the propellant tank.
Design of safety into the RIFT vehicle system and facilities will be
accomplished to the maximum extent possible. In order for the RIFT Safety
Program to be effective, recommended safety criteria will be implemented
into design. Typical areas and activities where safety criteria is required
for design are the following: (I) vehicle system designs, (g) NRDS facility
designs, (3) AMR facility designs, (4) operating procedures, etc. RIFT
design efforts are geared to incorporate the most advantageous safety techniques
and mechanisms for total system safety. Typical safety features under
consideration include: (i) pre-static test and prelaunch radiation monitoring
systems, (Z) radiation shielding, (3) reactor poison safety wires, (4)
engine destruct system, (5) stage and vehicle destruct system, (6) nuclear
safing and arming system, (7) emergency detection system, {g) reactivity
checks, (9) checkout emergency procedures, etc. From the standpoint of
design, other project inputs to the RIFT Safety Program is by reliability efforts
on failure mode analysis and failure effect analysis, qualification testing in
anticipated operating environments, and human engineering factors for reducing
possible human errors. Shown in Figure 3 is an indication of the nuclear
environmental problems imposed on the RIFT system affecting safety and
reliability of operation during static and flight tests.
III. Ground Operations
The RIFT static tests will be conducted at the Nuclear Rocket Development
Station, shown in Figure 4, to confirm the stage design and operation. These
tests will begin in late 1965 with present plans for testing approximately five
RIFT stages. Facilities for these tests will require safety criteria in design
and operation in the following typical areas: (i) facility isolation, orientation
and separation, (2) exhaust effluent and contamination control, (3) procedural
and personnel control, etc. Shown in Figure 5 is the RIFT captive test stand
concept to be utilized at NRDS. The stage would be positioned by lowering and
assembling it to the firing silo during test runs and transported by means of a
prime mover. The RIFT safety effort at NRDS will benefit from the previous
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KIWI and NERVA tests; however, accident and hazards analysis peculiar only to
RIFT stage operations will be necessary due to differences in design and opera-
tions. Accidents causing nuclear hazards could occur during the many test
activities as: stage/engine mating, handling, transport, test and checkout,
fueling, etc. Hazards from a normal static test firing include direct radiation,
fission product releases, activation, etc., resulting in ground, air, stage, and
facility contamination. More severe hazardous situations could result from
abnormal events during the stage test operations. Initiation of accidents could
be through various failure or malfunction modes of the system causing hazards
of varying degrees. Hazards involved could affect personnel by direct exposure,
inhalation, consumption, etc. A safety monitoring and control system, personnel
exclusion requirements and procedures, and physical separation of nuclear
activities from non-nuclear activities are safety considerations which assist in
reducing possible injury to operating personnel. All nuclear testing at NRDS is
remote from offsite populated areas and in addition, the test stand positions are
located with due consideration given to the atmospheric environmental factors,
site analysis, etc.
RIFT stages designated for flight tests will be transported to the Launch
Operations Center by combination of band and water. Figure 6 shows the launch
site area at Cape Canaveral indicating the general location of the C-5 Complex.
The engine and reactor components would be shipped separately to the Launch
Operations Center where they would be assembled and checked out in an engine
configuration in the Engine Assembly Building. The engine then would be mated
with the stage and checked out in the Stage Assembly and Checkout area. The
RIFT stage would then be transferred to a Vertical Assembly Building for
mating with the S-IC booster, S-II stage, instrument unit, etc., and overall
system checkout. Shown in Figure 7 is an artist's concept of the launch plat-
form and the launch umbilical tower for launching the C-5 vehicle. Nuclear
safety during these activities, not only duplicates some of the potential problems
at NRDS, but presents more severe problems which require much consideration
for resolution. These potential problems are brought about by additional
environmental and population factors. Typical of NRDS; however, a safety
monitoring and control system, personnel control, radiation shielding, etc.,
would be necessary at AMR during certain engine, stage and vehicle operations.
In addition, appropriate vehicle and pad safety procedures will be necessary
during periods of preparation for launch. Ground operations also include
problems in the disposal and storage control of radioactive materials. Before
a RIFT vehicle is launched, sister stages will have been fully tested at NRDS
with safety demonstrated. Also the stages allocated to the Launch Operations
Center will have been thoroughly tested (less nuclear), thus eliminating
radiation problems during ground operations at AMR. All conceivable classes
of accidents at NRDS and AMR will be postulated and analyzed to determine
potential hazards and also means of preventing or countering them.
IV. Fli_ht Operations
A series of four RIFT flight tests are scheduled to be conducted at the
Atlantic Missile Range beginning approximately 1967. Shown in Figure 8 is a
typical RIFT flight trajectory. RIFT trajectory studies include three different
test objectives regarding the engine burning periods as follows: (I) one
continuous burning period, (2) one restart, and (3) two restarts. Figure 9
presents a plot of certain RIFT vehicle trajectory parameters for the two
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restart case. For the three trajectory cases, the maximum altitude varies
from 600 to 1200kilometers. A flight azimuth of approximately 100°E. of N.
was assumed with an initial consideration given to range safety. An optimum
RIFT flight azimuth as typically shownin Figure 10would be based on safety
of the down range tracking stations, wind directions, and reliability of telemetry
transmission and reception. Also considered in the trajectory optimization
study for purposes of safety would be the trajectory profile, maximum range,
impact location, etc. The flight trajectory analysis assumes that, if the RIFT
stage fails to start up after cutoff and separation from the S-IC Booster, or if
separation fails to occur, the stage and/or vehicle would impact in the Blake
Escarpment area in the Atlantic, approximately 400 kilometers (250 miles)
from the launch site. Start up of the nuclear engine would be after the S-IC
Booster separation at an altitude of approximately 120kilometers and at a
range of 70 kilometers. Studies have indicated that particles falling from
altitudes below 30kilometers would travel predominately in an easterly
direction during the months October through May; therefore, the optimum time
of the year for launching nuclear vehicles may be during these months.
The AMR safety officer has the prerogative of destructing the vehicle,
as necessary, for range safety; however, the conditions on which a decision
would be made must be designed into the systems and incorporated in the
procedures. As already mentioned, the flight safety mechanism includes the
nuclear safing and arming system and command destruct system, etc. Many
classes of accidents and failure situations can be postulated during the boost
phase after liftoff from the launch pad and for each time interval during this
flight period. Each case, flight period and situation, will require a thorough
evaluation with regard to accidents and resulting hazards. The hazards
associated here could result from nuclear vehicle, stage and/or engine being
submerged in vehicle propellant, propellant fires and explosions, impacts on
the beach areas and shallow waters or submerged in sand/water, etc. The
final disposition of the RIFT stage after a normal flight would be in deep water
of the Atlantic Ocean. A consideration would be to destruct the total nuclear
stage just prior to impact. Regardless of the final disposition of the RIFT
stage at impact, it may be desirable to maintain surveillance around the impact
point for a period of time to obtain samples and collect informational data.
Another aspect of the nuclear flight safety program involves the nuclear
escape vehicle and operational missions in which consideration would be given
to problems as: random re-entry, orbital destruct, operational destruct
system, random impact on earth land masses, etc. Also there would be the
safety problems pertaining to space, lunar operations, etc.
V. Safety and Hazards Analysis
The RIFT ground and flight operations present certain safety and hazards
problems which require evaluation prior to actual static and flight tests of the
RIFT system. Several safety studies have been made by the KIWI, NERVA,
and RIFT contractors and other study efforts are underway by other organizations.
As the RIFT program progresses, pertinent theoretical and analytical safety
studies will be required to define potential accidents and hazards during all
RIFT operations at NRDS and AMR. At NRDS, the hazards could be direct
radiation from normal operation or direct radiation from excursions with the
atmosphere being the principal means of transport. At AMR; however, several
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nuclear hazard situations are evident for analysis with sources being a wet or
dry excursion, vehicle propellant fire and excursidn, land or water impact, etc.
The transport media for these could be by anyone or a combination of the
following environmental conditions: (I) atmosphere (cloud, fallout, washout,
etc.), (Z) water (fresh and salt waters), (3) ground, (4) marine, animal,
and plant life. The physical transport of the fission product releases, release
models, diffusion parameters, and dispersion patterns on the ground and at
altitudes along the flight path will require analytical development for environ-
mental safety analysis and evaluations. Hazards analysis determines the
consequences to human life as a result of body intake and exposure to radio-
active and toxic materials from potential nuclear excursions. Countermeasures
for the potential hazards include confinement, shielding, vehicle safety features,
permissives, etc.
Prior to flight of the RIFT C-5 nuclear vehicle, appropriate RIFT
safety presentations and reviews will be conducted to assure adequate
nuclear flight safety and obtain approval for operation.
In conclusion, I wish to state that nuclear propelled vehicles are no more
susceptible to operation failure than any other class of vehicles and that with
an ambitious safety program, the nuclear safety problems will be resolved
prior to operation of the RIFT vehicles.
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TRANSIENT REACTOR EXPERIMENTS ON NERVA FUEL MATERIAL
A. Boltax*, R. C. Liimatainen**, M. A. Vogel*, R. O. Ivins**, and P. H. Wilks*
Abstract _'_ 3 _1
This paper describes an experimental program to determine the feasibillty of
using a reactor transient to destroy the core of a nuclear rocket. The technical approach
involves transient irradiation of unrestrained sections of NERVA (KIWI B-4 type) fuel
elements in the TREAT reactor. Transient irradiation experiments were performed in
helium, vacuum, and water environments on fueled graphite made with either UO2Powder
or pyrolytic carbon coated UC 2 particles. The data obtained include nuclear excursion
data, fuel temperature, threshold energy values for fuel fragmentation, particle size of
fuel fragments, and fission xenon release. The results indicate that fragmentation of the
fueled graphite made from UO 2 powder will occur during TREAT excursions of 100 to 770
megawatt-seconds (MWS). The NERVA-equlvalent fragmentation values range from
1,000 to 11,000 MWS. Preliminary results obtained on the fueled graphite containing
the coated UC 2 particles indicate that it is more resistant to fragmentation than the fuel
made with UO 2 powder.
Introduction _' _ ''_' /_ ¢_'_IP
Consideration of the safety aspects of conducting orbital missions with a
nuclear rocket indicates that one effective way to minimize hazards related to the possi-
bility of an intact reactor falling on land is to physically destroy the reactor while still
in flight. Various methods of reactor destruct have been considered. These involve the
use of high explosives, thermochemlcal techniques, and reactor transients. Each of these
reactor destruct methods have been examined theoretically and several experimental pro-
grams are under way to determine their feasibility. This paper is concerned with an
experimental program to determine the Feasibility of using a reactor transient to destroy
the core of a nuclear rocket. In addition to this primary objective the transient experi-
ments also provide:
(a) Information on the nature of the shutdown mechanism to form a basis for
estimating the maximum credible incident for the NERVA reactor.
(b) Determination of fission product release during controlled reactor transients.
(c) A study of reactions between NERVA fuel and water during a reactor transient
occurring as a result of an intact reactor falling into water.
* Materials Department of the Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory.
**Chemical Engineering Division of the Argonne National Laboratory.
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dExper br,_,l_ta I Technique
The experimental approach involves irradiation of encapsulated sections of the
NERVA fuel in the TREAT (Transient Reactor Test Facility) reactor.. The TREAT reactor is
designed to produce large transient thermal fluxes (,,.3 x 1015nvt). (17 With appropriate
control rod motion, an integrated power of up to 1000 megawatt-seconds (MWS) can be
produced on a period of the order of 40 milliseconds. Some examples of heating rates
obtained on NERVA fuel (fueled graphite containing 400 milligrams of 93% enriched
uranium per cubic centimeter) are given in Table I.
A description of the various types of fueled graphite used in the program is
given in Table II. The old type fuel was made from a dispersion of UO 2 powder (< 5
micron diameter) in graphite which converts to UC 2 during the graphitizlng heat treatment.
The new fuel is a dispersion of pyrolytic carbon coated particles of UC 2 (50-150 micron
diameter particle with 25 micron coating) in graphite. The old type fuel was subject to
hydrolysis which would cause reversion of some UC 2 to UO 2. Samples of the old type
fuel prepared with minimum contact with hydrolyzing environments following graphitiza-
tion (at 2250°C) contained about 5 percent of the UC 2 reverted to UO 2 (completely
carbided fuel). Fuel samples stored in air normally contain about 20 percent UO 2 (air
stored fuel) and samples stored in moist air about 35 percent UO 2 (oxygen stored fuel).
The coated particle fuel is resistant to hydrolysis followlng graphltization (at~1900°C).
The size of the fuel sample used for most experiments was a 0.5 inch diameter by 0.75
inch long seven hole section of a KIWI B-4 element. Except where specifically noted,
the fuel samples were unrestrained and did not have NbC liners on the coolant channels.
Transient experiments were carried out in high pressure autoclaves 9.rkd in
capsules which permitted photographing the fuel specimen during the transient. _J The
autoclave tests included experiments in helium, vacuum, and water environments.
Figure 1 shows the internal components of the high pressure autoclave used for experiments
in either helium or vacuum. The autoclave instrumentation consisted of a thermocouple
to measure the sample temperature, a thermocouple to detect specimen fragmentation, and
a transducer to monitor the pressure developed in the autoclave. It may be noted that
significant pressures (> 100 psia) were obtained only when fuel samples were pulsed in
contact with water.
In general, two types of transient experiments were performed; a calibration
experiment consisting of several transients on one sample to obtain data on peak sample
temperature as o function of integrated power, or a single transient to determine the
behavior of the fuel material. Examples of the results obtained from the calibration
experiments are shown in Figure 2. The difference between the experimentally determined
peak temperature and that calculated assuming adiabatic heating of the sample represents
the heat loss from the samples.
Measurements following the transient irradiation include: particle size of
fuel fragments (if any); composition of gases in the autoclave including fission products;
fission products retained in the sample; and in the case of water experiments fission
products in the water. The values of average particle size reported are the "Sauter"
mean diameter which is defined as follows:
_"ni d3i
d -
sv _-n. d 2I i
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and computed from the relationship:
d
SV
1
W. I
i=1 d.
I
where:
d = Sauter mean (surface to volume) diameter
SV
d. = Average diameter of i th size groupi
n. = Number of particles in i th size group
I
N = Number of size groups
w. = Fraction by weight of particles in the i th size group.
!
The Sauter mean diameter is a convenient quantity to use since it represents the diameter
of spheres that would have the same ratio of surface area to volume as the total population
of particles.
Results
Summaries of the results obtained on the various forms of old type fuel material
are given in Table III and Figure 3. The results reveal that the threshold energy for
fragmentation is lowest in the water tests (,"100 MWS), intermediate for the air or oxygen-
stored samples (,,,350 MWS) and highest for the completely carbided samples (,-.770 MWS).
Additional data obtained from the transients performed on fuel specimens in
contact with water are given in Table IV. With regard to the experiments in water, the
test performed at 800 MWS differed from the tests at lower energy in two principal ways.
In the highest energy transient sea water was admitted to the autoclave 20 seconds prior
to the transient. In the low energy tests the fuel samples were coated with Kry!on and
placed in the autoclave and in contact with distilled water for about one week prior to
the transient. The Krylon coating was necessary to prevent chemical reaction of fuel
and water during the storage period. Finally, samples of the gas contained in the auto-
clave after the high level transient were taken 5 minutes and one week after the transient.
In the low energy tests gas samples were only taken one week after the test.
The results in Table IV show that a rather violent reaction occurred between
fueled graphite and water during the transient at 800 MWS. The chemical reaction
produced a 5000 psi pressure pulse of less than 0. 1 second duration at about the same
time as the attainment of the peak fuel temperature (> 2500°C). The results also show
that the xenon release during the transient is small compared to the xenon release during
the week of contact between the fuel sample and water following the transient. Thus,
it would appear that the major portion of the fission xenon release is due to a water
leaching reaction. Further work is necessary to confirm this preliminary result.
The results obtained on air and oxygen-stored fuel samples show rather clear
trends in particle size and xenon release as a function of transient energy. It is interest-
ing to note the marked increase in xenon release which occurs when the samples fragment
during the transient. The results obtained on the completely carbided samples also
indicate the marked xenon release with sample fragmentation.
217
The high speed motion picture (4, 000 frames per second) records obtained from
the photographic series of experiments, using the speclally designed TREAT capsule, pro-
vided qualitative information valuable to the interpretation of the results of the autoclave
experiments. The results obtained from these experiments show:
(I) The old type fuel heats uniformly during the transient. Preliminary studies on
the first batch of coated particle fuel show evidence of non-uniform fuel
particle distribution in these particular samples as indicated by non-unlform
heating of the samples.
(2) During fragmentation of air-stored samples a small fraction of the fragments
have velocities as high as 8 feet per second.
(3) Vaporization of considerable quantities of the fueled graphite samples (up to
20%) has been observed when sample temperatures exceed 3000°C.
Finally, preliminary transient experiments on the coated particle fuel indicate
that it is more resistant to fragmentation than the alr-stored or fully carbided material. An
extensive series of transient experiments on the coated particle fuels are now in progress.
Discussion
A brief discussion of possible mechanisms of fuel fragmentation will be
presented. The fragmentation threshold for transient experiments in water occurs at
approximately 900°C. At this temperature the water-gas reaction (i.e. C plus H20
forming CO, CO 2 and H2) proceeds at an appreciable rate. It is suggested that
fragmentation is due to tl_e formation of steam and products of the water-gas reaction at
the surface and within the pores of the fueled graphite.
The fragmentation threshold for alr-stored material occurs at about 2100°C.
At this temperature the back reaction between UO 2 and C proceeds at a rapid rate,
resulting in the formation of CO or CO 2 gas. The proposed mechanism of fragmentation
involves cracking of the graphite matrix by rapid build up of locally high pressures due
to the formation of CO or CO 2 gas within the graphite body. This mechanism is con-
sistent with the results.of electrical heating experiments carried out at Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory. (3)
The mechanism of fragmentation of the completely carblded fuel is believed
to be the same as that proposed for the air-stored material. It is presumed that the lower
oxygen content of the completely carblded material is responsible for the high fragmenta-
tion threshold of 770 MWS (fuel temperature > 3200°C). It may be noted that above
2800°C the mechanical strength of graphite decreases rapidly with increasing temperature.
For example, at 3200°C the tensile strength of graphite has been reported to be about
100 psi (4)
Table V summarizes the fragmentation threshold values obtained from the
transient experiments on the old type fuel. Also given in Table V are the calculated
values of the NERVA-equivalent nuclear transients which correspond to the experimental
threshold values. For each threshold value a maximum and minimum NERVA-equlvalent
energy has been calculated. The minimum NERVA threshold was obtained by considering
the neutron flux in the peak power regions of the reactor during a nuclear excursion and
assuming no heat loss from the fuel. At the minimum value only a small portion of the
reactor fuel elements would be expected to fragment. The maximum NERVA threshold
218
values were obtained by assuming a uniform power distribution in the core and values of
heat loss similar to that obtained in the TREAT experimental program. At the maximum
threshold value, most of the fuel elements would be expected to fragment.
The calculated NERVA-equivalent fragmentation threshold values for the
various excursion conditions range from 1,000 to 11,000 MWS. If one assumes that the
NERVA engine is capable of a programmed excursion of the order of 10, 000 MWS, then
it may be concluded that nuclear transients would be useful in fragmenting the core (made
of old type fuel) or at a minimum weakening the core to enhance the effectiveness of an
explosive or thermochemical destruct system. It should be noted that the preliminary
information available on the coated particle fuel indicates that nuclear transients may be
somewhat less effective in causing fuel fragmentation. However, theoretical analysis of
the behavior of coated particle fuels during nuclear excursions in_kcate that faster
excursions (periods < 1 millisecond) may cause fuel fragmentationY / Experiments are
being planned in the TRIGA Mark F reactor to evaluate the theoretical studies.
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Table I Maximum Heating Rates Obtained on KIWI B-4 Fuel Samples in TREAT
Transient Reactor Maximum Fuel Maximum
Energy Period Temj_erature Heating Rate
MWS (ms) (_C) (°C/sec)
100 150 940 1150
375 75 2040 2500
550 50 > 2700 8500
Table II Description of Fuel Samples Used in the TREAT Program
Percent of UC 2 Fuelpresent Particle Size
as UO 2 (microns)
OLD
Completely Carbided
Air Stored
Oxygen Stored
"5 <5
,'20 <5
"35 <5
NEW Coated Partlc le < 1 50-150"
* UC2 fuel particle coated with 25 microns of pyrolytic carbon.
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Table IV Detailed Comparison of Results Obtained from Water Tests
Test Number
83 84 96
Reactor Energy, MWS 105 360 800
Particle size, d (mils) 86 28 18
SV O
Peak fuel temperature, C 900 1710 >2600
Peakopressure during transient, psi negligible -- "5000
Xe 13_ Release, microcuries
5 minutes after transient .... 20
1 week after transient 175 1660 > 470*
Gaseous Reaction Products, cc. at STP
5 minutes after transient .... 2850
1 week after transient 450 1550 --*
Composition of Gases, mole % **
H,_ 71.1 48.3 55.2
cb
CO, o 0.5 5.4 8.4
Hy_ocarbons 8.4 2.6 0.7
Extent of Fuel Reaction, weight % 17 25 33
* Gas leak in autoclave following transient prevented accurate determination.
** For tests 83 and 84 gas was collected one week after transient.
For test 96 gas was collected 5 minutes after transient.
Table V
Water Excursion
Air Stored Fuel
Dry Excursion
Air Stored Fuel
Dry Excursion
Completely Carbided Fuel
Fragmentation Thresholds for Nuclear Transients
(Reactor periods of 40-150 milliseconds)
Energy of Transient (megawatt-seconds)
TREAT N ERVA
Minimum* Maximum**
,',100 1,000 2, 000
,,,350 3, 000 6, 000
,,,770 5, 000 11,000
* At peak power positions.
** Assuming uniform power in core.
NOTE: A 10, 000 megawatt-second NERVA transient will vaporize"20% of
the core (neglecting heat losses).
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EFFECTS OF LIQUID PROPELLANT EXPLOSION__ _'_
E. Karl Bastress
Arthur D. Little_ Inc.
Cambridge_ Massachusetts
ABSTRACT
An experimental program was conducted to determine blast effects from
explosions of liquid rocket propellants. One phase of the program was
concerned with the internal characteristics of propellant explosions and
their effects on nuclear rocket engines. The purpose of this phase of
the work was to determine the hazards which might result from a failure at
launch of a large liquid-propellant booster rocket with a nuclear powered
upper stage.
A variety of instruments were used to measure peak-pressures and heat
transfer rates within propellant explosions. In addition_ observations
were made during each test of the movements of the fireball and dust-cloud_
and of the fragmentation and scattering of debris.
Measured characteristics of propellant explosions were utilized to predict
their effects on nuclear rocket engines of the NERVA type_ and to determine
the hazards which might arise from distortion of the engine or vaporization
of reactor components. Hazards considered were blast_ radioactivity_
dispersion of toxic materials_ and scattering of reactor fragments. As a
result of this analysis it was concluded that incorporation of a NERVA
engine in a SATURN vehicle is not likely to create a hazard to personnel or
property beyond safe distances required for propellant blast effects.
iThis work was sponsored by George Marshall Space Flight Center_ National
Aeronautics and Space Administration_ and Space Nuclear Propulsion Office_
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission_ under Contract No. NAS8-523.
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I. Introduction
The projected use of nuclear powered rocket engines for space exploration
has introduced a number of new problems in the form of hazards to personnel
in the vicinity of the launch site and near the point of re-entry or impact.
One of the problems arises from the fact that a typical nuclear reactor
contains toxic materials such as radioactive fission products and metallic
beryllium. Any mechanism by which these materials could be dispersed in
finely divided form constitues a serious hazard.
In early use_ nuclear rockets will serve as upper stages in combination
with chemically powered boosters. In this situation it is possible that
toxic materials from the nuclear stage could be dispersed by a failure of
the chemical booster_ particularly at launch where the maximum quantities
of propellants are present. In order to evaluate the possible hazards which
will be created_ the conditions to be expected in the failure of chemical
boosters must be determined. The effects of these conditions on a nuclear
powered engine can then be predicted.
Arthur D. Little_ Inc. has recently completed a series of experimental tests
to determine the blast effects which might result from a failure at launch
of a SATURN rocket vehicle (1) 2 . In brief_ the tests involved intentional
spilling of scaled quantities of SATURN propellants: RP-I_ liquid hydrogen
and liquid oxygen. These liquids were spilled on the ground and allowed to
mix_ and detonation of the mixture was initiated by a small explosive charge.
The purpose of the tests was to determine the maximum blast which might be
expected from a SATURN fai_re. Tests were conducted using propellant
quantities equal to I/i0_000_ 1/2000 and 1/25 that to be used in the C-2
configuration. The propellant containers used in the 1/25-scale tests are
shown prior to spilling in Figure i. Instrumentation was employed to
determine the characteristics of the resulting blast waves over a range of
distances from the test site. The tests were also observed by high-speed
motion picture cameras to provide more information as to the nature of the
detonations.
In order to obtain information which might aid in evaluating the hazards
associated with a nuclear stage_ additional instrumentation was provided in
the largest scale tests to determine the characteristics within the region
of the detonation and resulting fireball (2_ 3). Instruments were devised
which would indicate peak pressures and total heat flux at various locations.
Also_ photographic coverage was increased to include observations with a
wide field of view to provide cloud travel information. Photographs of
the fireball and dust-cloud from one of the tests are shown in Figure 2.
Three 1/25-scale tests were conducted and each of these were instrumented
in this manner. Difficulties were encountered in these large-scale tests
in that ignition of the propellant mixtures occurred prematurely in each
case. It was intended that ignition take place seven seconds after the
start of the spilling process to provide an optimum time for mixing.
However_ ignition occurred spontaneously between three and five seconds
from the start of the spill_ so that mixing had proceeded to a different
degree in each test. As a result_ the characteristics of the detonations
varied widely_ and a greater range of conditions were obtained than had
been intended.
Another program associated with these blast tests involved the exposure of
samples of beryllium to the detonation and fireball. This work was performed
under a subcontract with Westinghouse Electric Corporation (4).
2Numbers in parentheses indicate References at end of paper
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II. Test Results
A. Pressure Conditions
The SATURN vehicle utilizes three liquid propellants: RP-I (kerosene)_
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. The C-5 configuration will contain
approximately five million pounds of these propellants. Spilling and
mixing of these propellants create a two-phase mixture - a gas phase
consisting principally of hydrogen_ oxygen and air; and a liquid phase (or
liquid-solid mixture) containing RP-I_ oxygen_ and possibly a small percent-
age of hydrogen. Ignition of this mixture results in a violent detonation
and a blast wave in the surrounding air similar to that produced by high
explosive materials. A description of blast waves from liquid propellant
explosions is contained in Reference i. Within the detonating mixture the
blast characteristics of the two phases are found to be quite different.
Peak pressure measurements in the liquid phase have indicated pressures
ranging from 7000 to over 90_000 psi. The wide variation results from the
inhomogeneity of the mixture. The highest pressures were obta_ined in
mixtures wherein the greatest degree of mixing had occurred. The maximum
theoretical pressure attainable in these liquid propellant mixtures is
approximately 150_000 psi. This value was calculated by assuming a
constant volume reaction.
In the gas phase_ peak pressures are of a lower magnitude than in the
liquid. Gas phase pressure measurements ranged below 2000 psi in all
instances with most measurements below 1200 psi. The gas phase pressures
are caused by shock waves from the liquid reaction as well as reaction
within the gaseous components. Therefore_ peak pressures decrease rapidly
with distance from the liquid body.
The dimensions of the zones of the detonation region are shown in Figure 3.
A reduced distance coordinate is used in the form of d/w I/3 where d is the
radial distance in feet from the center of the detonation_ and w is the
weight in pounds of propellant which is spilled and mixed. Experimental
results (i) indicate that only premixed propellants contribute to the blast
and that the explosive yield 3 is approximately 1.0 ib of TNT per pound of
propellant mixture. In predicting the extent of the detonation region for
failure of a given vehicle_ it would be unrealistic to assume that all the
propellant would participate. The actual amount which could become mixed
prior to ignition can only be estimated.
The dimensions shown in Figure 3 are based on results of the experimental
program. Liquid detonation zone dimensions were taken from crater measure-
ments_ and vapor cloud dimensions were taken from photographic records. The
dimensions shown are those predicted for a symmetric collapse of the vehicle
creating a pool of mixed propellants on the launching pad. This is an
unrealistic model_ but represents the worst case from the standpoint of
blast level. Asymmetry in the mode of failure of the vehicle would reduce
the concentration and mixing of the propellants and would probably result
in lower blast pressures.
3Explosive yield as used here is defined as the weight of TNT required to
produce a blast wave of equal magnitude as that produced by the propellant
mixture_ divided by the propellant weight. The value of 1.0 pertains only
to the SATURN propellant combination. Yields for other combinations of
these propellants are contained in Reference i.
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Also shown in Figure 3 are the maximum peak pressures to be expected at
ground level as a function of distance from the center of the blast. The
distribution of peak pressures can be divided into three zones wherein the
mechanisms producing the over-pressures a_different. In Zone I_ which is
that area covered by a liquid propellant mixture_ pressures up to 150_000 psi
result from the detonation reaction within the liquid. In Zone II, pressures
vary from 2000 psi near the inner edge of the zone to i00 psi at the outer
edge. Peak pressures within this zone are generated by the combined effects
of the shock wave emerging from Zone I_ continuing chemical reaction in
Zone I_ and vapor phase chemical reactions in Zone II behind the shock wave.
In Zone III peak pressures are below i00 psi and fall off rapidly with
increasing distance from the center. Within this zone the shock wave is no
longer supported by continuing chemical reaction_ and its characteristics are
similar to those of a wave produced by a point-source explosive.
B. Heat Flux Conditions
During the experimental blast tests_ the following measurements and
observations were made on the fireball produced in each test:
i. Internal heat flux measurements
2. External heat flux measurements (radiant)
3. High-speed motion picture recording
4. Spectrographic recording of external radiation
These observations were made on fireballs resulting from tests ranging in
size from i/i0_000 to 1/25 of the SATURN C-2 propellant load. As a result_
the characteristics and behavior of the fireball were well established and a
basis was obtained for predicting the characteristics of the fireball which
might be expected from a vehicle failure.
In the event of a failure of a SATURN C-5 wherein a major portion of its
propellant load participated in the initial explosion_ a fireball would be
formed up to 2000 feet in diameter. The fireball diameter is less dependent
upon propellant mixing than is blast level. Unmixed propellant can react
quickly enough to contribute to the initial fireball. The average
temperature of the fireball would be approximately 3000 F. The fireball
would remain in contact with the ground for a period of 3 to i0 seconds and
during this time its temperature would remain nearly constant (Radiant heat
loss appears to be balanced by continuing energy release during this period).
As the fireball began to rise from the ground_ it would begin to cool_ but
would continue to glow visibly for 15 to 20 seconds after ignition. Heat
transfer to objects within the fireball would be primarily by radiation_
and would occur at an initial rate of approximately 0.5 Btu/sq in-sec. An
object remaining on the ground with an absorptivity of 0.8 would receive
a total heat input of i to 4 Btu/sq in. Material fragments carried upwards
with the fireball might receive a greater heat input_ but since the heat
flux drops rapidly with temperature_ the additional energy received would
be small.
Quantities of fuel which were not consumed during the initial explosion
would remain on the ground and burn in an air-fuel diffusion flame. Because
of its volatility_ liquid hydrogen could be expected to vaporize and burn
quickly. However_ an RP-I flame might persist for several minutes depending
upon the depths of the pools formed. Results of experimental studies of
burning pools of kerosene have been analyzed to determine heat transfer
characteristics of such flames (3). The analysis has indicated that surfaces
within kerosene-air diffusion flames could not be expected to rise above
Ii00 F. This value is in agreement with results obtained from heat flux
gages which were enveloped in flames from burning RP-I during the SATURN
blast tests. Maximum temperatures attained in these instances were between
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800 and I000 F. These temperatures correspond to a maximum heat transfer
rate of approximately 0.02 Btu/sq in-sec.
Because of the complex structures of the SATURN vehicles and the many possible
modes of failure, the manner in which the propellants were consumed could
vary considerably from the conditions of the SATURN blast tests. However,
in any event it is unlikely that heat transfer rates could be obtained
greater than 0.5 Btu/sq in-sec which was the maximum rate observed with pre-
mixed propellants.
C. Fireball and Dust Cloud Movement
Photographic records were utilized to determine the movement of the fireball
a_d dust cloud resulting from each of the large-scale blast tests. This
information was required to aid in predicting the hazards which could result
from airborne materials released from a propellant explosion. The photo-
graphs shown in Figure 2 were taken at 4 and 30 seconds after initiation of
a blast test. Cloud movements as determined from these records are shown
in Figure 4. It is observed that the initial rate of rise is approximately
75 fps and that an altitude of I000 feet is attained within 20 seconds.
Beyond this altitude the movement is variable, but an ultimate height in
excess of 2000 feet is indicated.
III. Hazards Analysis
A. General
There are a number of hazards associated with the launching of large liquid
propellant rockets. Chief among these are:
i. Bl_st
2. Thermal effects
3. Acoustic effects
4. Toxic effects
5. Flying debris
For each vehicle the potential hazards must be estimated and protective
measures taken to prevent injury to persons and property. The primary
protective measure is the establishment of safe distances for personnel,
equipment and property not associated with the launching operation.
Additional protective measures are required for launching personnel and
equipment.
In assessing the hazards that could result from launching of a combined
nuclear-chemical vehicle, such as SATURN with a NERVA engine for upper stage
propulsion, we are primarily interested in those aspects which might require
protective measures beyond those normally provided for the launching of a
chemically propelled vehicle of nominally the same size. The hazards which
could result from damage to a nuclear engine are:
i. Blast
2. Radioactivity
3. Dispersion of Toxic Materials
4. Scattering of Reactor Fragments
B. Blast
The maximum blast potential of SATURN rocket vehicles has been well
established (I). However, with a nuclear stage, a question arises as to
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whether a launching failure could cause a power excursion of sufficient
magnitude to increase significantly the potential blast effect of the
vehicle. The energy content'of NERVA engines will be comparable to the
available chemical energy of the booster propellants. Therefore, the
fraction of this energy which could be released accidentally is important
in analyzing the blast hazard.
A number of studies have been made of accidents which could occur during
various stages of flight of a nuclear rocket (5, 6). The "maximum credible
accident" anticipated during launching would result from immersion of the
reactor in water or other liquids, and the blast accompanying such an
accident would be small. These analyses did not take into account the
pressure levels occurring within propellant explosions. Recognizing that
these conditions could conceivably cause a more extensive excursion than
had been predicted previously, Arthur D. Little_ Inc. studied the possible
modes of failure of a nuclear-chemical vehicle (3). As a result of this
study it was concluded that in theory propellant detonation pressures would
be sufficient to compress the reactor and cause a serious power excursion.
However_ it would be unreasonable to expect that the conditions necessary
to achieve this result could be encountered in an actual launching failure.
Therefore, the maximum credible accident is still regarded as that due to
irmnersion or its equivalent_ and the blast hazard associated with a nuclear
rocket is small in comparison to the chemical booster.
C. Radioactivity
Hazards analyses of nuclear rocket operations have established that release
of fission products during launch pad accidents would not create hazardous
conditions beyond the launching site. In the case of the maximum credible
accident, release of 15 percent of the fission product inventory is
predicted. In the event of a propellant explosion, the quantity of fission
products created would not be increased, but the fraction released could
exceed the 15 percent prediction. Fragmentation of the reactor and combus-
tion of fuel elements could cause a greater release of these materials. The
radioactivity levels in the vicinity of the launch a_eawould be increased
accordingly. However_ from the analysis of fission product dispersion
conducted by the Martin Company (6), it appears that even a i00 percent
release would not create a hazard to personnel.
D. Dispersion of Toxic Materials
The current design of the NERVA engine includes a beryllium reflector
weighing approximately 2200 pounds. Beryllium in the form of vapor or fine
particles is extremely toxic, and as a result, exposure of the reflector to
a propellant explosion could create a hazard. A review of experimental data
on the vaporization of beryllium has shown that the metal must be raised to
temperatures approaching its melting point (2340 F) before vaporization
occurs at significant rates. Substantially higher temperatures are required
to ignite beryllium particles. As mentioned in the previous section, the
maximum heat flux rate observed within propellant explosions was 0.5 Btu/sq
in-sec. In Figure 5 calculated surface temperatures are shown as a function
of time for beryllium fragments of various shapes when exposed to this heat
flux. The maximum expected exposure of ground objects to a fireball from a
SATURN C-5 failure is I0 seconds. It is seen from the figure that only small
particles of beryllium would reach temperatures above 2000 F in this time.
Thus, it can be concluded that the quantity of beryllium vaporized in an
explosion would be determined by the degree of fragmentation rather than the
total quantity present. Since beryllium exhibits some ductility under stress,
it would not be expected to shatter into tiny fragments. Only areas of stress
concentration would be expected to be reduced to small particle sizes. An
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analysis of the reflector element design, as shown in Figure 6, indicated
that small fragments could be expected from the corners and from the webs
formed by the control drum passages. The maximum quantity of beryllium
which would be reduced to particles susceptible to vaporization has been
estimated to be ii0 pounds.
To determine the concentrations of airborne beryllium particles which would
result from an instantaneous release of Ii0 pounds of beryllium, Sutton's
equations for atmospheric dispersion were utilized. Conservative, but
realistic, values of diffusion coefficients and release height were used.
The results indicated that the maximum concentration occurring at ground
level would be of the same order as the minimum allowable concentration
for instantaneous exposure. Total exposures predicted would exceed maximum
recommended levels only for wind velocities below i mph. Since all
assumptions made in this analysis were conservative, it is concluded that
there is little lilelihood of a beryllium hazard arising from launching
accidents involving NERVA reactors of the present design.
E. Scatterin$ of Reactor Frasments
The positive impulse (overpressure-time integral) of blast waves increases
with the mass of the explosive substance to the 1/3 power. It is reasonable
to expect that scattering of debris from a vehicle failure would vary
similarly. Analyses of debris patterns and motion picture records from the
SATURN blast tests confirmed this expectation. On this basis, it is
predicted that debris scattering from a failure of a SATURN C-5 would extend
to a radial distance of approximately 1-1/2 miles with isolated fragments
traveling farther. The presence of a nuclear reactor would not increase the
hazard from flying debris, but would result in the distribution of toxic and
possibly radioactive material fragments in the vicinity of the launching area.
IV. Conclusions
During this analysis it was necessary to make assumptions or estimates
regarding the extent of various processes. In each case an effort was made
to assure that the assumption was conservative, but not unrealistic. As a
result, the effects predicted for a nuclear-chemical vehicle failure are
regarded as improbable but not impossible, or in terminology used in hazards
analysis, the predicted effects are the "maximum credible" hazards which
could result. After consideration of the various potential hazards and the
mechanisms by which they could be generated, the most serious effects
predicted are as follows:
le The quantity of beryllium vaporized during a propellant
explosion depends upon the design of the reflector elements
rather than the total quantity present. Only small
fragments of beryllium would be susceptible to vaporization.
2. In the case of a NERVA reactor, a release of beryllium
vapor or particles could result within the fireball,
but the maximum concentration occurring at ground level
would not exceed the maximum allowable concentration
for instantaneous exposure. Total exposures could exceed
maximum recommended levels only if wind velocities were
low (i mph or below).
3. There is little likelihood of a propellant blast causing a
nuclear power excursion of a greater magnitude than that
described in Reference 5 as the "maximum credible accident"
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4. Dispersion of fission products could exceed that predicted
for an accidental power excursion prior to launching (5).
The increased concentrations of radioactive materials
would not exceed tolerable limits except possibly within
the immediate vicinity of the vehicle failure.
5. Fragments of reactor material could be scattered around
the launching area to distances of up to 1-1/2 miles.
6. Contamination of the launching area with beryllium
particles and fission products could prevent further use
of the area until radiation had subsided or until pre-
cautionary measures had been taken against beryllium
poisoning.
From this description of possible effects it is apparent that the presence
of a nuclear engine does not constitute a hazard to personnel or property
beyond safe distances which would be required for propellant blast effects.
However_ the contamination of the launching area would be objectionable_
and the release of airborne contaminants_ though not harmful_ could
constitute a public relations problem.
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Figure 1 - Propellant Container Arrangement for Large-Scale SATURN
Blast Test
Figure 2 - Fireball and.Dust Cloud from Large-Scale SATURN Blast Test
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THE LOS ALD_IOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
ROVER FLIGHT SAFETY PROGR/_I _
L. D. P. King
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, University of California
Los Alamos, New Mexico
About a year and a half ago an effort was made at Los
Alamos to coordinate and expand the contributions the laboratory
could make towards solving Rover Flight Safety problems. The
responsibility for providing early technical data clearly lies
with organizations capable of doing so. It was with this in
mind that a Rover Flight Safety Office and committee were
established at Los Alamos. Their aim was to evaluate potential
problems, in particular those concerned with the reactor itself,
and see that suitable experiments were undertaken.
It was becoming evident at this time that the demonstration
of the feasibility of nuclear rockets was in itself not sufficient
to make them usef_l. Of equal importance was that government
agencies concerned, as well as the general public, are convinced
that all Rover Flight Safety requirements can be met.
To assist in attaining this objective the documentary film
you will now see was made. It illustrates that substantial work
towards solving flight safety problems has already been performed
at Los Alamos.**
*Submitted as a portion of the Rover Flight Safety Session of the
Nuclear Propulsion Conference August 15 - 17, 1962 at Monterey, Calif.
**At this point a 25 minute color sound film was shown at the
conference. The written material which follows covers the same
material as presented in the movie. This documentary film is
available on loan from the Los Alamos Report Library for any
organization having a Sigma 16.2 clearance or equivalent.
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At present, only very broad safety guidelines ar_ available.
Namely, radiation levels in all nuclear rocket work are not to
exceed the values specified in the Federal Radiation Protection
Guides, and nuclear rocket engines are not to be operated in
any manner which would permit the reactor or any large part
thereof to re-enter or impact on any of the earth's land masses.
Laboratory effort has been directed towards seeing if these broad
guidelines can be met under all test and operational conditions.
The principal types of problems have been pointed out in a
previous LASL report, i
No difficulties are anticipated during normal launch pad
operations where standard procedures using distance and shielding
can be used. Abnormal behavior, however, does present a number
of new potential hazards. A booster abort could place the
reactor in an intense explosion or fire, break up the engine by
impact on the launch pad, or flood the core with liquid hydrogen
or water.
The beryllium reflector produces a potential toxic vapor
problem if a fire from the liquid oxygen, hydrogen, and RPI
fuels can be shown to last an appreciable time. This problem
and the possibility of a self sustaining high temperature
beryllium water reaction is under investigation elsewhere. The
LASL has performed calculations to study the relative merits
of other reflector systems in case design changes are required.
Extensive calculations have been carried out and are in
progress to determine the magnitude of an incident which might
occur on the launch pad. The maximum energy release would be
due to a rapid water insertion into the reactor. This is estimated
to produce about 1021 fissions with a kinetic energy release of
a few hundred pounds equivalent of high explosive. More probable
types of incidents caused by accidental control rod motion
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or hydrogen "fl_ooding are expected not to exceed 1019 - 020
fissions with only a minor kinetic energy release.
Another type of accident which is receiving extensive
calculational effort and experimentation is to determine the
possibility that a core continue to operate in a semi-stable
manner if it were slowly submerged in water. This requires
some knowledge of heat transfer rates, water injection velocities,
and fuel element life while the reactor is at high t_nperature.
Present indications are that for water injection pressures
which exceed about 6 psi the reactor will be disintegrated
by a fuel vapor explosion. For low water additions rates
the reactor might not be disrupted if the average power does
not exceed its ability to dissipate heat, estimated to be 250
to 500 KW. Preliminary experiments on fuel element life indicate
that the fuel itself has a good possibility of surviving a
number of hours in the temperature range I000 ° to 2000°C.
Estimates of reactivity effects which might be expected
from water in_nersion have been perfo_ned using polyethylene in
a reactor mockup. The total contributions from external reflection
are about equivalent to the cold hold-down available from control
rods. The addition of water into the reactor coolant channels is
worth, reactivity wise, about $2.6/kg of hydrogen for the first
two inches of penetration and $5.7/kg of H 2 for the next six inches.
Additional work is in progress to delineate the probability
of continued reactor operation if submerged in water.
Experiments have been performed to determine the release of
fission products to water. Results show that the extraction is
slow and generally limited to a few percent. The maximum
release from normal fuel has been obtained from fully carbided
elements in boiling sea water; the minimum from partially
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carbided "shelf" type fuel in room temperature distilled water.
The release is highly specific in regard to which isotopes are
more soluble. The iodine isotopes are the principle offenders
and have given a max/mum leaching rate of 2 to 3% of the initial
activity in the first 24 hours. After one week the extraction
rate is down an order of magnitude. Additional leaching infor-
mation with fuel at high temperature is being obtained from
in pile transient testing of water i-T,ersed samples.
How does one take care of reactor disposal after operation?
Can one shatter the reactor into sufficiently small parts that
will either burn up and be destroyed on reentry or reduce the
radioactivity of any remaining fragments to harmless levels
through induced escape of fission products and wide dispersal?
A number of experiments have been undertaken at the LASL to
obtain answers to the problem of safe reactor disposal. These
include the use of nuclear explosives, chemical explosives,
nuclear transients, after heat to boil off fission fragments and
chemical additives to weaken, alter, or disintegrate the core.
The use of nuclear explosives is not desirable since it
increases the total radiation hazard. Calculations indicate
that megaton yields would be required to vaporize the entire
reactor in a fire ball with the distances required to prevent
damage to the bomb components from reactor radiation.
A series of experiments were undertaken to determine the
feasibility of using chemical explosives for the dispersal of a
Rover core. Forty-six 1/3 and smaller scale shots have been
fired to study (i) the effect of varying the size and type of
explosive charge (2) the applicable scaling laws (3) the effect
of the physical and mechanical properties of the fuel material
(4) the effect of the geometrical configuration of the fuel
(5) the effect of the case and reflector.
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Based on present information, it is estimated that a full
scale core could be fragmented for i00# HE into pieces in which
less than 10% would exceed a radius of i centimeter. This may
not by itself produce fragments with a sufficiently low radio-
activity.
The use of rapid core heating as a destruct mechanism is
under investigation. Initial experiments consisted of rapid
resistance heating of fuel samples. Results from these studies
indicated the "shelf type" fuel in which the uranium carbide has
partially back reacted to the oxide can be shattered. Fully
carbided fuel on the other hand could not be fragmented with
almost double the energy deposition.
These experiments were continued in the Argonne Laboratories'
TREAT Reactor Facility at Arco, Idaho, to more nearly simulate
heating during a reactor transient excursion, to extend the
temperature range, and to test the feasibility of self destruction.
Pressures, temperatures, and the characteristics of the TREAT
reactor pulse are observed. Rover fuel samples could be heated
by this means to the vaporization point at 3350°C with up to
10% vaporization of the sample. Transient periods as short as
40 milliseconds are obtainable. Such transient testing verified
the electrical heating experiments. Partially oxidized fuel
could be fragmented into small pieces 1/8" in diameter or less
by transients producing sample temperatures of 2000°C or higher.
On the other hand, fully carbided fuel could be broken into
large pieces only if the sample was partially vaporized. The
fragmentation in the "shelf type" fuel is believed to be
caused by the rapid conversion of uranium oxide to carbide
accompanied by rapid internal pressure rise due to the formation
of carbon dioxide. Breakup of the fully carbided fuel appears
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to be due to the formation of internal vapor pressure.
Experiments to test the maximum removal of fission products
by the use of afterheat have been carried out up to a temperature
of 3200°C. At this temperature a maximum of 80% of the fission
products could be removed in 5 minutes with little further gain
expected by extending the time.
The use of UF 6 as a post operational additive was found
to be remarkably effective in crumbling and disintegrating the
fuel in i or 2 minutes. This process is most effective at low
temperatures, however, and stops at 400°C. Its use is therefore
questionable since the core would have to be precooled. BrF 3
is another potentially destructive additive under present
investigation. Explosive reactions at high temperatures have
been obtained between finely dispersed graphite and this material.
The promising fragmentation results produced by a rapid
nuclear transient with partially carbided fuel has lead to the
investigation of means of rapidly converting a fully carbided
fuel, which is expected in a reactor after operation, to a
partially oxidized condition. Investigations using CO or water
vapor as a post operational additive look promising for achieving
this objective.
Safe core disposal after operation by the use of one or
more of the above methods now appears possible. Another area of
investigation is a determination of the release of fission products
due to nuclear accidents. Measurements have been carried out at
all of the Kiwi reactor tests in Nevada to determine the total
radiation release and dose rate during and following normal tests.
Experimental measurements have been made on the gamma decay
dose rate from Kiwi B IA. Since the accumulated fissions,
9.2 x 1020, were obtained in about 1.5 minutes, the analogy
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to an accident is good. The initial dose rate measured at
60 ft was 5.4 x 105 tad/hour. The decay during the first i00
minutes followed the relation y - kt -I and for the next 7
hours a y - kt -1"85 law. Residual ground and test cell activation
after reactor removal decayed with a 15 hour half life indicative
of Na 24 .
The following table of normalized values for total dose
obtained from the Kiwi B IA operation is compared with
theoretical predictions for 1020 fissions.
Gamma rads Neutron fads Total tad
Position Exp. Theor. Exp. Theor. Exp. Theor.
2" from pres-
sure shell 1.3xi06 1.2x106
i00 ft 700 980 500 320
200 ft 170 220 120 69
i00 yds 70 90 50 26
200 yds 14 17 9 4.2
400 yds 1.8 2.4 i .42
800 yds 0.12 0.19 0.053 0.017
1200 1300
290 290
120 116
23 21
2.8 2.8
0.17 .21
The experimental mean free paths for gammas and neutrons
were determined at this Kiwi test to be 300 and 260 yds. respect-
ively. The sea level values used in the calculations were 350
yds. and 220 yds.
The principal biological hazard associated with the
effluent from normal reactor tests is the release of a number
of Iodine isotopes. This would presumably also be true for
accidents. The majority of the activity appears as very small
particulate matter or gas. Instrumentation is available at each
test to determine the transient pulse shape and to measure the
dispersal and release of any fission products in case of an
accident.
The material shown in the film covers the period through
the first part of this year. Work since then which has been
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completed or is in progress at Los Alamos includes
I. The determination of the e2cpected fuel life as a
function of temperature when immersed in sea water.
2. The escape of fission products from fuel fragmented in
sea water by a fast nuclear transient.
3. Calculations on the expected transient behavior of the
new type Rover fuel. Experiments on this fuel are now
in progress in the TREAT reactor.
4. Detailed planning for several full scale reactor
experiments are in progress to determine:
a. The reactor response and shut down mechanisms to
abnormal controlled excursions.
b. The feasibility of self destruction of a reactor
with a fast nuclear transient.
c. The fission product dispersal and explosive yield
due to a maximum credible type incident produced by
means of a "Simulated Water Entry Test".
In conclusion, a few brief remarks on the new type of Rover
fuel and its effect on the Rover Flight Safety program. A
decision was recently reached to alter the composition of the
fuel for both the Kiwi and Nerva reactors. Fuel used in previous
Rover tests has made use of a mixture of very small UC 2 particles
uniformly distributed in a graphite matrix. These particles are
only two or three microns in diameter. Unless protected from
air or water vapor as much as 20 to 30?. of the particles will be
in the form of UO 2. The new type of fuel makes use of much
Larger UC 2 beads. These are i00 to 150 microns in diameter and
covered with an additional 25 micron thick pyrolltic carbon layer.
This coating, furthermore, has less than one tenth the conductivity
of normal graphite. About 907. of the fission product energy is
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lost in the new fuel particles themselves and the remainder in
the pyrocarbon layer. In tb_e dl_ type fuel, on the other hand,
over 90% of the energy can escape the fuel particles and be
uniformly deposited in the graphite matrix• Fission product
energy is deposited in only 3% of the core material instead of
as previously in 100% of the core material. It is evident that
this can have a profound effect on the mode of breakup of the fuel
when subjected to a fast nuclear transient. Large temperature
differences can be created between the fuel beads and the
graphite matrix. The faster the transient the greater the
temperature gradients will be. Fuel may now fragment due to
temperature stresses, differential expansions, or vapor pressure
created in the fuel particle itself or the carbon Jacket.
Extensive experiments and calculations are in progress to
obtain a complete understanding of the transient behavior of the
beaded fuel and its potential as a self destruct mechanism for
the reactor.
• LA 2409 "Nuclear Safety Aspects of the Rover Program"
March 1960, G.A. Graves, P.S. Harris and W. H. Langham
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A Destruct System For the NEPxVA F.ngine [U] .....
K. N. Kreyenhagen, W. H. Thie[, and S. K. Yoder
Aerojet-Genera[ Corporation
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High explosives represent a promising source of energy, both
for reducing the NI_RVA reactor core to sub-critical masses
in the event of booster malfunction, and for disposing of the
reactor after operation so that contamination wi[[ be prevented.
Severa[ design concepts are possible for the pre-operation
requirement, including the use of linear explosive charges and
shaped charges for cutting open the pressure hu[[ and dispersing
the core rods. The post-operational requirement is more
difficult, since the 3000-pound core must be broken up into
fragments of approximately one mm major dimension. Various
concepts are being explored, utilizing external charges of
exp[osive as we[[ as charges which are prope[[ed into the
reactor prior to detonation. The feasibi[ity of accomplishing
the required fragmentation with reasonab[e masses of explosive
is currently being determined. Experiments are also being
performed to assess the physical and chemical changes which
wi[[ occur in explosives when they are subjected to the radiation
environment around the NERVA_. _w_,react°r" _ _..H..__'
Introduction
A probable mode for accomplishing the destruction requirements for the
NERVA engine is through the use of conventional high explosives. The
energy density in exp[osives would appear to make it possible to design a
relatively light weight system or systems, and the high reliability and rapid
response time of explosive system add desirability to their employment. As
part of the NERVA engine deve[opment, a program is being conducted to
initially evaluate the feasibility of a high explosive destruct system. Assum-
ing that such feasibility is established and an explosive mode for destruction
is chosen, subsequent app[ied research and development wi[[ be undertaken.
Destruct System Requirements
Two separate requirements exist for the NERVA engine destruct system.
One is for a system to render the reactor harmless in the event of malfunction
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of the booster s_ste_Tn prior to operation of the reactor. The second require-
ment is for a system to adequately dispose of the core fission products in a
manner which will not cause unacceptable contamination in the event of reentry
to the earth's surface. These requirements differ quite distinctly, such that
two separate systems appear to be indicated. We call these a pre-operational,
or anti-criticality system, and a post-operational, or perhaps more descrip-
tively, disposal system.
In the event of failure of the booster system prior to reactor operation, the
reactor core should be broken into pieces which are sub-critical even when
immersed in a highly moderating water, hydrocarbon, or liquid hydrogen
environment. This means that the core must be broken into pieces and
distributed such that no critical masses form. Assuming a uniform distribu-
tion, no more than 0.205 grams of UZ35 can be distributed per square
centimeter of water surface. This is equivalent to an approximate total mass
of 750 grams of uranium within a Z7-in. dia circle.
During operation the reactor produces a large inventory of fission products.
To prevent unacceptable contamination of the earth's surface, the core must
therefore be fragmented into pieces which will ablate down to Z5 micron size
by the time they reach 100,000-ft. level. Current investigations suggest that
the characteristic dimension of graphite particles which will meet this criteria
is approximately 1 ram.
Since the post-operational fragmentation criteria certainly encompasses the
pre-operational dispersion requirement, it is appropriate to consider whether
or not a single system might satisfactorily do both jobs. While such a com-
bination would be desirable from the standpoint of design simplicity and weight,
it appears that a double system is more appropriate. This conclusion is
reached based upon the desirability for using a minimum explosion to accom-
plish the pre-operational destruction, so as to minimize the attendant risks
from detonating a large quantity of explosive in proximity to the large booster
fuel and oxidizer tanks.
3. Pre-Operationa[ Destruct Concepts
The achievement of the pre-reactor operation destruct requirements appears
to be within the existing bounds of high explosive technology. There are
available, indeed, a multiplicity of concepts for accomplishing this task. We
are currently involved in experiments to demonstrate the efficiency of these
concepts, thus providing data upon which to base selection of the best concept,
and upon which to commence preliminary design work.
Figure i shows one pre-operationa[ destruct concept, consisting of a girdling
array of linear shaped charges. Upon command, these charges cut through
the reactor casing and the reflector segments, delivering an impulse to the
core modules, thus dislodging, freeing, and scattering these modules. This
is a simple and reliable basic concept, readily adaptable to the reactor and
engine design. The explosives in the linear shaped charges are, of course,
unable to withstand the thermal and radiation environment during reactor
operation. Hence provision must be made for dismounting or discarding of
the array of charges during starting of the reactor.
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Figure Z shows a second pre-operational destruct concept, consisting in this
case of a single conical explosive shaped charge to be fired up into the core
from its mounting in the nozzle. A hypervelocity jet of metal is ejected by
such a shaped charge, which will impact and penetrate the core. This impact
and penetration process will introduce a strong shock in the core material,
which, if it is sufficiently strong, will break and dislodge the rods and cause
rupture of the reactor casing, thus permitting escape or dispersion of the rods.
While this concept is extremely simple and reliable, we are uncertain as to
whether the shock produced in the core will be strong enough to break open the
casing ahd free the fuel modules. Full-scale testing will be required to verify
this concept. Its major advantage is light weight. Upon startup of the engine,
of course, the shaped charge is discarded.
The girdling array of linear cutting charges and the nozzle-mounted shaped
charge can be combined as an additional design. The linear charges are
reduced to the minimum required to cut through or substantially weaken the
reactor casing, thus assuring that the nozzle-mounted shaped charge can
achieve scattering of the fuel modules. We have subjected this concept to
preliminary full-scale testing, and have found that it performs adequately.
Figure 3 shows the reactor mockup which was used for this experiment. The
important components of the reactor were simulated, i.e. the pressure vessel
by a steel rocket casing, the reflector segments by magnesium bars, the fuel
modules by 3/4 in. dia stacked graphite rods. A discarded Titan nozzle was
attached to the aft closure which, while it is much shorter than the NERVA
nozzle nevertheless provides a throat diameter for the shaped charge jet to
pass through which is nearly the same as on NIERVA. The network of
explosive girdling charges is seen in this photo. These charges contained
Composition C-4 high explosive with a cross-sectional area of 4.5 square
inches. Total weight in the girdling charge was IZ5 pounds. These charges
were simultaneously initiated at six separate points. The conical shaped
charge is seen mounted in a location which corresponds to the exit plane of
the NERVA nozzle. This entire mockup weighed approximately 9000 pounds.
Figure 4 shows the test arena shortly after the explosive charges were
detonated. It is possible among the scattered remains of the reactor to
identify pieces of the casing, reflector bars, graphite rods, and test stand.
The graphite was very effectively broken up, primarily into pieces 3 - 4
inches long and shorter. The largest pieces were approximately IZ inches
long.
We believe that this test demonstrates the ability of this type of explosive
system to break the reactor core into small pieces. If anything, the fuel
modules were broken up more than is necessary or desirable. We look
forward in subsequent experiments to substantially reducing the quantity of
explosive used in the girdling charges.
4. Post-Operational Destruct Concepts
The achievement of the post-operational destruction of the reactor constitutes
an extremely difficult physical task. A 3000 pound core of fuel-enriched
graphite must be broken up into pieces with a maximum characteristic dimen-
sion of the order of 1 mm. This core consists of extruded fuel rods (either
stacked hexagonal rods or round rods inserted in a structural graphite matrix)
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each containing numerous small axial holes for propellant passage. Typical
graphite sections between holes are 1/10-inch thick. Figure 5 is a cross-
sectional schematic of the reactor. The core assembly is surrounded by
pyrolitic graphite tiles, support tiles, a lateral support system, graphite
reflector barrel, steel barrel, shim rods, coolant channels, tie bolts,
beryllium reflectors containing control rods, and the aluminum pressure hull.
Fragmentation of the reactor by use of an explosive charge detonated within the
core has been the concept for post-operational destruct which has received the
largest amount of attention to date. In the paper by Z. D. P. King from Los
..Alamos, the work at that Laboratory with such a central burster concept has
been described. The scaled-down equivalent of I00 pounds of explosive was
detonated in scale models of reactors. Based upon extrapolations of data
obtained, it was concluded that a significant portion of the graphite core will
break up into fragments with a characteristic dimension of 1 crn or greater.
One surmises, however, that through use of multiple charges and a larger
total mass of explosive, satisfactory fragmentation of the core can be obtained.
It is not possible, of course, to include large cylinders of explosives within the
reactor core design, primarily because explosives cannot withstand such an
intense radiation environment. Consideration has therefore been given to
techniques by which explosives can be quickly moved into the core and detonated
there. Figure 7 shows one concept to which we are giving current attention.
The explosive is stored in long projectiles located in launcher tubes situated
around the engine compartment behind the shiled. Upon command, the projec-
tiles are simultaneously accelerated by propellant charges, penetrating the
shield and the core of the reactor. When the bodies of the explosive charges
are within the reactor, the explosive is detonated. Supporting experiments
are being conducted at the Aberdeen Proving Ground to evaluate this genera[
concept. In initial experiments, gun projectiles were fired into a stack of
solid graphite bars to study if the projectile could completely enter the stack
without causing premature disintegration in the process. At an impact
velocity of i000 feet per second, it was shown that adequate penetration can
readily be achieved without immediate disruption of the core.
The second series of experiments at Aberdeen will consist of firing explosive-
loaded projectiles into full-scale reactor mockups. Discarded uranium-
enriched fuel rods will be utilized for some of these experiments. Three
previously emp[anted explosive charges will be simultaneously detonated
along with the injected projectile. The experiment is expected to provide
clear knowledge of the effectiveness of the internal explosive charge system
in a full-scale geometry.
Providing that the multiple internal explosive charge system works satisfac-
torily, we are then faced with the problems of designing guns or launchers
which are both lightweight and reliable, and with achieving the required degree
of simultaneity with respect to the arrival time of the multiple projectiles at
the position for detonation. Relatively heavy weight appears unavoidable with
this projectile injection system. If we assume, for example, that four charges
of 30 pounds of explosive each are required, the parasitic weight is estimated
as follows:
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metal parts in projectile
launcher, or gun barrel
supporting structure,
85 pounds each
140 pounds each
140 pounds each
A total weight of nearly 1500 pounds is therefore estimated for the system, and
this does not include control and power source circuitry.
Because of the high parasitic weight penalty for the projectile insert concept,
and also because its feasibility in accomplishing the total fragmentation of the
core is still in doubt, we are also exploring alternate concepts. One of these
is shown in Figure 8. Multiple shaped charges are fired through the reflector
into the core from all sides. These shaped charges consist of cylinders of
explosive with a conical cavity in one end, this cavity being lined with metal.
This cavity collapses under the pressure of the explosive detonation, ejecting
a portion of the linear as a jet of metal particles traveling at velocities in the
range of Z5,000- 30,000 feet per second. The effect of many such jets around
the reactor periphery will cause not only the direct penetration of the core at
many points, but also since the penetration occurs at extremely high velocities,
intense shock waves will be introduced, causing additional fracture of the fuel
rods by interaction with the coolant passages. The extent of such shock-
induced fracture is unknown at present, but it will be evaluated in future full-
scale tests.
One means for incorporating such a multiple shaped charge concept into the
reactor and engine design is suggested in Figure 8. The shaped charges are
stored behind the shi[eding and are translated on tracks or by mechanical
linkages to their firing positions around the waist of the reactor.
It is worth noting that, while the effect of a single shaped charge will probably
be relatively small, multiple charges may be expected to produce amplifying
interactions. For the same 1500-pounds that is envisioned for the projectile
insert concept which was previously described, an array of perhaps 100 or
more conical shaped charges plus inert components can be employed.
A third concept for fragmenting the core material is by use of external crushing
charges. These consist of slabs of explosive surrounding the reactor which,
when detonated, implode on the core. Preliminary experiments with this
concept have produced promising results. As with the multiple shaped charge
concept, the explosive would be stored behind the shielding during reactor
operations, and would be moved into proper position just prior to firing.
5. Radiation Damage to Explosives
Providing that realistic weights of high explosives can achieve the degree of
fragmentation required to meet the post-operational destruct criteria, a
second question must then be answered: can the explosive withstand the
radiation flux surrounding the reactor?
The radiation field around the NI_RVA reactor wilt vary from total dose rates
of 105 rad/sec around the sides to l03- l04 rad/sec behind the shield. With
reactor operation of 1Z00 seconds, the total dose will therefore vary from
106. 108 rads (108 - 1010 ergs/gm).
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When an explosive is subjected to such an environment, it wilt, just as any
material, be heated due to gamma absorption and inelastic scattering processes.
When explosives are heated by any means they reach a temperature where the
exothermic decomposition reaction releases energy at a rate which exceeds
the rate at which energy escapes from the explosive mass. Self-heating, and
eventually spontaneous and rapid decomposition and perhaps deftagration follow.
The temperature at which this occurs is of course dependent upon the mass of
the explosive, but typical temperatures are in the range of 150- Z00°C.
In addition to the indirect effects of thermal heating, explosives art appear to
be directly degraded by reactor radiation, due apparently to bond breaking in
the explosive molecules.
The energy threshold at which most explosives apapear to be seriously degraded
is in the range from 109- i0 I0 ergs/gm.(107- 10Urad). This degradation
consists of significant decomposition as evidenced by gas evolution and porosity,
plus a 10% reduction in heat of explosion. Direct application of these threshold
values to the NERVA environment suggests that, at least behind the shield,
high explosives could be safety, and perhaps reliably, employed. These rough
threshold values, however, have been established as a result of studies made
with explosives in radiation fluxes which are several orders of magnitude lower
than are anticipated even behind the shield of the NERVA reactor. At the
higher NERVA fluxes, some cooling of the explosive will clearly be necessary
to avoid unacceptable heating. In addition, we must perform experiments to
find whether or not the direct radiation effects are independent of the flux level.
In association with J. V. R. Kaufman of Picatinny Arsenal, we are planning to
conduct four series of experiments aimed at clarifying several of the questions
which remain concerning explosives in the NERVA environment, and which wilt
provide data upon which to base shielding and coolant designs for the explosive
system.
As an initial exploratory experiment, impact sensitivity measurements will be
made on explosive samples which have been irradiated at the highest flux
levels which are available. This will probably be 5x 1013nvt. These sensi-
tivity measurements wilt serve to indicate either an unsafe increase in
sensitivity or, conversely, a serious degradation, such that initiation becomes
unreliable. Several explosives will be studied, including TNT, DATB, PETN,
HMX, and perhaps a propellant materiaL.
The second experiment is of a somewhat more fundamental nature, consisting
of monitoring the temperature rise occurring in relatively large samples of
explosives during irradiation. As mentioned earlier, radiation has two
apparent effects on explosives--the indirect damage due to heating, and the
direct effect on molecular bonds. By monitoring the temperature rise, and
comparing this with the temperature increase which can be expected on the
basis of calculated energy deposition and conduction, we obtain a quantitative
measure of the energy released by the explosive, both from thermal decompo-
sition and radiation-induced chemical reactions. We hope to obtain from this
difficult experiment a better understanding of radiation damage mechanisms in
exp[osive s.
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Some experimentaL evidence is avaiLabLe suggesting that radiation damage
thresholds are increased by reducing the explosive temperature. This possi-
biLity is very attractive to us, since a coolant system would be far Lighter than
massive shielding. To evaluate the effect of reduced temperature on the
expLosive, we are preparing a cryogenic experiment in which 80 gin. spheres
of expLosive are irradiated while being continuously cooled in a speciaLLy-
cooLed HeLium environment to 100°K. Temperature rise in the explosive
spheres wiLL be monitored and compared with resuLts at higher temperatures.
From these experiments, we wiLL hopefuLLy confirm that reduced temperatures
improve the usefuLness of explosives, and further, wiLL establish design
conditions for a cooLant system.
Th_ final experiments wiLL involve measurements of any changes which may
occur in the energy threshold required for reLiabLe initiation of explosives
during and immediateLy foLLowing irradiation. Again this is a difficult
experiment, since it involves attempts to deLiberateLy initiate expLosives while
they are in or near a reactor, which is certainLy not a very popuLar idea. It
is necessary for us, however, to obtain the resuLts of these experiments so
as to know whether or not the expLosives are reLiabLy useful during and after
irradiation.
Figure I Figure Z
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IE-MAD FACILITY DESIGN CONCEPT
Stanley K. Hellman
Vitro Engineering Co.
INTRODUCTION
The successful flight of a nuclear rocket requires test facilities to optimize
engine and vehicle reliability and insure safety of the program. Paramount
among the facilities in the static test complex is the nuclear rocket engine
maintenance, assembly and disassembly (E-MAD) facility, which will be a
part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) at Jackass Flats
(Fig. I), an area within the Nevada Test Site. This facility (Fig. 2) will
have the capability for assembly of new reactors and engines; disassembly
of fired engines; maintenance of reactors and engines - before, after, or
between firing sequences; and post mortem examination and testing of reactor
and engine comporients.
It was obvious at the start that the development of criteria for this facility
depended, to a large degree, on the definition of the NERVA engine, its
configuration, and its handling characteristics. Since the engine program
was in the initial development phase, close coordination with the NERVA
engine industrial team was required. In addition, since much experience
had been obtained at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in the testing and
handling of the KIWI reactors and in the operation of the reactor (R-MAD)
facility at NRDS, it was felt that the valuable technical information developed
by LASL should be incorporated into Vitro' s design. This permitted the
development of initial facility concepts. After review of design criteria by
all parties concerned, the facility concepts were presented by Vitro in a
report. _':-_This effort is being followed by detail design of the facility, an
initial part of which has been completed. Construction work on this facility
is presently underway, with partial occupancy expected during the latter
part of 1963.
This presentation defines the design concept of the E-MAD Facility in terms
of size, capability and operational characteristics.
DESIGN BASES AND FACILITY OPERATIONS
During the criteria development phase of the project, consideration was given
to designing a facility capable.of handling future generation engines, as well
as the NERVA and Phoebus engines (the Phoebus engine is defined here as
one that operates 4000 Mw with only a slight increase in size over NERVA).
The largest engine originally contemplated for this facility was one which
would operate at 16,000 Mw, being a scaleup in size from the NERVA-
Phoebus unit. The resulting preliminary study indicated that to accommodate
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such a power level would result in a very high construction cost for this
facility, not in line with the limited funds available. In addition, the study
clearly indicated scaleup factors which were based on hypothesized data suf-
ficiently indefinite to render the facility designed for the largest engine
merely conjecture. In view of this, and on the basis that the Phoebus engine
utilizes a reactor similar to NEI_VA, it was decided to limit the design of the
E-MAD Facility to the size and power level of Phoebus.
In establishing the radiation levels for building design, it became obvious that
a time interval between completion of firing (shutdown of engine) at the static
test stand and return to the E-MAD hot bay would have to be established.
Past studies on the engine had indicated that forced convection cooling for
removal of decay heat is necessary up to 12 to 24 hr after firing to prevent
overheating the engine. Consequently, it was assumed that after shutdown,
the Phoebus engine would remain at the test stand Z4 hr before being brought
into the E-MAD Facility.
Studies of disassembly indicated a need for flexibility in facility design to
accommodate the final procedures selected. Consequently it was felt that,
with experience gained in operation, it might be desirable to bring the core
through the hot bay to the core disassembly cell as soon as possible, although
this could not be ascertained at the time the study was being made. Accord-
ingly it was assumed that radiation levels throughout the hot bay portion of
the building (up to and including the disassembly cells) could be based on the
radiation level of the engine Z4 hr after shutdown. Further, it was obvious
that several days would be required to disassemble an engine. Therefore, it
was reasonable to assume that small internal engine and core parts would
reach the post mortem cells Z-I/Z days after shutdown. Thus ultimate
storage of fuel modules in the fuel module storage area and of parts in the
low level graveyard (outside of the E-MAD building) would not be accom-
plished for at least 5 days after shutdown. Consequently, radiation levels
for subassemblies were derived with due consideration for these assumed
decay periods.
Generally, the functions of the E-MAD Facility are to:
I. receive the completely assembled engine (minus the core) and
critically safe complete core together with component engine
parts and fuel modules
Z. store unfired engines, cores and their components
3. inspect, checkout and asse_r_ble cores and engines with core
4. receive engirfes for maintenance and modification during test
sequences or engines following test completion for disassembly,
examination and disposal.
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
The NRDS is located within the northwest confines of the AEC Nevada Test
Site (NTS), which is in a desert area, approximately 80 miles northwest of
Las Vegas. This area of the NTS, designated as Jackass Flats, is reached
via Road A and Road C (See Fig. 1).
The existing facilities, test cells A, C, R-MAD and CP Area, operated under
the direction of LASL, are used for the development of reactors. The
E-MAD Facility is directly west of the CP Area and south of Road H. It is
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connectedby railroad to the static engine test stands (Test Stands i and Z)
which are almost directly north of E-MAD. Directly west of this area, toward
40 Mile Canyon, will be located a nuclear rocket stage static testing area
which will eventually tie with E-MAD via a railroad track running east-west.
The componentsof the facility (Fig. Z) within the fenced area include:
E-MAD building, the decontamination pad for the locomotive and rocket engine
conveyor car, the warehouse, a substation, a water tank and stacks for heat-
ing and ventilation. The auxiliary facilities in the immediate vicinity (outside
the fence) include the guard house, locomotive maintenancebuilding, a sani-
tary waste tile field, low level burial site, fuel module storage area and a
radioactive waste tile field. For the latter three auxiliaries, a sufficient
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exclusion area is fenced in for personnel protection. A new railroad Spur A
runs from the E-MAD Facility to the existing Spur B which services the R-
MAD area and test stands. In the vicinity of E-MAD, spur tracks from Spur
A service the Locomotive Maintenance Building, the Cold Assembly Area, the
Low Level Burial Site and Fuel Module Storage Area.
The E-MAD building is essentially a multistoried structure divided into six
separated sections based on specific functions and personnel and material
traffic flow. These sections (See Fig. 3) are as follows:
i. Hot Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly Area
2. Cold Assembly Area
3. High and Low Level Cells
4. Operating Galleries
5. Shop and Service Areas
6. Office Area
COLD ASSEMBLY AREA
The cold assembly area is divided by function into three sections, namely:
the core and fuel module storage area, the engine receiving area, and the
final engine assembly area. One of the basic premises in the design is that
this area houses only cores and engines that have never been fired and are
thus nonradioactive.
Fuel elements or whole cores enter the E-MAD Building via a door, in the
south wall. It is anticipated that cores may be shipped assembled in sealed
containers, adequately safeguarded to prevent criticality. Total floor space
for this area is 84 ft by 72 ft, ample to provide storage space for the even-
tuality that fuel modules must be shipped individually or in groups, and then
require core assembly in this area.
When cores are required for assembly in an engine, they are transferred to
the final engine assembly area through a door on the north wall. This area is
neutron monitored and provided with alarms to warn personnel of an incident.
The nonnuclear engine (engine minus core) enters on the" east side of the E-
MAD Building via the Engine Receiving Area. It is assumed that the engine is
received in the horizontal position in a sealed container. The floor space,
measuring 7Z ft by 36 ft, is utilized for unpacking, and inspection, after the
hardware has been unloaded onto a truck dock from a large trailer. Follow-
ing uncrating and inspection, the engine is moved through a door in the north
wail, into the final engine assembly area.
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The engine is brought into the Final Engine Assembly Area and placed in the
vertical position on a turntable. Depending on the final design of the engine
and its assembly sequence, it can then be brought over to the other turntable
(or the nozzle section removed and brought to this station) for installation of
the core into the engine assembly. In order to provide flexibility for final
assembly procedure (being developed at present by the engine contractor),
adequate floor space (144 ft by 7Z ft) is provided to accommodate jigs, fix-
tures, special tools, etc. In addition the clear bay height of the building is
set at 53 ft to accommodate the engine in the vertical position, to allow pas-
sage of a 40 ton crane and to allow for a mockup station for final checkout
beJ_ore transfer to the test stand.
SHOP AREA
In order to assist in assembly operations, a machine shop and an instru-
mentation shop are located on the west side of the final engine assembly area
(See Fig. 3). This layout permits easy access to the cold disassembly bay
for minor hardware repairs, etc. In addition, access to the other side of
the E-MAD Facility (operating gallery) is also provided in the event that
cold parts must be modified and transported into the hot areas. Except for
these passageways, normal access to Final Engine Assembly Area is through
the Cold Change Room.
HOT MAINTENANCE, ASSEMBLY AND DISASSEMBLY AREA
The Hot Disassembly Area receives the radioactive engine after firing at the
test stand. It consists of the Main Hot Bay, the Crane Maintenance Balcony,
the Gore and Engine Disassembly Cells and the Hot Hold and Transfer Tunnel.
Normally, the locomotive backs the engine installation vehicle (with engine
on it) into the Main Hot Bay where it can be either completely disassembled,
or have a part replaced and transported back to the test stand for further
static firing.
The main hot bay is a large shielded area approximately 66 ft wide, 146 ft
long, and 77 ft high. The floor area permits dismantling engines through the
use of jigs and fixtures utilizing the remote handling equipment, turntables
and crane permanently installed in the bay. The railroad track, which per-
mits easy transport of the engine and subassembly through the building is off-
set so as to permit the area on the west side of the track to be utilized as
working area, and the area on the east side of the track to be utilized as lay-
down area for major parts.
Among the major remote handling equipment in the bay is a newly developed
overhead positioner and handling device capable of covering approximately
all of the floor area and reaching a height of approximately 40 ft off the floor.
This is a special development for this facility. In addition four specially de-
veloped side wall manipulators (two on the west wall and two on the east
wall) together cover nearly all of the plan area in the bay. The_e units can
reach a height of approximately 44 ft.
An operating gallery extends the entire length of both the east and west walls
(and at higher levels) and partly around the south side and by the hold tunnel
of the main bay. This gallery, which has numerous working stations
(shielded viewing windows and master slave manipulators) , provides the
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flexibility for final disassembly sequences on the engine.
A completely shielded master control room is located, at the southwest
corner of the main bay, above the first floor operating gallery. This room
contains all of the instrumentation and communications necessary to direct
operation of the complete facility including: l) remote control and monitor-
ing of the entire railroad layout, including the test stands; 2) override con-
trol of the major remote handling equipment, turntable, crane, etc. (opera-
tion of the equipment can be accomplished from selected working stations
under permissive control from the master control room); 3) operation or
override control of the main doors, such as the front door to the main bay
through which the engine enters the building, the personnel access door on
the northeast wall, the balcony doors and hold tunnel door for removal of the
engine, core, or radioactive parts from the main bay; 4) monitoring and
control of the facility air handling system; and 5) radiation instrumentation.
The balcony is located south of the main bay, with its floor at the third floor
level and extends up to the top of the main bay elevation. Structurally it is
contiguous with the main bay and extends across the entire south end. It
extends in depth over approximately half the two disassembly cells and the
hold tunnel. Its primary use is for maintenance of remote handling equip-
ment, jigs and fixtures and for working on the core or other hot parts.
Working stations with shielding windows and a master slave manipulator are
located around the east, west, and south sides of the balcony.
South of the main bay is the hold tunnel, used primarily to store hot engines
or to transfer hot cores and other hardware to the disassembly cells, on the
east and west side of the tunnel. This transfer is accomplished through the
assistance of an overhead crane, manipulator, turntable, and railroad tracks
at grade level. Again, viewing windows in the cell provide work stations for
remote work to be done in this area.
The two major disassembly cells are located south of the main bay on either
side of the hold tunnel (east and west), and directly below the balcony. The
west cell is defined as the core disassembly cell and is to be used primarily
for disassembly and detailed examination of cores and modules through spe-
cial equipment, including an overhead crane and manipulator, to be placed in
the cell. In addition, numerous working stations at grade level (with shield-
ing windows and master slave manipulators) are available to assist in ac-
complishing intricate operations. The east cell, engine disassembly cell, is
used to perform close examination and further breakdown of the engine parts
(non-fuel) .
Directly to the south of the disassembly ceils are the two banks of post
mortem cells separated by an associated cell service area. These ceils are
utilized for detailed examination of small parts, radiography, small compo-
nent testing, etc. In each bank, the cells are contiguous with common shield
walls separating each cell. Steel doors are provided in the partition walls to
permit passage from cell to cell and isolation of any particular cell.
The fuel module cells are directly south and adjacent to the core disassembly
cell while the engine post mortem cells are directly south and adjacent to
engine disassembly cell.
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AUXILIARY SERVICE AREAS
There are auxiliary service areas in the basement and first floor. These
areas accommodate the auxiliary electric power requirements, motor control
and electric breaker center, waste handling tanks and pumping equipment,
counting room, change room areas, etc. In addition two stacks (Fig. Z),
approximately 115 ft high, are located outside and just north of the main bay.
One stack handles the discharging air load from the main bay and balcony
(actually the filter exhausts from the main bay below grade to the stack)
while the second stack handles the cell area. Gamma monitors are located
in the stack to detect high activity release due to possible filter failure.
SHIN LDING CKIT E RIA
While the E-MAD facility will initially handle the NERVA engine, the shield-
ing, in order to provide flexibility for future generation engines, has been
designed for the Phoebus engine Z4 hr after shutdown.
The shielding design of the facility is based on maintaining a dose rate which
permits a man to work for 40 hr/wk, 8 hr/shift and receive no more than
I00 mr in any weekly period.
The shielding design is based upon the criterion which assumes one engine
test per week. It is assumed that the engine arrives at the E-MAD Building
after its third successive full power run at its earliest possible time of ar-
rival, 2.4 hr after shutdown. It is further assumed that a single individual is
always in a position in a gallery which exposes him to the highest dose rate
from the engine throughout a period of 40 hr week cited above.
Normal operating areas such as the galleries, the office and shop area, the
cold bay, and outside the building are normally considered as unlimited ac-
cess areas. However, at certain times personnel will be located in warm
areas for less than 40 hr per week.
The shelter area is designed to protect personnel as the hot engine is trans-
ported from the test stand to the main disassembly area. The shielding for
this area is designed to limit the maximum dose rate in the shelter to 25
mr/hr during the approach of an engine, at the moment when the dose rate
in the shelter is greatest (just before the engine enters the main bay). This
produces an integrated dose of Z mr during the approach of an engine.
SOURCE DATA
The unshielded dose rate i0 ft from a bare Phoebus core, Z4 hr after the
third shutdown from a full power run is iZ4,547 r/hr. This dose rate in-
cludes the contributions from all energy groups and has been calculated from
data supplied by the reactor subcontractor.
The engine consists of the core surrounded by a pressure vessel and reflec-
tor. There is a difference in the facility shielding required for handling the
complete engine rather than the bare core because of the shielding effect of
the pressure vessel, reflector and thermal shield. These engine parts serve
to attenuate the radiation from the bare core by a factor of 3. 8 if no other
shielding is present. However, if in addition, a 5 ft concrete wall (biologi-
cal shield) is interposed between the bare core and a dose point, the total
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attenuation factor attributable to the reflector, thermal shield and pressure
vessel is 2.9.
The radiation source level of the Phoebus engine Z4 hr after shutdown as a
function of distance from the engine has been calculated for I0 to 3,600 ft.
The results, which include the effect of air attenuation, indicate that a _lis-
tance of 3,500 ft is required to reduce the dose to 2.5 mr/hr.
In order to evaluate the integrated dose to meet the criteria that a man re-
ceive no more than i00 mr/wk in a series of five 8 hr shifts spaced 2.4 hr
apart, the curves of gamma energy vs. time are integrated to determine the
effect of the source strength decay.
This analysis shows that the dose through a 5 ft concrete wall is primarily due
to the I-2 mev and 2-3 mev groups. Based on the decay of these groups one
can see that the radiation level drops by a factor of approximately 5, between
I and 5 days post shutdown.
The dose in the control room is within unlimited access tolerance, because
most of the front is protected by 5 ft thick concrete walls facing the inside of
the main bay. A small section of 2.ft 6 in. thick wall facing the front of the
building serves to extend the width of the control room. The west wall of this
room is 18 in. thick; the rear wall is I ft thick. A 3 in. thick steel door is
provided to attenuate the gammas streaming down the gallery, which might
otherwise back-scatter into the control room.
In the gallery, the dose rate from the core through 5 ft of ordinary concrete
at the centerplane of the core, is 48 mr/hr, with the core 10 ft from the dose
point; through a 6 ft wall of ordinary concrete the instantaneous dose rate is
2. 5 mr/hr. The ratio of the core dose rate to the engine dose rate, both
shielded by a 5 ft concrete wall, without accounting for engine parts activa-
tion, is 2.9. Thus the dose rate due to the engine at I0 ft from the dose point
through the 5 ft concrete wall 2.4 hr after shutdown is 16. 5 mr/hr. The dose
calculated by integrating the dose rate from the engine over a 40 hr week, is
16.5 x II = 182 mr/wk. However, because of the relative position of the en-
gine, and its normal distance from the wall during disassembly sequences,
an operator working in a gallery is exposed to a maximum of I00 mr/wk.
The sources from engine parts are due to the activation of aluminum and
steel. When the core is in the engine, these parts then contribute to the total
dose from the engine. It has been determined, by studying the various parts
and their source spectrum, that the maximum contribution from the most
radioactive part is Ii.5 mr/wk.
The areas designed to shield (6 ft of concrete) an entire bare Phoebus core,
Z4 hr after shutdown include: the southwest portion of the main bay, the crane
maintenance balcony, the core and engine disassembly cells and the engine
hold tunnel.
The walls of the core and engine disassembly cells are also 6 ft thick. They
attenuate the radiation from a Phoebus core, 24 hr after shutdown, to 2.5
mr/hr, with a core 4 ft from the inside surface of the cell walls.
The balcony is designed to hold a full core. Its walls are 6 ft thick from the
floor to an upper elevation. Above this walls reduce in thickness up to the
roof. The upper two wall thicknesses are reduced to 4 ft and 3 ft respec-
tively to accommodate the crane rails. These thicknesses are adequate
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because of the combined effects of slant penetration and distance attenuation,
Fig. 4.
The total dose rate (direct and scatter) to a man in the gallery from a bare
core in the balcony, 24 hr after shutdown, is approximately 5 mr/hr with the
core 4 ft from a wall, and a maximum of 6 mr/hr with the core 22 ft from awall.
RADIATION MONITORING
The philosophy used in radiation monitoring for the E-MAD Facility is to
provide an adequate, integrated surveillance of the facility. The installed
radiation monitoring for this building may be divided into three systems:
i. Neutron Monitoring System
3. Gamma Monitoring System for Process Areas
3. Gamma Monitoring System for Personnel Areas Adjacent
to the Process Areas
Each core has a neutron monitor, which travels with the core as it moves
about the facility. Remote record and alarm of the neutron count rate are
provided. Fixed gamma detectors with remote readout are located in the
process areas (main disassembly bay, crane maintenance balcony, hold
tunnel, core disassembly cell and engine disassembly cell). Personnel
areas adjacent to these process areas are provided with local gamma indi-
cation and alarm with individual remote alarm to indicate the trouble area
to the health physics personnel. Portable gamma monitors are used to
supplement the installed monitoring. Hand and foot counters are located at
the personnel entrances to the process areas.
The health physics office is the center of all radiation monitoring operations
for the E-MAD facility. For initial operations, this office has been tempo-
rarily located on the first floor of the east operating gallery, adjacent to the
engine disassembly cell. In the final facility it will be relocated in the office
area of the building. Instrument local panel YI is installed here. This panel
contains the readout instrumentation for the neutron and gamma radiation
monitoring systems, which consist of a 40-point annunciator assembly, a
Z0-channel gamma radiation recorder, the amplifiers for the process area
detectors, two neutron recorders, and the patch panel for the neutron moni-
tor connection boxes.
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Kiwi-B-1A, the first in the Kiwi-B series of reactors to be designed and
tested by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory as part of the Rover progrsm, was
operated at full power on December 7, 1961 at the Nevada Test Site. The test of
this reactor, the only reactor in the Kiwi-B test series for which it is presen-
tly planned to use gaseous hydrogen as the coolant, was essentially a scaled- .
down v6rsion of subsequent reactor tests designed for liquid hydrogen operation.
As originally planned, the reactor was to have been operated for 500 sec-
onds at a nominal power level of 270 megawatts with a hydrogen flow rate of 20
lbs/second, the power level being automatically adjusted to maintain a core exit
gas temperature of 4100°R. However, as a result of the intentional opening of
the temperature control loop and a considerable calibration error in the linear
neutronics system, the reactor only reached a power level of 225 megawatts with
a measured flow rate of 20 lbs/second. Unfortunately, it was necessary to ter-
minate the experiment soon after reaching the full-power plateau due to several
large and potentially dangerous hydrogen fires near the nozzle flange area, the
actual full power duration being only approximately 36 seconds.
Notwithstanding the brief duration of the full-power plateau at lower-than-
design conditions, considerably more information was obtained from the Kiwi-B-1A
test than from any previous Kiwi full-power test. Almost every core thermocouple
functioned properly during the full-power run, providing information on the core
thermal performance that had been previously all but unobtainable. The quality
and smount of experimental information obtained from the highly-instrumented
Kiwi-B-3_& core would indicate that this experiment was quite successful, even
though the test conditions were not fully achieved.
Description of Kiwi-B-1A
Figure 1 shows a sectioned view of the Kiwi-B-1A reactor. The hydrogen
coolant, after entering a toroidal manifold around the base of the reactor,
flowed up through three risers to the nozzle coolant inlet manifold (uppermost
part of the drafting). The hydrogen then flowed down through the coolantpassages
of the tubular nozzle and the reflector system into the core inlet plenum. After
reversing direction, the hydrogen flowed up through the core and was expelled
through a conventionally-shaped rocket nozzle.
A cross-sectional view of the Kiwi-B-1A core and reflector system is shown
in Figure 2. This core was of a cold-end-supported modular design with a length
of 52.3 inches and a radius of 35.2 inches. The loaded graphite fuel elements
were contained in modified hexagonal graphite modules which supported the fuel
elements against the core pressure drop and provided additional moderation. The
modules were in turn supported in tension from an aluminum plate at the inlet
@
Work performed under AEC Contract W-7405-ENG 36 and AEC-NASA Contract SNP-1
For a more complete discussion, see LAMS-2708, "Final Report on the Kiwi-B-1A
Full-Power Run", Donald W. Brc_n and Samuel Cerni, April 20, 1962.
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end of the core. Each fuel element contained seven coolant passages (not shown)
_hich were niobium carbide coated to prevent hydrogen corrosion.
The core was enclosed by the core sleeve assembly which separated and ther-
mally insulated the core frcm the graphite reflector cylinder. The core sleeve
assembly, ccmprised of an axially-se_uented ½-inch-thick cylindrical ring of
graphite surrounded by a 20-rail stainless steel _Tapper, was held away frcm the
core by rows of pyrographite tiles glued to the inner surface of the graphite
ring. A thick concentric beryllium reflector, made up of twelve sectors, sur-
rounded the graphite reflector. Each sector contained a rotary beryllium control
drum with boral plates covering approximately one-third of the drum surface.
The entire reactor was enclosed within a two-piece aluminum pressure shell.
Test Objectives and Abortive Runs
The primary objective of the Kiwi-B test series is to develop the basic
reactor design for the NERVA nuclear rocket engine. As a result of this primary
objective, the specific objectives of the Kiwi-B-iAfull-power run were to obtain
early design verifications on the following items:
1. The structural integrity of the cold-end-supported graphite modules.
2. Fuel element integrity.
5. Beryllium reflector and control vane system.
4. Graphite reflector system and pyrographite core insulation.
5. Regeneratively-cooled nozzle.
6. Closed-loop reactor control on measured exit gas temperature.
7. Core power and flow balancing.
In order to save several months in facility availability, it was decided to test
Kiwi-B-1Awith gaseous hydrogen rather than liquid hydrogen as originally planned,
even though the reactor and nozzle had been designed for liquid hydrogen operation.
Design studies indicated that the gaseous-cooled nozzle would perform adequately,
but that the full-power level _ould have to be reduced framthe design value
of ll20 MW due to flow limitations arising both from flow choking in the nozzle
coolant tubes and a limited test facility gas storage capacity.
The full-power test was originally scheduled for November 7, but was post-
poned after an unfortunate series of events during pre-test operations culminated
in a hydrogen explosion within the shed covering the reactor. A subsequent
reactor inspection revealed only minor damage to the core itself so after suit-
able repairs to the shed, the full-power run was again attempted on December E.
Soon after starting the full-power run, it was discovered that the majority of
the core thermocouples were reversed, and in addition, the neutronic behavior of
the reactor was in question. Therefore, the reactor was scrammed and the full-
power run rescheduled for the next day.
The Kiwi-B-1A Full-Power Run
After the initial full power run conditions of 8 KW and a hydrogen flow rate
of 1.7 lbs/second had been established, the reactor power was slowly increased to
l0 },_ in such a way as to increase the exit gas temperature at 25°R per second.
With the low flow rate, this allo_d the core to thermally expand against the
core sleeve assembly, the integrity of which was in question as a result of the
previous hydrogen explosion, particularly under large flow-induced pressure
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differentials. Figures 3 and 4 on the following page show several of the major
test parsmeters as measured during the Kiwi-B-1A full-power run. Soon after
reaching the lO0-second low-power hold, an error in demanded flow rate (specified
flow rate was 2 lbs/second) in ccmbination with the aforementioned neutronic
power calibration error caused the temperature loop to reduce the power to 5 MW
for the remainder of the hold. During the rise to the interT_ediate po_r hold
of 165 _£W and 15.9 lbs/second, one of the three exit gas temperature thermocouple
channels became excessively noisy. Since the average of these three channels
was used as an additional input to the power controller, the perturbation resul-
ting from this noisy channel effected the control drum position demand signal,
causing large control drum oscillations. An automatic rejection system had been
specifically designed in anticipation of such a problem, but before the noise
level of this thermocouple had increased enough to trip the reject circuitry,
the temperature loop was opened to prevent further control drum oscillations and
the resulting large power variations. From this point in the run, exit gas
temperature became a dependent variable, being determined by the correctly-
programmed flow rate and the pre-determined power profile, the latter being
dependent on the 15 percent high neutronic power calibration in the absence of
an overriding exit gas temperature feedback signal.
Following the 60-second intermediate-p_er hold, the power and flow rate
were again increased to the full-power hold values of 225 I_ and 20 lbs/second.
The majority of the hydrogen fires first observed just prior to reaching this
hold apparently resulted from h_Irogen leaks at several circumferential locations
around the nozzle flange area. These hydrogen leaks appear to have resulted
from the combined effect of the differential-pressure-induced flexure of the
pressure vessel at full flow, and the inability of the soft altnninum o-ring to
seal the resulting gap between the nozzle and the pressure vessel. _nty-four
seconds after the full-power hold had been established, the reactor was shut
down and flow switched to helium because of concern about the potential dangers
of these hydrogen fires.
The average measured core exit gas temperature during the full-power hold
was 3550°R, showing excellent agreement with the post-run cc_puted value of
3530°R. The average computed hydrogen mass flow rate was 20 lbs/second, exactly
as specified. On the basis of a reactor coolant heat balance, the average thermal
power level during the full-power hold was 225 _,G_,only slightly greater than
the post-run radiochemically-corrected neutronic power level of 220 _ (the best
agreement ever obtained for a Kiwi reactor test). An essentially independent
series of radiochemical power determinations produced an additional average full-
power value of 225 _FW. The ideal specific impulse during the full-power hold
was 761 seconds as cQmpared to a non-ideal value of 606 seconds, calculated on
the basis of existing site conditions and using experimental data.
Core Temperature Distributions
The Kiwi-B-1A core was instrumented with approximately 280 thermocouples
located at three axial stations: 8, 20 and 32 inches from the inlet end of the
core. These thermocouples were not located in the fuel elements themselves but
rather in the graphite modules. In addition, approximately 1000 thermal capsules
were placed in longitudinal holes in the last 14inches (exit end of thecore)
of selected modules. Post-run analysis of the reduced thermocouple data in-
dicates that the core radial temperature distributions at the three above-men-
tioned axial stations were essentially uniform during the approximately steady-
state operation at the intermediate- and full-power holds. Figure 5 is a plot
of the core radial temperature profiles during the full-power hold.
H_ever, two separate and distinct t_es of temperature irregularities were
observed at or near the edge of the core. The first, and as yet unexplained
temperature irregularity, existed near the edge of the core as measured by the
station 8 thermocouples. In order to better understand the anomalous behavior
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at station 8, the temperature distributions near the outer edge of the core are
shown in considerable detail in Figure 6. In this figure, radial temperature
profiles for each of the three core stations over a small angular band of less
than 5 degrees, are shown at a time during the full-power hold. As can be seen,
large temperature gradients ranging up to 400°R existed across several outer
modules in an azimuthal direction. However, those large temperature gradients
did not exist at either station 20 or station 32.
Bypass coolant flow at two nearby azimuthal locations between the core and
the core sleeve assembly became pronounced during the rise to the intermediate-
power hold, and persisted during the remainder of the full-power run. The exis-
tance of this bypass flow was verified, both by peripheral core thermocouple
data at station 32 as sho_m in Figure 7, and by post-run core and core sleeve
assembly visual inspection. During the rise to the intermediate-power hold,
the hydrogen flow rate increased fr_n 1.7 lbs/second to 15.9 lbs/second, with a
resultant increase in the core pressure drop as shown in Figure 4. As the core
pressure drop increased, so did the pressure difference between the outside and
inside of the core sleeve assembly, tending to c_npress the core sleeve around
the core. Because of restraints, perhaps caused by pyrographite tiles that had
been dislodged and overlapped as a result of the hydrogen explosion mentioned
earlier, the core sleeve assembly did not shrink uniformly around the core.
Consequently, the b_s_ass flow between the core and the core sleeve assembly
preferentially channeled up a small portion of the core periphery, cooling this
region of the core surface more markedly than the rest.
Axial temperature profiles at the center of the core were obtained for both
the intermediate and full-pc_er holds frc_ core instrumentation at stations 8,
20, and 32 supplemented by thermal capsule te_rperature data beyond station 32
for the full-power hold. These data for the first time afforded a check on the
model assumptions as well as the flow and heat transfer relationships incorpora-
ted in a LASL steady-state digital code. This code was used prior to core
assembly to determine fuel element locations and flow orificing to produce an
approximately uniform radial temperature distribution, as well as supplying axial
and radial temperature distribution predictions for the full-power run. Since
the test conditions _re not achieved, the experimentally measured average mass
flow rate, core pressure drop and coolant temperature rise for the intermediate
and full-power holds were used as code inputs. The resulting computed axial
temperature profiles show remarkable agreement with the experimentally determined
profiles, providing a substantial verification of the analytical model. _ne
cc_puted profiles (solid and dashed lines) and the measured core axial tempera-
tures are compared in Figure 8.
Kiwi-B-1A Post-Run Condition
The niobium-carbide-coated Kiwi-B-1A fuel elements all survived the full-
power zun with no blistering or other apparent damage except for one isolated
pair which were found on post-run examination to have plugged center coolant
passages. The anc_alous behavior of these two fuel elements has been only
partially explained, though it is evident that these two elements operated at
a considerably higher temperature than neighboring fuel elements.
During post-run visual exsmination of the graphite core modules, all of
which had experienced differential-pressure-in&_ced tensile stresses during the
full-power run, two large transverse cracks were discovered, one on each of two
peripheral modules. In each case, the transverse crack extended almost half way
around the module and _as centered on the outermost module face (at the edge of
the core). Axially, these two cracks were located at approximately station 41,
corresponding to the hottest portion of the core during the full-power hold.
Azimuthally, these two cracked peripheral modules were located on either side
of the point of maximum bypass flow during the full-po_er hold and as a result,
I
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exhibited quite large radial temperature gradients in excess of IO00°R. Figure
9 shows the transient temperature behavior of a peripheral module with coolant
bypass flow. The upper curve shows the temperature behavior of the inner sur-
face of this module. Two additional peripheral modules were found with large
transverse cracks by post-run radiography. These two modules were located in
the region of a smaller bypass flow. It has been concluded that these four
modules were cracked by thermal stress due to the large radial temperature
gradients -which were the direct result of b_ass flow.
Of all the reactor cc_ponents, the core sleeve assembly sustained the most
dsmage. Post-run examination of the sleeve showed manor permanent longitudinal
_rinkles in the stainless steel wrapper. In addition, evidence of overheating
of this wrapper was found near the core er_t end. The intermediate graphite
section was very badly cracked to the extent that large pieces were c_npletely
severed. Approximately 50 pyrographite tiles which had been glued to the inner
surface of the graphite to provide core thermal insulation _re loose and about
l0 tiles had been dislodged and were out of their proper locations during the
run. It appears that the non-uniform circumferential shrinkage and wrinkling
of the core sleeve assembly along with local restraint due to dislodged pyro-
graphite tiles was responsible for the observed bypass flo_.
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KIWI-B-IA TEMPERATURE-REACTIVITY EFFECTS* H_#
- j
H. B. Demuth, C. E. Stiles and J. E. Perry, Jr.
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
I. INTRODUCTION
The nuclear propulsion reactor Kiwi-B-iA exhibited peculiar temperature-
reactivity variations during its final runs in Nevada. An analysis of the un-
usual effects was made by reconstructing the runs on an analog computer model
of the reactor system. The Nevada data on reactor power, hydrogen flow rate,
control rod positions, and exit gas temperature were used as input data and
the analog model was used to decompose reactivity into its various separable
components.
This paper reviews the reactor phenomena, the methods of the investigation, and
its results.
II. EXPERIMENTAL PHENOMENA
Various anamolous static and dynamic reactivity phenomena were observed in
Kiwi-B-IA. When it was first assembled at Los Alamos, cold delayed critical
operation was observed with the control rods extracted $6.60. Upon reassembly
at the Nevada Test Site, the reactor had gained about 80¢ in reactivity. It
was conjectured that the core components were more closely packed, or that the
fuel elements had adsorbed hydrogen as products of hydrolysis of U_.
In the first low-power runs, when the core temperature rose only about i00 ° F,
abnormally large control rod motions were required to overcome an apparently
large negative temperature coefficient. Temperature data were meager, so that
no definite conclusions could be reached.
In Experimental Plan 6, the first attempt at a full-power run, the control rods
moved out about $I more than had been expected in raising the exit gas tempera-
ture from ambient to 2000 ° R. This unanticipated rod motion led to aborting
the run. Subsequent cold critical operation showed that the reactor lost about
$1.70 of reactivity. In the post-mortem, it was decided that if things got no
worse, it probably would be possible to achieve design power and temperature.
In the final full-power run, Experimental Plan 6A, design conditions were near-
ly reached. The exit gas temperature was 3550 ° R instead of the 4100 ° R de-
sired, due to an error in neutronic power measurement. The control rods were
98.5% retracted, but otherwise had shown no untoward behavior. A subsequent
cold critical check showed a nominal loss of i0¢ of reactivity during the run.
* Work performed under AEC Contract W-7405-ENG. 36.
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III. TEM_ERATU RE- REACT IVITY INVESTIGATION
Because of the unusual reactivity effects noted above, it was decided to try to
unscramble thermal reactivity effects during Experimental Plans 6 and 6A. This
study would serve the dual purpose of possibly explaining the temperature ef-
fects and checking the validity of the analog computer model used prior to the
run for the design of automatic control loops and power-flow-temperature
profiles I .
In the reactivity study, the following equation was used:
5k TKMP = 5k EXCESS - 5k RODS - 5k SHUTDOWN - 5k He (Eq.1)
Here 5k EXCESS is the reactivity required to produce the power profile observed
during the run. It is the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is super-
critical at any time. The 5k RODS is the positive reactivity given to the re-
actor as the rods are withdrawn. It is defined to be $0 when the rods are
fully inserted. The 5k SHUTDOWN is the rod worth extracted to achieve cold
delayed critical operation at 40 kw in Experimental Plan 6. In all of what
follows,
5k SHUTDOWN = $5.70.
The 5k _ is the positive reactivity of the hydrogen coolant gas in the reactor.
Finally, 5k TEMP, the quantity calculated in Eq. i, is the reactivity presumed
to be due to all effects caused by changes in core temperature.
Several temperature effects are possible: (I) core thermal expansion; (2)
changes in neutron interaction cross sections; and (3) loss of adsorbed hydro-
gen from the core. From the outset it was clear that if two or more of the
phenomena occurred simultaneously, it might not be possible to resolve their
effects. However, it was felt that comparison of 5k TEMP with other quantities
measured during the run might produce useful insight into reactor behavior.
The various components of Eq. i were obtained as functions of time during the
runs in the following ways:
A. 5k EXCESS
The measured power profiles were fed as a demand into a closed reactor
power loop which included the reactor neutron kinetic equations. The ana-
log computer then calculated that variation of reactivity required to pro-
duce the observed power profiles.
B. 5k RODS
Control rod positions were recorded during the experimental runs; and the
rod reactivity was computed from the position data and from pre_run rod
worth calibrations performed by LASL Group N-2.
C. 5k SHUTDOWN
As noted previously, this was determined directly in Experimental Plan 6.
V.
This component was the smallest (maximum of 35¢), but involved the most de-
tailed calculations. The observed profiles of power and hydrogen flow were
fed into the analog computer, and slight adjustments made in power until
t _,
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the observed experimental core and outlet gas temperatur_ profiles were pro-
duced. Hydrogen density was calculated from average core temperature and
gas pressures. The total hydrogen in the core was multiplied by reactivity
weighting functions to yield hydrogen reactivity.
Certain facts should be noted before giving the results of the study. The
5k EXCESS, as calculated here, agreed to within a few cents with that derived by
two independent methods, one digital and one analog, used by T. E. Springer and
J. D. Balcomb, respectively. The slight adjustments in power profile mentioned
above did not influence 5k EXCESS by more than about 2¢. Some small errors in
the core heat transfer model were discovered during the study. When these were
corrected, calculated core temperatures, both transient and steady state, agreed
quite closely with thermocouple readings recorded during the runs, and with
other values calculated digitall_. Average core temperatur_ for Experimental
Plans 6 and 6A were computed from the calculated temperature of the individual
core segments in the analog model, and from their known masses. The average
core temperature has an estimated standard error of 5% of the temperature rise
above ambient. The quantity 5k TEMP is derived through a multiple subtraction
process; and it has an estimated standard error of about 20¢. It was possible
to register curves to within _ 2 sec in time before performing the calculations
required to obtain 5k TEMP.
IV. RESULTS
The results of the study are given in Figs. i, 2, and 3.
Figure I shows profiles of power, flo_ exit gas temperature, average core tem-
perature, and the various reactivity components for Experimental Plan 6. The
large discrepancy between a linear temperature reactivity, calculated from a
constant -65¢/i000 ° R,* and the actual temperature reactivity obtained in this
study is especially interesting. Note also the permanent loss of about $1.70
during the run.
Similar data for the final power run (Experimental Plan 6A) are presented in
Fig. 2. The violent rod position and power fluctuations just after 8700 sec
occurred when an exit gas thermocouple became noisy and gave poor feedback sig-
nals to the exit gas temperature control system. It is apparent from the fig-
ure that 5k TEMP was relatively linear in Experimental Plan 6A. The smoothness
of the 5k TEMP curve indicates that the various profiles must have been regis-
tered in time to about +i sec. Prior to Experimental Plans 6 and 6A, a tempera-
m
ture coefficient of (-50¢ _ 25¢)/1000 ° R was used in the analog computations.
The value (-65¢ _ i0¢)/I000 ° R derived from Experimental Plan 6A data is within
the anticipated range.
In Fig. 3, 5k TEMP is plotted versus average core temperature for both experi-
mental runs. Here, the over-all temperature-reactivity behavior of the core is
shown directly. The progress of time during runs is indicated by arrow-heads.
It is believed that the sharp variations in Fig. 3 are not caused by displace-
ment in time of the various profiles. Possible explanations for these varia-
tions are being investigated a .
V. DISCUSSION
Several temperature effects appear to have contributed to the complex pattern
shown in Fig. 3.
* All temperature-reactivities refer to reactivity changes due to changes in
average core temperature.
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The $1.70 los_ between the beginning and end of Plan 6 (points A and F) is
attributed largely to the loss of hydrogen adsorbed in the reactor fuel_ but
may be due in part to irreversible deformation of the core structure. Subse-
quent experiments** have shown that water vapor is adsorbed by uranium-graphite
fuel, the amount of water being dependent on the humidity of the atmosphere in
which the fuel is stored and the length of storage. Quantitative analyses have
shown the presence of enough hydrogen in typical cases to create a reactivity
of the order of $i to $2. In the adsorption process UCe hydrolyzes to form U_
plus hydrocarbons. Additional controlled heating experiments have indicated
that the temperature-time history of Plan 6 was sufficient to drive off essen-
tially all of the hydrocarbons. Indeed, no further significant loss was noted
in Plan 6A.
A recent attempt has been made to calculate the loss of reactivity caused by
core expansion and the change of neutron cross sections with temperature in an
S
unpoisoned Kiwi-B-i reactor . The result is a larger average coefficient
(-[$i.0 _ $0.2]/I000 ° R) than that found in Plan 6A. The calculated curve is
essentially linear, whereas the trend observed in Plan 6A between points F and
J of Fig. 3 is generally concave downward. The presence of control drum ab-
sorber materials in the reflector may mean that the reactivity-temperature curve
will be a function of control drum angle, an effect which may be investigated in
the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the fact that it was not possible to separate the effects of core de-
formation from those of adsorbed hydrogen in Experimental Plan 6, and despite
the fact that it is not now possible to explain all the detailed meanderings
in Fig. 3, the general technique of decomposing reactivity into its separable
components has provided considerable insight into the operation of Kiwi-B-iA.
It is planned to use similar analog computation techniques to study reactivity
variations during the actual operation of future Kiwi-B reactors. In these
reactors the use of liquid hydrogen will give rise to a large propellant re-
activity. With this added complication direct interpretation of the reactivity
decomposition results will become more difficult, but understanding of the runs
will be virtually impossible without such a decomposition. It is hoped that
an "on-line" reactivity computer will provide on-the-spot diagnostic information
in the case of aborted runs or nuclear excursions.
/
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POSTSCRIPT
Kiwi-B-iB, the first liquid-hydrogen-cooled reactor, was operated successfully
on September i, 1962. Design hydrogen flow of 65 _ 5 Ib/sec was achieved for
some 75 seconds, and a reactor power of about 950 MW was held briefly, l_ss
of some core material forced the control rods to go fully out, after which
power decreased and the reactor operated quite smoothly on a balance between
hydrogen and temperature reactivities. Despite careful attempts to keep moist
air away from the fuel elements, there appears to have been about $I of ad-
sorbed hydrogen which was driven off during the run. A reactivity decomposition
of the general type discussed in this paper is in progress, and is indeed pro-
viding much insight into the reactor operation. The "on-line" reactivity com-
puter malfunctioned during part of the run (operational amplifiers were tempor-
arily overloaded), but provided very interesting on-the-spot information during
the rest of the run.
t
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KIWI-A PRIME DISASSEMBLY
Donald B. Anderson Everett B. Ramsey
Charles D. Montgomery Marvin N. Swlnk
I NTRODUCTION
The KIWI-A Prime Nuclear Propulsion Reactor was the second engine in the Rover Program
to be tested at Jackass Flats, Nevada. This engine was tested on July 8, 1960, and dis-
assembly operations began on July 9, 1960. It was the first engine of the series to be dis-
assembled entirely by remote methods. The assembly and disassembly of this reactor was
performed by ACF for Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The over-all post-mortem require-
ments were supplied by the LASL reactor design groups and details of accomplishment were
worked out with ACF.
Remote disassembly operations consisted of the following basic steps:
1. Recovery of the test car from the test cell.
2. Removal of the reactor from the test car.
3. Exposure of the core.
4. Disassembly of the core into its component parts.
5. Extraction of fuel elements.
6. Post-mortem examination.
The disassembly area of the Rover Program Maintenance, Assembly & Disassembly (MAD)
Building, is divided into two (2) maior sections composedof the upper bay and the lower bay
with a separate hot cell section for post-mortem operations. However, portions of the post-
mortem operations were performed in the upper bay. The lower bay was equipped with two
(2) General Mills Model-300 slde wall manipulators. Both the upper bay and the lower bay
were served by a General Mills Model 700 overhead manipulator (O'Man) and a P & H 25-
Ton crane with one (1) 5-Ton auxiliary hook. The upper bay contained two (2) pairs of mas-
ter-slave manipulators. The hot cell area was served by a General Mills Model-300 over-
head manipulator, a 2-Ton hoist and three (3) pairs of CRL Model-8 manipulators. TV equip-
ment and binoculars were used as an aid in distant viewing.
C. D. Montgomery, Manager, MAD Building Operations, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
Los Alamos, N. M.
D. B. Anderson, Project Engineer, ACF Industries, Inc., Albuquerque, N. M.
E. B. Ramsey, Senior Project Engineer, ACF Industries, Inc., Albuquerque, N. M.
M. N. Swink, Project Engineer, ACF Industries, Inc., Albuquerque, N. M.
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RECOVERY OF ,IHI_TEST CAR FROM THE TEST CELL
The recovery of the test car from the test cell was initiated within twenty-four (24) hours
after reactor shutdown. Technicians manually disconnected the control rod hydraulic lines
in the test cell with sixty-flve inches (65") of concrete protecting them from the highly ra-
dioactive engine. Remote operation began with the automatic positioning of the radio con-
trolled locomotive. The locomotive was positioned so that when the test car was jacked
away from the test cell, the two (2) would be coupled automatically.
After the locomotive was in place, the instrumentation plug of the test cell was remotely
disconnected from the plug of the test car. Complete disconnect of the instrumentation plug
was indicated bya light at the control point. At this time, the controls for the test cell jacks
were actuated and the test car was moved away from the test cell to the locomotive. After
the coupling of the test car to the locomotive and the jack was fully extended, the locomo-
tive was started towards the MAD Building. The trip from the test cell to the MAD Building
required approximately ninety (90) minutes.
REMOVAL OF THE REACTOR FROM THE TEST CAR
The test car was brought into the disassembly bay of the MAD Building by the locomotive,
stopped automatically, and operations were started for transfer of the reactor from the test
car.
The top of the core was viewed through the nozzle opening using television cameras, since
it was suspected that three (3) modules with elements were lost during full power operation
of the reactor. It was found that three (3) modu les appeared to be missing. Durlng the view-
ing of the core, radiatlon effects samples were removed from the test car and reactor using
the side wall manipulator.
Removal of the reactor from the test car required the prior removal or dlsconnectionof instru-
mentatlon, coolant piping, deuterlum piping, propellant piplng and tie down lugs and clamps.
The main coolant, deuterium and propellant piping has specially designed flanges and clamps
so that the joints could be separated without the use of special equipment. Instrumentation,
stainless steel tubing and stainless steel flex hose were severed from the reactor using a re-
motely controlled heating torch.
The first problem of the operation was encountered when installatlon'of the reactor lift bail
was attempted. It was discovered that a section of pipe which had been changed at the last
minute prior to the power run, interfered with the instal latlon of the reactor lift bail. A
heating torch was used to melt away enough pipe to allow the lift bail to be installed using
the 25-Ton crane with assistance from the O'Man. A ten foot (10') lift was required to clear
all obstacles on the test car. The reactor was transferred to the disassembly stand and was
locked in place with tie down lugs, using the side wall manipulator and an impact wrench.
EXPOSURE OF THE CORE
The exposure of the core consisted of the removal of the center island, the nozzle - exit
plenum liner - inlet section package, the clamp ring, and half of the reflector segments.
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The bolts attaching the center island jacket to the pressure shell were removed using a 200-
foot-pound electric impact wrench held by the O'Man. With the bolts removed, the reactor
and upper partofthe disassembly stand were withdrawn from the center island. This package
was placed on the bay floor while visual inspections were made of the charred thermal paint
protecting the center island.
The reactor was reposltioned on the turntable. The four (4) clamp rings holding the pressure
vessel halves together were removed after the attaching bolts were severed in two (2) Ioca-
tions with a cutting torch positioned by a manipulator.
Ma_y piecesof instrumentation had to be severed with an oxy-acetylene heating torch before
the pressure vessel halves could be separated. When all connections had been severed, the
disassembly continued with the installation of the reactor llft bail. At this time, the fixture
was used for removal of the nozzle package. The nozzle package was raised slowly. After
about two feet (2') of movement, the package was suspended in this position while several
additional pieces of instrumentation within the reactor were severed.
Disassembly operatlons continued with the removal of the reflector segments. Each reflector
segment was removed by a fixture containing two (2) expanding screws. After removal, each
reflector was placed on the flat car for transfer to the dump.
After removal of the first two (2) rows of reflector segments, the reflector cylinder surround-
ing the core could be removed. The cylinder was raised slowly off of the core to permit dif-
ferent length thermocouple leads to strip easily from the I.D. and O.D. With the reflector
cylinder removed, the next step in the disassembly procedure was removal of the entire core.
The core was raised very cautiously to permit over eighty (80) thermocouples to strip from
their locations. This stripping was required as all thermocouples exited the pressure vessel
via pass-thrus located in the bottom of the pressure vessel and which were completely inac-
cessible.
After the core was withdrawn from the pressure vessel, numerous pictures were taken oflts
outside diameter. Imprints of carbon wool insulation (contained between the core O.D. and
the reflector cylinder) and bypass gas flow were evident. The core was then inserted into
the trunnion fixture.
The corewas positioned in the trunnion fixture and the core handling fixture was withdrawn.
Several attempts to install the can cover over the top of the core proved unsuccessful. It
was determined that there was one-quarter inch (1/4") interference between the core I.D.
and the can cover. This oversight caused four and one-half (4-1/2) hours delay in disassem-
bly while modifications were made. The cover was removed from the bay, decontaminated
and one-quarter inch (1/4") of stock was removed. The cover was easily instal led after mod-
ification and was secured in place. The trunnion fixture was rotated 180 ° and the cover,
now visible on top, was removed.
CORE DISASSEMBLY
The core disassembly consisted of the removal of the support tube nuts and the inlet reflec-
tor; the extraction of the loaded modules and the subsequent transfer of the modules to the
upper disassembly bay for ejection of fuel elements.
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Prior to removal of the inlet reflector, one hundred and twenty-six (126) each support tube
nuts, washers, springs and spring covers had to be removed from the support tubes which pro-
jected from the inlet reflector. The nuts were removed from the support tubes using a side
wall manipulator equipped with a special, electrically powered, nut removal tool. All but
four (4) nuts were unscrewed with this tool. These nuts appeared to be jammed in place. The
inlet reflector removal tool was attached to the inlet reflector by means of three (3) expand-
ing llft screws similar to those used on the reflector segment removal tool. The inlet reflec-
tor was then lifted two inches (2") and spacers were inserted between the modules and inlet
reflector. The offending nuts raisedthe modules attached to them. The fixture was removed
and the support tubes were unscrewed from the modules using a conventional socket with the
electric impact wrench. The freed modules slid back into place. The fixture was again at-
tached to the inlet reflector and the part was removed and placed on the flat car.
With the removal of the inlet reflector accomplished, the extraction of modules began. The
modules were pulled from the can of the trunnion fixture, one (1) at a time, utilizing the
support tubes which were gripped bythe manipulator. As each module was pulled, it was re-
placed by a dummy module made of wood. These dummy modules were installed to maintain
the physical integrity of the core. Each module, as it was extracted, received a prelimi-
nary visual inspection for excessive erosion, discoloration and cracking. When the module
viewing was completed, it was placed in a handling storage container.
The first three (3) modules removed were portions of those broken during the full power op-
eration. These modules were placed in a special transfer contalnerand taken to the hot cells
for immediate examination and photography. All modules which contained radiation samples
and radlochemical thermometers (RCT's) were then extracted and transferred to the upper bay
for element ejection. Rapid recovery of these samples was imperative due to the decay of
the radioactive isotopes contained within the samples which were to be used in the radio-
chemical analysis. The remaining modules were removed in a predetermined sequence and
transferred to the upper bay for fuel element removal.
EXTRACTION OF FUEL ELEMENTS
As modules were transferred from the lower disassembly bay, the extraction of the fuel ele-
ments commenced. Approximately four thousand (4000) fuel elements were extracted and
either packaged for storage or sent to the hot cell area for post-mortem examination.
The module transfer containers were placed in an inclined rack in front of one of the view-
ing windows in the upper disassembly bay. The master-slave manipulators, with special de-
signed hands, were used to remove the modules from the containers and place them in the
fuel element ejector.
The element ejector was an automatic, remote control led, turret type tool, for ejecting the
elements from the modules. The position of the turret of the ejector was determined by the
number of holes contained in the module.
After clamping the module in place, the turret was positioned and the push rods of the ejec-
tor matching the hole pattern of the module were actuated. It was necessary to stop the push
rods at different positions to allow the manipulator operator to remove the ejected elements
and place them in a rack for transfer to another viewing window. As each element was han-
dled, the serial number of the element was read and recorded.
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Upon completion of the ejection of elements from the module, the elements were either
transferred to storage containers or sent to the hot cell area and the module was replaced
in its container. Certain modules, containing RCT's, were transferred to a remotely operated
saw for post-mortem operations.
/
POST-MORTEM
The post-mortem effort on KIWI-A Prime was quite lengthy and, in fact, investigations of
certain components are continuing to this date. Discussion of the po_t-mortem operations
is separated in two (2) sections. The first will be modules, and the second, elements.
Certain modules in the core contained RCT's, which had to be removed by sectioning the
modules. A specially designed, remotely operated saw was used to make a transverse cut
across the module which produced a wafer. The wafer was positioned on the table of a mod-
ified drill press. A master-slave manipulator advanced a rotating end mill into the wafer
and stopped just shortof the RCT. The RCT was thenshaken from thewafer. The RCT'swere
retrieved as soon as possible in the disassembly sequence and sent immediately to LASL for
radlochemical analysis.
In addition to radiographic analysis of modules, many of the modules were sawed axially to
expose the inner surfaces of the element holes. These exposed surfaces were inspected for
indications of bypass gas flow and structural failures.
A few modules were weighed on a Metrogram balance for a pre-and post-operation compar-
ison. This operation was discontinued after no trend in weight change appeared. Three (3)
photographs were taken of each module, which were later correlated with the module visual
inspection maps. These maps describe any cracks, punky porous regions, pits, etc., observed.
An important post-mortem investigation performed on the fuel elements was gamma counting.
Information obtained was used to confirm core design parameters and to determine power
output.
Each element received a cursory visual inspection of gas passage holes and outside diame-
ters, and a portion of the elements were weighed to determine welght losses. Many elements
were cut longitudinally to expose gas passage holes to permit more detailed examinations.
Numerous thermal capsules, which were small graphite capsules containing alloyed metals
of different melting points, were removed from elements. The capsules were then crushed to
reveal the condition of the contents.
Post-mortem investigations were not limited to core components. Many investigations were
also performed on the nozzle, pressure vessel components, reflectors, graphite components
and radiation effects samples.
CONCLUSIONS
Many things were learned from this operation and noted in detail for future reference and
action during operations meetings. A few of the more general benefits noted for future prog-
ress were:
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More reliable information is now available to provide a
meaningful time study of operations, although a new ap-
preciatlon for additional contingency time was realized.
The additional operational history allowed upgrading of
routine maintenance schedules as more was learned about
the manipulators and other equipment.
Theuse of several simple devices, such as extension han-
dles on flange disconnect bolts, to expedite the remote
disassembly, could be incorporated advantageously in
future reactors and test car assemblies.
The necessity of having all remote tooling and fixtures
on hand well in advance of their planned use, in order
to allow a detailed operational checkout was noted as
imperative.
Looking back in retrospect after disassembly and post-mortem of subsequent reactors, it can
be stated that this was a successful operation and much was learned which was very impor-
tant to the design of reactors to follow KIWI-A Prime, as well as to the remote disassembly
of them.
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DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS IN TRE DEVEIXPYLENT F._-_.B
OF THE LIQUID HYDROGEN FEEDSYSTEM FOR KIWI-B*
R. J. Bohl,+ E. A. Bro,_n, C. P. Milich, and M. J. Nutter
Ur_iversity of California
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Los Alamos, New Mexico
INTR____ODU_CTION
Kiwi-B-13, which w_s tested in August cf this year, was the first of a series of
Rover and Nerva nuclear propulsion reactors to be cooled by !!cuid hydrogen.
One of the major efforte leading to these tests was the development of a high-
performance liquid hydrogen feedsystem capable of delivering 70 Ibs/sec flow
rate at a pressure of approximately 850 psi. The feedsystem dynamic character-
istics and its operation with the remaining Xiwi-B control systems have been
described briefl_. The purpose of this paper is to present a more complete
description of the feedsystem, the differential equations, the turbopump speed
control system, and the specific speed control system.
The basic elements of the liquid hydrogen feedsystem are a Rocketdyne Mark IX
pump driven by a Mark III turbine. The turbine is powered by ambient-tempera-
ture hydrogen gas which is stored in a tank farm. The turbopump speed is varied
by positioning a throttle valve in the pipe between the tank farm and the tur-
bine inlet nozzle. The valve has a linear relationship between stem position
and effective area.
A block diagram of the feedsystem is shown in Fig. I. It contains three closed
servo loops which control turbopump speed, mass flow rate to the reactor, and
specific speed. Reactor flow rate is measured with a venturi located a few feet
down stream of the pump in the pipe leading to the reactor. This measured flow
rate is compared to the demanded flow rate. The error voltage thus developed
is operated upon by the flow rate controller, which changes the turbopump speed
to bring the measured flow rate into correspondence with the demanded flow rate.
The turbopump speed control system normally operates as a sub-loop in the flow
rate control loop. It regulates speed to the value demanded by the flow rate
controller by varying the position of the turbine throttle valve. The specific
speed control system is an auxiliary safety system which protects the turbopump.
If a flow blockage occurs in the main reactor flow pipe, the liquid hydrogen by-
pass valve is opened. This vents liquid hydrogen from the pump to the atmos-
phere, thus preventing the pump from stalling.
The reactor is some i00 feet down stream of the venturi which is used to measure
reactor flow rate. Since flow rate is controlled at the venturi, the reactor
* _;ork performed under AEC Contract W-7405-ENG. 36.
+ Part of the work discussed herein was done by one of the
authors (Bohi) et !Lockctdyne, A Division cf North American
Aviation, Inc., Canoga Park, California.
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flow rate is not actually controlled in the dynamic sense. An additional effect
of the pipe is that it causes a frequency dependent gain and phase change be-
tween pump flow rate and discharge pressure. The pipe line dynamics are in-
cluded in the digital and analog simulations of the system; however, they are
not treated in this p_er.
FEEDSY_EM DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
The differential equations which describe the feedsystem are given below. The
symbols are identified in Fig. i. Assuming choked flow through the turbine
throttle valve and the inlet nozzle and a negligible time delay due to gas
compressibility in Me volume between them, one obtains the following relations:
c_t
Atv -
g Ps
Atv = _Xtv
Pti
= gAt n
dN 30
dt - _ (Lt - _)
L t = Wt(2050 - 0.0185N)
= -5.41(I0)_N _ + 5.61(IO)-_NWp - 10.33Wp 2
Ppe = "l'01(10)'SNe + 2"63(10)'SNWp " 0"591Wp 2 + Ppi.
Assuming infinite pipe line bandwidth and a square law reactor load, then
Pri = Ppe " RdWr e,
Wp = Wr + Wbp,
Wr =Wv, and
Prl=
Pump specific speed, which is a measure of the location of the pump operating
point on the pump map, is defined as
Ns =__ 0.75N/_D
- (Ppe" Ppi)_ •
TURBOPUMP SPEED CONTROL
(1)
During the normal course of a reactor startup, the speed control system is
called upon to regulate speed from approximately 1,000 to 24,000 rpm. The most
critical region relative to starting a reactor on liquid hydrogen is generally
above 6,000 rpm. For this reason it is desirable to have a speed control system
which has reasonably constant dynamic characteristics above 6,000 rpm. For-
tunately, the turbine inlet nozzle has choked flow above something like 4,000 to
5,000 rpm; therefore, this assumption was made in all of the system analysis
work. Cold flow experiments were performed to make sure that the system would
operate in a stable manner while traversing the region from 1,000 to 6,000 rpm.
s
>
292
The turbopump speed control system transfer functions for small perturbations
are given below.
_i 11(_+ 1)(_+ l) volts
_F_(s) s(_ + i)(1_0+ i) Volt
5Xtv(S)_ 1.5 in, . _ in_.__.
5_ (S) - lO0 volts %Xtv d in.
0.015 in____.
2(0.5)S + i) Volt(_+ I)(28_ + 282
_Wtv(S) 0.813(i0)_e p s ib/sec
5Xtv(S) = in.
If the pump operating point is kept on a constant specific speed line, pump
torque can be represented by Lp = _ rather than by equation (i). Assuming
that Lp = 2.03(i0)-s_, then
__ 2050 - 0.0185 N o
• + 1]5Wt(S) [4"06(I0)_N° + 0"0185Wt°][1.22(i0)-_i_ 0.555 Wto
(_ + i) •
Some representative values of _ are as follows:
8wt(1)
N
_wt(s)
2.3(lO)_
6,000
(_is+ I)
1.6
rpm
ib/sec
12,000
9.9(10) 4
(s + i)
3.5
23,500
4.3(10) 4
(s + 1)
7.2
The speed transducer transfer function is
___E(S) Volts
8N (S) = 3"33(i0)'a --rpm .
The open loop transfer function of the speed control system at 23,500 rpm with
Ps = 3300 psi is
ON(S) =
22(_+ 1)(_-_ + 1)
_ _ 2(o.5)s+ 1)s( +i)( +l)(_+l)(y_o +1)( + 282
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Nichols plots of the system characteristics for several speeds are shown in
Fig. 2. The closed loop bandwidth is approximately 7 cps. The gain and phase
margins are in the order of 12 db and 60 ° , respectively. As speed is decreased,
closed loop bandwidth increases a small amount and stability margin decreases
slightly.
SPECIFIC SPEED CONTROL
Care must be exercised in using a Mark IX liquid hydrogen pump to keep the pump
pressure rise and flow rate within certain limits. If the pressure rise is
allowed to get too high for a given flow rate, the pump goes into stall. This
occurs when the velocity vector of the fluid relative to the blades shifts
sufficiently to cause a sharp drop in pump pressure rise. Cavitation occurs
when the fluid static pressure gets below the vapor pressure. Stall generally
is more serious than cavitation because it can cause excessive turbopump speed
and vibration. The pump in use at the Nevada Test Site has been driven into
stall several times by momentary flow blockage in the pipe lines. This usually
occurred because of the formation of a gas bubble in a pipe which was not
thoroughly chilled before the turbopump was started.
/
!
The usable ranges of speed, turbine flow rate, pump flow rate, pump pressure
rise, pump torque, and specific speed are shown on the pump map in Fig. 3.
The specific speed at which stall and cavitation occur are approximately 750
and 1900, respectively.
The pump is prevented from going into stall by the specific speed control sys-
tem shown in Fig. i. This system senses when the pump specific speed falls be-
low a pre-set value. When this happens, the liquid hydrogen bypass valve is
opened, venting liquid hydrogen from the pump discharge to the atmosphere. The
bypass valve automatically opens such that the correct amount of hydrogen is by-
passed to increase the specific speed to the pre-set value. If the specific
speed is above the value set into the system, the bypass valve remains shut.
Specific speed is sensed in the control system by comparing pump flow rate to a
constant times speed. The pump flow rate is measured with a venturi located a
short distance from the pump in the pump suction line. As can be seen in Fig. 3,
both _-e - P"@/N_ and Wp/N are equal to constants when the pump is operating on
a constant s_ecific speed line. The relationship Wp/N was chosen as a measure
of specific speed rather than _pe - Pp_/he because the latter relationship is
double valued when the pump goes into stall. This phenomenon is shown in Fig. 4,
which is a plot of @pe - Pp_/Ne vs Wp/N for different operating levels. The
specific speed at which the control _ystem becomes active can be adjusted by
changing the value of the constant.
The transfer function of the specific speed controller is
__._(S) 2S ('i_ + i)
_F_(S) S(to--_-+ l) .
The characteristics of the bypass valve for small perturbations can be
approximated by
_x_D(s) =
SXbpd(S)
167 2(1.4)S(_ + l)( + 160 + i)
The transfer functions of the remaining elements of the specific speed loop are
heavily dependent upon the characteristics of the other feedsystem control sys-
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tems and upon which other feedsystem loops are closed; therefore, the equations
will not be listed in this paper. A representative Nichols plot of the specific
speed loop characteristics is shown in Fig. 5. These data were obtained _th
the speed and flow rate control loops closed.
CONCLUSIONS
A liquid hydrogen feedsystem has been developed which is capable of meeting the
cooling requirements of Kiwi-B and Nerva reactors. The flow rate and turbopump
speed control systems operated well during the Kiwi-B-IB hot run despite large
pipe line flow and pressure oscillations during most of the startup. The
oscillations are believed due to an interaction between the specific speed con-
trol system and sections of two pipe lines which were not cooled sufficiently
prior to starting the turbopump. The oscillations ceased as the pipes became
chilled.
i.
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FIGURE I
KIWI-B-IB PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
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